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SUMMARY AND CONCLUS TONS
the theories which were
other .
The Report. of this year, while extending Its scope to two
non EEC countries, Sweden and Austria, on one side
consolidates the diagnostic side of the analysis, on the other
one deals with a set of proposals, or, rather, a set. of
conditions which have to he fulfilled in order to attempt to
revert the present, unemployment, trends In our countries.
The surveys
The wain results and conclusions of the present general
Report can be summarized as follows.
(1) Youth unemployment is the apparent problem. The real one
is unemployment. The Inability to fully utilize available
labour resources is the result. of a deep crisis 1n the
mechanisms of regulation, allocation and distribution.
(2) Such mechanisms worked relatively well nnt.1l the early
seventies. Since then macro-economic policies ceased to be
effective. Expansive monetary stimuli started to produce
increasingly price effects rather than real effects; more
recently the possible breakdown 1n real and price effects of
expansive stimuli has become substantially difficult to
forsee. This amounts, 1n policy terms, to a loss of control of
our econom les.
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(3) Tnflation has become the main concern of our governments.
The Influence and leadership of the Ministries of Treasury 1n
each of the countries has become overwhelming. This produced a
reinforcement of the Influence of economic advisors 1n the
design of prevailing policies, and, thus, of the leading role
of 'mainstream' economic theory.
rate of gi
increasing unemployment. 	 w
real explanation of the changes which occurred in our
industrialized economies around 1970. Their microeconomie
foundations are completely deduct 1 ve ; s i nee they are based on
lief« η i Μ η 1 «» α η ri ltni^Vtanrrinrr hiinnf Ιιαοαη λ ** ηα«-<^.η<>14*-.> 4- Κ α ιτ οχ^
econometrie modelling, on the other one Is based on the fact,
that, the basic policy messages which are generated by such
theories substantially correspond to what the political sphere
1s willing and Interested to hear. A paradox like this is not.
new In recent history; It would be enough to re- read in such
a perspective two books of John Malnard Keynes: 'The economic
consequences of the peace' and the 'General theory'.
(5) We provide an interpretation of the changes which occurred
in our economies around the first half of the seventies. This
interpretation on one side explains the upsurge of stagflation
and the Increasing ineffectiveness of traditional economic
policies; hut it. suggests also some of the directions in which
to look for appropriate strategies to get out. from the present
crisis. However, to move in the directions that are suggested
hy our Report, requires a sharp change in the attitudes of
policy makers. Two distinct factors militate against the
likelihood of such a change: the first one 1s given by the
cognitive attitudes of most of the political forces and of the
mass-media from which the ipolicy makers derive their
strength, constituency and Influence.
Such cognitive attitudes are such that (a) Inflation is
considered the worst of the evi 1 ; (b) promoting at. any cost,
gains In the international competitiveness of the country is
considered the best, when not. the only, way to Increase
employment; (c) while everybody 1s ready to talk of the
complexity which has been reached by our society, none 1s
really ready to take it into account in the interpretation of
facts and in the structuring of appropriate policies.
The second negative factor is given hy the time
specification of the interests and the constraints which
affect the political sphere. The policies which are needed
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imply long run perspant.ive and a certain degree of intelligent
generosity. The average time length of the pol i ti ca 1 cycle is
usually not long enough to allow policies aimed at pursuing
relatively distant effects. On the other hand, the present
economic strains and the paranoiac trend to international
competitiveness are creating a climate, at the international
level, which Is favourable more to isolation than to an
upsurge of solidarity and cooperation, that. 1s, to what, is now
dramatically needed.
These considerations," together with those concerning the
Influence that economic theory is having upon policy makers,
explains why we consider the need of changing the prevailing
cultural attitudes as the main preliminary target, and why we
devote a good deal of attention on one side to the criticism
against, the orthodox economic way to look at the present
economic situation, and on the other one to the building up
of a different Interpretation of the major changes which have
determined, and contributed to maintain, the present,
situation.
(6) The present, situation can be summarized as follows. Our
economies are heavily Integrated.. This implies that, any action
undertaken 1n one of our countries manifest spill- over
effects in other Integrated countries. This would require in
Itself more consciousness of the existing Interdependence and
more coordination In the actions. Tn some sense, It is as if
we had become, at. least within EEC, almost a unitary system,
but. this system continues to be led by different governments.
However, this situation is made worse by the fact that all of
the governments substantially share the same culture ahout
policy making, and hy the fact. that. the content of this
culture is such that each one of the countries Is convinced
that, the only way for being 'better off' is to gain something
at the expenses of the others. Since each one of the countries
behaves in this very same way, relative positions remain the
same In the long run; all the gains are ephemeral; all of the
countries end up In heing worse off. Tn other words we are
facing a negative sum game.
Before the Seventies the situation was different. Not. only
were the economies less Integrated and interdependent, but
the economic policies of the different ioountrles were more
differentiated and, ahove all, their business cycles and
their counter-cyclical policies were less s 1 nchron 1 zed .
Moreover, such policies were on the main more expansive,
while each of the countries was on a path of building up an
Internal environment and climate of progressive social
policies and social solidarity.
The abandonment of fixed exchange rates and the need to
adjust, to the first and subsequent, oil shocks, dramatically
changed, In the early Seventies, this favourable environment.
Tn particular, the first. oil shock obliged, for the first
time, the different EEC countries to undertake restrictive
policies at the same time; given the Interdependence and the
lack of coordination, the restrictive policies independently
pursued by each country were made relatively Ineffective hy
the fact. that the same policies were adopted by competing
partners; this brought, to a reinforcement, of the restrictive
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policies themselves. This one was the first time in which the
countries ceased to . compete only on the ground of
International trade, and began to compete straightforwardly in
terms of macro-policies.
(7) The climate of slump generated by synchronized restrictive
macro-policies generated a set. of negative feed- backs in the
national domestic environments. Such feed-backs can he
summarized as follows.
- Companies changed their expectations. While until then
they were quite confident in a relatively high and
sustained rate of growth affecting quite homogeneously
the different sectors, their state of confidence on the
general business cycle began to be impaired. As a
consequence of this, they started to rely increasingly
only on the eventual positive expectations concerning
their specific business branchi This led them to reduce,
or even revert, the expansion of their productive
capacity.
- This 'competitiveness drive' brought the firms to adapt,
their productive organization and technology to a more
competitive, unstable and not forecastable environment.
This produced a tendency to the reduction of the lahonr
stock pertaining to single firms, tn sub-contract 1 ng , to
a search of flexibility based upon the externa 1 1 zat 1 on
of many of the act.1vit.1es which were previously
performed within the firms, with the contemporary
building up of networks of separate firms; to the
adoption of labour saving technologies.
- The search for competitiveness brought employers to
reduce labour costs, not only acting upon gross wages,
but also through the erosion of lahour standards. This
implied a change of personnel strategies and in the
climate of Industrial relations. The process was eased
by a weakening of labour unions' strength, only partly
due to growing unemployment.
There has been a strong, general and non selective reaction
against puhllc sector activities. This encompassed all of the
state roles In the economy: Tallocation, distribution and
regulation. This reaction found a fertile ground in the
growing inefficiency and Ineffectiveness of many of the
public act.1v1t.1es. The reaction tended to take the form of
wild deregulation (also In the domain of labour and labour
markets; many of labour policies amounted to hare
deregulation), and of measures aimed at. dismantling welfare
state provisions; more in general it produced a loss of
solidarity and coordination, and a general down-grading of
ethic and cultural attitudes.
(8) The growing ineffectiveness of macroeconomic policies,
coupled with growing unemployment, produced a stronger
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fragmentation of different policies. On one side there was the
set of hudgetary and monetary policies; on the other one the
remaining policies, above all Industrial and labour policies,
which took the form of remedial measures.
All these negative feed-hacks contributed to make more
rigid our economic systems and resulted in a reinforcement of
the negative international interdependence.
*****
From our analysis above of the current. situation, some
important policy implications follow; they are based on the
need to take a new approach to policy. We have devoted chapter
TV to develop these Implications and what we regard as a
coherent set of proposals and Indications. We reproduce here a
section of that chapter.
(1) The main policy implications are the following ones:
labour policies, and in particular the youth unemployment
policies which have been widely adopted by EEC countries,
cannot, hut he fundamentally useless, since none of them is
appropriate to deal with the set. of prohlems which have heen -
in Itself and within the present, context - outlined. Some of
the lahour policies could result as useful, hut only within
the framework of an entirely different setup.
(2) No policy, if undertaken hy a single country without
coordination with the other connected ones, could obtain any
relevant, result. The main difficulty, however, 1s to push
countries to collaborate and to coordinate themselves. Because
of this, it. 1s better even avoiding to attempt. very wide
inter-countries agreements, and to search for effective
agreements among a limited number of countries, at least, at
the beginning. The Ideal target would be to reach suitable
agreements among EEC countries; but even a more limited
coalition could constitute a good starting point.
(3) The most. Important. target is to establish a climate of
credibility about the undertaken policy arrangements. This, 1n
turn, Implies
(1) that the agreed structure of international
coordination be nredlhle; in order to have this, it
should be better to root. most of the countries'
behaviours to clearly established automatic rules, that,
should be established through national laws before
Implementing the discretionary parts of macro expansive
po 1 1 ci es ;
(11) that. the pursued expansion should be moderate and
gradua 1 ;
(111) that the pursued expansion should mostly be
announced In real terms, that. is, should be openly
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translated in terms of programmes about 'things to be
made '
(4) Macro policies should he supported and Integrated by
consistent micro policies, fostering the effects of the former
upon the needed increase In productive capacity, while
discouraging bets on prices and rewarding the firms that
choose to expand their real output and employment. The
structural design of such, entirely new, micro-policies will
be actually descrihed in section 6 helow.
(5) The fifth implication is that/ the policy of coordination
and cooperation at the international level should be
replicated within the single countries. A new launch of
strategies based on solidarity and of cooperation among
otherwise conflicting parties would contribute
(1) to stabilize positive expectations, reinforcing the
framework of certainties;
(1i) to corroborate the credibility of the adopted macro-
po 1 1 c i es ;
(111) to corroborate the climate of International
coopérât i on .
This Implies a strict collaboration/negotiation between
planning authorities and social partners, in setting the
likely and/or desired values of the main macroeconomic
magnitudes, in stipulating the set of consistent behaviours to
which the negotiating partners have to comply, and in defining
the sanctions and the rewards of failure (the past Austrian
experience 1s very suggestive 1n this respect)
(6) Macro policies should he integrated by additional
policies, aimed at. forestalling the Idleness, and thus the
deterioration, of lahour and human resources in general,
through special job-creation programmes. The feasibility
criteria for the choice of such programmes should he agreed
internationally, along the lines suggested in the previous
chapter of this Report. For each Individual there should he
the guarantee that. It should not. he allowed that, he could
remain idle longer than a pre-established and clearly defined
length of time; incidentally, this would contribute In itself
to keep a favourable climate of expectations, since firms (as
it. 1s presently happening In Sweden) would read In that. a
serious plea, on the side of policy makers, towards a high
level of employment and towards expansion.
(7) The extent, of direct measures for special joh creation
programmes, and not. only their evaluation criteria, should he
agreed at the international level, since the fiscal
adjustments, that such measures make necessary to adopt, could
reverberate upon prices and, thus, upon relative
competitiveness. Because of this, the best, way, and the one to
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be pursued in the longer run, would be to finance such
measures hy an increase in Indirect, taxes (value added, or an
additional tax on consumption final goods), which would not he
borne hy exported commodities; however, this might he
Inconvenient In the shorter run, since 1 t could contribute to
develop a pressure on prices in the moment when expansive
policies begin to take off, which would be undesirable.
(8) More in general the efforts towards expansion through
macro-policies and towards 'additional employment. programmes
should be differentiated among country partners. The rule for
such a differentiation should be established In advance and
made to apply quite automatically. Such a rule should be
linked to some indicators of the trend of trade imbalances
within the group of countries participating to the agreement,
so that the countries which tend to have a surplus in their
balance of trade with respect to the others should be those
which are hound to practice more generously both expansive and
job creation policies. This attitude could become
contradictory in the longer run, since such policies
positively contribute to growth, welfare and productivity. Tt
will he odd, thus, to limit the benefits that the weakest,
among the partners could get. However, it is a sort of 'must'
at. the beginning, when the risks and the possible costs, in
terms of inflation and above all In terms of international
Imbalances, are higher. Recause of the same reason it. would
also be better that the extent of such policies be larger for
those countries which have a higher trade surplus and a lower
rate of inflation in absolute terms.
(9) A good way for weakening the effects of the contradictions
descrihed under (8) would he that of reconverting the use of
European funds, in such a way as to make more resources to
flow towards the countries which have higher unemployment
rates or infra- European trade deficits.
(10) A further important Implication (the ninth one) is that
the whole group of agreeing countries should aim at reflating
the foreign demand for the goods produced within the area.
This can he pursued hy two coordinated sets of measures. On
one side providing a system of guarantees and loans aimed at
fostering the trade between the area and a relevant group of
new developing countries. On the other one hy promoting long
term contracts between such countries and pools of firms
helonglng to different countries within the iarea.
(11) More in general, the whole of agreeing countries should
promote a 'fair' degree of competitiveness with respect to
the rest. of the world, meaning by this the fact that. the
ability to compete should not he based, as 1t tends to be
presently, on the erosion of lahour standards and on the
compression of wages, hut. rather on systemic efficiency, on
the maximum exploitation of Intelligence and culture, on well
planned industrial coordination policies aiming at the
valorization of the complementarities and sinergies which
appear to he potentially available within the European area.
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(12) This requires to devote the maximum of efforts in favour
of education and research, while deeply revising the
presently prevailing tendencies favourable to low-profile
training policies. Such policies, in fact, while possihly
effective in the short run, not only reduce employment but.
contribute to render the system more rigid, since the
tendencies towards continuous innovations tend to make
rapidly obsolete any specific skill. Education, on the
contrary, tends to render the labour force potentially more
flexible and to mold the social environment 1n such a way as
to become more creative and ready to accept Innovations and
their fruits. This does not Imply the need to skip training
activities, hut rather that. of avoiding to over stress their
role and Importance, that, of shifting resources from training
to general and higher education, that of rendering training
vicarious to education.
(13) Many of the previous policy "suggestions require a real
leap In the quality of public action and, therefore, in
Intelligence and culture of public administration. Many of
the suggestions imply also a widening of state Intervention.
Should the extension of the traditional sphere of state
intervention and the quality of puhlic administration remain
as they presently are, the emergence of a negative attitude
towards the proposed measures among ordinary people, mass
media and politicians, would be likely to occur. This is why
the whole of the proposed measures have not. only to be
accompanied by, hut rely on, a profound revision of the
philosophy of puhlic action. The range of direct
interventions should narrow, while that, of regulation should
widen; the state should directly make less things and become
more capable to order to make things to third parties and to
control that they properly and timely comply to such orders;
1n short, thus, less 'making', and more 'regulating and
control 1 Ing'
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CHAPTER I
THE CORE OF THE MESSAGE
1 · Iñ££2áM£t ¿on
The present levels and trends of unemployment (and not just
of youth unemployment) should raise a higher degree of concern
and political alar». In fact they are the manifestation of
major forms of irrationality of our societies. Unemployment
implies a loss of potential output. Furthermore, while there
is still a wide set of unsatisfied needs (both private and
collective), the people who could work for satisfying such
needs are not only kept paradoxically idle, but are frustrated
and suffer from material as well as psychological deprivation.
It is a subtle form of 'regulatory', if not plainly
political, irrationality, that we overlook and to which we are
beginning to be increasingly accustomed, while attributing the
responsibility for it either to the forces of the system or,
even worse, to the previous attempts to fight against them.
However, human societies are not anarchic or spontaneous
systems. Since their origins they have been characterized by
their being structured by sets of rules and led by some fora
of government; and since the beginning of the present century
many conscious attempts have been developed to impose some
form of rationality on such rules and on the behaviour of the
governments, as the end-result of long-lasting efforts,
consolidated during the illuministic period and strengthened
by recent cultural as well as factual 'revolutions', such as
the blossoming of post-positivistic approaches, the explosion
of mass education and the unprecedented economic affluence.
Political rationality is likely to be an endless
escatological gamble. Nobody really thinks it could be
achieved, and still most people believe it should be pursued;
and that pursuing it is not only rational but positively
contributes to some unspecified -but strongly shared- state of
collective well-being.
Most of the social reforms that have been attempted, and
partly achieved, in the course of this century -such as
various forms of welfare state policies, post-keynesian full
employment policies, the virtual elimination of extreme forms
of poverty, the improvement of civil rights, etc.- are
regarded as improvements in the degree of our political
rationality, even by the majority of those conservatives who
maintain critical attitudes towards the concrete features of
such actions.
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2 · ?he._ sub t.l e_ b¿as_ o f _...'_ s ci e njt¿ f.ici jr a t i ona l¿ty
Not only are most of these actions 'value loaded', those
who have inspired them were 'value biased', such as Wicksell,
Myrdal and the Swedish reformers of the early part of this
century; as the Webbs, and Beveridge; as Roosevelt and the New
Deal; as, though in a lesser degree, Keynes himself. This is
why these fundamental steps in the history of our civilization
were never truly regarded, within the scientific debate, as a
real progress in the degree of rationality of our societies,
despite the fact that for a long while most of the scientists
were strongly influenced, if not even fascinated, by the».
But values are values and they are not regarded, by the
highbrow neo-positivist tradition which prevails in social
sciences, as being susceptible of evaluation from the
viewpoint of rationality. So, for example, the value of
solidarity can be liked or disliked, accepted or refused, but
could not be considered as being more rational than that of
aggressiveness and competitiveness.
It is to be noticed that such an epistenological attitude
is historically new: classical economists -such as Smith and
Ricardo- who considered the political economy as a part of
their philosophical research, investigated the 'laws' of the
economy in order to strengthen, with the help of rational
investigation, their normative and ethical approach to better
ways of ruling modern societies; and this tradition continued
in economics until Pigou, that is, until the first quarter of
this century, and then faded away, under the influence of
apparently more 'pure* scientists, such as Pareto, Robbins and
Hicks. It is to be noticed also that, paradoxically enough,
such an epistenological attitude, while still dominating
within the economic science, is now regarded as only
instrumental^ useful, but substantially obsolete, by most up-
to-date philosophy of knowledge.
3 · £&£-fl££d_£qr_an upsurge o
There is a reason, a reason that we consider as most
important for our Report, for devoting some attention to
apparently peripheral issues in the history of economic and
social thought. Present policies are in fact strongly
influenced by economic disciplines, and particularly by those
branches of economics which mostly departed from the classical
and Pigouvian tradition. In their efforts to rule out valuejudgments, and to found a pure economic science, modern
economics ended up in stylizing economic facts as determined
only by the interaction of purely selfish individual
motivations. Given this, no space exists, in the
reconstruction of the world which is made by pure economists,
for forces different from those which are motivated and put
into motion by the selfishness of utili ty-maxi»izing
individuals; that is, for forces which stem out of ethical
and ideological motivations, from emotions and affective
instincts, from moral intelligence, from the sense of
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justice, freedom and solidarity, from the evolution of our
aesthetic and moral as well as scientific culture.
As we said, the economic culture strongly influences our
government leaders and opinion makers; therefore it strongly
influences most of collectively relevant choices which are
made in our societies . _Qu¿te_on_the_contraryx_we_bel¿eve_t hat
what^qur 	 societ¿es_most¿y 	 SêêÍL	 ¿S 	 2£der 	 to~_so¿ve 	 the¿r
EEfi.BÌ£fi8_-of 	 whiçh^growing	 Μ31£»Εΐ2Υ»£2.1_Ϊ2. 	 finïy.__~_.theImo st
Xi.s¿b¿e_and 	 lffiffi.ed¿ate_one-_..¿.s._a_ne.w_deaí_£orI_s.o¿ldarlt¿,._led
.feY._a 	 renewed 	 and_ long- sight ed 	 c£ll.ect¿ve ¿ñtelí¿gence_and
£aìtur.e^. ~ "" "
Economics, in this respect, can become - and actually has
become - more dangerous than a mere false description of the
'laws' which regulate individuals' behaviour. If economic
systems and their laws of motion are not merely contingent on
selfishness and utility-maximizing, any policy which, instead,
is based on these assumptions will lead to long term failures
rather than to the establishment of the 'true' economic (or
social and political, for that matter) rationality.
Economic systems have always relied on some form of
'solidarity' (socio-economic compromises, policy measures
aiming to blunt spontaneous contradictions, etc.). If we
destroy those solidarity mechanisms in the name of a supposed
higher form of rationality we may reach a situation in which
every one is worse off.
The international arena is the clearest case: growth and
development of single countries have always taken place in an
essentially cooperative international environment. Highly
ruthless competitive international environments have, on the
contrary, always led to catastrophes, though in the short
period some countries may have apparently made large gains(World War I - peace - World War II).
Thus solidarity is a value judgment but also a more
concrete policy indication. We all should recall Keynes's
attitude towards the peace-treaty after World War I (The
Ic2£2li.£_ ..Consie.gue.nce s o f .. the Peace ) .
Specifically, in our context, solidarity means finding
expansive policies which could allow Europe to rise the global
level of employment without single countries having to bear an
excessive burden.
The above proposition is stated as a condition rather than
a proposal. Our concrete proposals will be much weaker,
although much more complex, such as to require a real leap in
our ruling abilities. In fact the proposals will consist in
an articulated set of provisions and rules aimed at
coordinating internationally domestic actions to be developed
by single EC countries. Coordination is thus treated as the
first realistic step to be undertaken to establish a new wave
of solidarity, not only within single countries but also among
them.
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4 · i.t.t.desp.Ate.the_ unfavourable cui tura l._
ehyironment
Even so, it is not an easy task; on the contrary, it is
likely to be over-ambitious, at least for the moment; a moment
in which the wind of aggressive conservatism, of wild
deregulation, and of over-stressed competition is powerfully
blowing all throughout Europe.
And this is why the challenge to official and well
established technical expertise becomes a difficult but
unescapable preliminary task, despite the fact that policy and
opinion makers tend to refuse analyses which are too demanding
in terms of attention and comprehension efforts. And despite
the fact that innovative cultural elaborations are
disadvantaged in comparison with customary orthodoxy , since
the latter tends to be accepted even if it is not fully
understood, simply because of the persuasive strength which
derives from well established conformism.
5 · *fe_are f acing._a_ negat J. ye_sum_game
General equilibrium models -the core of economic orthodoxy-
represent the economy as a game in which the interaction among
selfish players produces the maximization of the prizes which
are available for the whole of the participating players. Our
main point is that this could happen only under certain
circumstances, which depend on the environment in which the
game takes place and on the rules according to which the game
is actually played; and both the rules and the environment are
neither 'natural' nor 'fixed' by any standard of judgment.
They are instead subject to change, along a sequential path in
which the number and the quality of players, as well as the
rules of the game and the resulting overall performances,
influence each other . And... the 	 point is, that present
circumstances _are such as to de ter m
.l.i!ke¿y_.. ex tens i on _qfnegative- sum game s^
This is mainly due, though not only, to the fact that the
competitive games, which were previously taking place mainly
among individuals playing within fairly isolated systems, are
now taking place also among systems; and while individuals
compete (both within and across systems) under relatively
stable rules, systems tend to compete each against the other
through continuous and strategic adjustments of the rules
themselves. It happens thus that the systemic results of the
game drastically change.
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6 · ïh£. .nature, of _the
There is nothing, in what we just said, against the market
as an acceptable and relatively efficient allocation
mechanism. The market, however, is in itself nothing but a
rule; and, like all rules, is neither perfect nor sufficient
in itself, and its effects depend on the remaining rules
which apply to the environment and on the features of the
environment itself.
The market performed quite well until around 1970; that is,
a period in which almost all of the EC countries were strongly
involved in improving labour standards and developing
ambitious social policies. Macro-policies were fundamentally
expansive, and the climate of expectations was good.
International monetary coordination, as produced by the
agreements of Bretton Woods, worked in such a way as to ensure
substantially stable exchange rates;
It was in this climate that international trade could
develop, and the construction of the European Common Market
could begin, despite the relevant range of the industrial and
fiscal features which contributed to distort the competition
among the European partners.
Then a sequence of events occurred that completely reverted
the above picture. In particular a wave of aggressive
competition began, which ended up with the countries competing
each against the other in the field of restrictive macro-
policies, through the worsening of labour standards and the
dismantling of most of the previously adopted progressive
social policies. Policy makers became increasingly concerned
with inflation and less and less concerned with the issue of
employment and labour standards, up to the point of indicating
the improvement of labour standards as the main cause of
inflation and rigidity. (This explanation, indeed, became the
most appealing to opinion leaders, who never indulged in
wondering how something -as the labour standards- which was
so most different across countries, could actually be the
cause of phenomena -such as inflation and unemployment- which
were so similar in most of the countries.)
7 · We...mus t..unde r.s t andt ;he_ t r ans f or mat i o ns_¿n_ o r der regai η
control
Therefore, if we want to cure unemployment, we first have
to attempt to explain, beyond prevailing superficial
approaches, the complex process that produced the above
described change. However, this is a necessary but not
sufficient condition.
If -as we think- what happened was not a simple change in
the values of variables and parameters of a basically
unchanged structure, but a major structural change in our
systems and in their reciprocal relationships, then the
understanding of changes has to be integrated with that of the
CHAPTER I 6 86230
actual working of the systems which resulted from these
changes .
8 · T.her e._.i s_ no ._easy_ way out
Our point will be that the degree of complexity and of
uncertainty which characterizes our systems has grown much
more and much faster than our ability to understand and govern
them. Therefore, there is not any easy way out from the
present problems; at least not one that does not imply a major
change in the rules which are adopted, in the fashion of our
collective life, in the culture and the skills which are used
in the management of our systems.
We are still in a transitional phase. The unemployed are a
minority, however great, but still a minority; they do not
starve, nor are they violent. The degree of social alarm
associated with unemployment appears to be now decreasing, and
to rank rather low in the scale of political concerns. Most
of the governments seem to be convinced that the problem is
being solved automatically by demographic factors.
	 Not only. ..._do_we 	 no t_ share 	 these_Ofitlilstic_.vi.ewSj but we
$h.Ank...that_they :...are.._da.ngerous.. Even if youth unemployment
might actually decrease , this would not imply that we have
understood and solved our problems. If, as we believe,
unemployment is not'the' disease, but just the visible
symptom of it, and the true disease is the inability of
managing and controlling our societies in a progressive way,
the disease is bound to remain and to emerge, or to
explode , somewhere else.
9 · A_.s.amfi¿e ...of._wr o_ng_answer s
With this Report -as we said- we will accomplish three
years of international research. Nine countries within the
European Community and two outside (Sweden and Austria) have
been considered. The financial constraints were such as to
compel us to utilize second hand research, but strong efforts
have been made to compensate this drawback by carefully
targeting national contributions, through intensive
coordination and active and extensive exchanges of ideas among
the members of the international team.
We did not aim at a comprehensive collection of labour
policies experiences nor at a careful microeconomic evaluation
of them; we have chosen to maintain an overall and systemic
perspective, and to focus upon the social, institutional and
cultural differences which constitute the background of youth
unemployment, and which thus make different not only what the
occurrence of unemployment really means in different
societies, but also help to explain how apparently similar
provisions are differently conceived and actually
administered, and tend to produce different effects in
different societies. If, in fact, purely occupational overall
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effects appear on average to be quite modest, labour policies
appear to have, instead, quite relevant effects in other
areas, such as social relations (family and households
patterns, stigmatlzation processes,...), institutional changes(the role of training, the involvement of the sphere of
education and the transformations occurring therefrom, the
delegation of new tasks to local communities,...), the
functioning of the labour market (new hiring patterns, new
forms of labour segmentation,...), and industrial relations(the weakening of labour unions, the upsurge of concession
bargaining,...), the personnel management strategies(restriction of the area of internal labour markets, new forms
of labour organization,...), the distribution of incomes(between employers and employees, among employees, between
workers and the rest of people,...). And many of these
effects appear to have been somewhat negative.
Some of the attempted measures appear to have had positive
occupational effects upon the directly affected youth;
however, direct and indirect evidence tend to show that this
is likely to depend either on what we could call a 'disguise'
effect (people are induced to attend additional and special
programmes for further training or education), or on heavy
'substitution' effects. Those who are hired because of the
labour policies are actually squeezing out from employment
some other people; and this perception is consistent with the
feeling that the overall effects of labour policies are rather
modest.
Such substitution effects put into light a rather new and
worrying aspect of the whole issue: employment is becoming a
new 'distributive' problem, similar but distinct from that of
the distribution of income and wealth; distinct, in so far as
the status of being employed is still, in our societies, a
crucial, though too often overlooked, factor of social
integration, and work is, for many, a source of satisfaction
in itself.
When, during the second half of the seventies, youth
unemployment began to worry the governments, most of European
countries were still pursuing progressive policies in the
domain of transition from school to work. The well
consolidated German system -which was itself in the way of
changing because of the implementation of previously conceived
improvements- performed someway, directly or indirectly, as a
reference model. In countries such as GFR, Netherlands,
Denmark, Belgium and France, the upsurge of youth unemployment
tended to manifest itself as an ill- functioning of the
mechanisms of transition from school to work. Many of the
provisions which attempted to cure youth unemployment through
the strengthening of the training efforts, and which were
later on widely limited in other countries, were born in such
a perspective.
This is a good example of the superficial, short sighted
and naive attitude which policy makers, social parties and the
vast majority of public opinion took with respect to the
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problem. Since the more skilled had higher probabilities to
find jobs, this was extrapolated to the system; unfortunately,
what applies to individuals not necessarily does to the
system, where the effects were simply a reshuffling of
individual probabilities of finding jobs.
More sophisticated experts held that more training would
have increased the relative competitiveness of the country.
But since all of the competing countries did the same,
relative competitiveness remained substantially stable, while
the overall need for labour was likely to decrease.
Similar patterns of wrong conceptualizations stay behind
other attempted measures, such as marginal employment
subsidies and provisions aimed at fostering labour and labour-
market flexibility. We call them, in our Report,
'stereotypes', since they have the look of common-sense
reasoning, they are widespread among people and across
countries, and they produce results which are very convenient
for powerful vested interests.
Despite the great cultural, institutional and economic
differences among the observed countries, the policy measures
which have been adopted are extraordinarily similar, at least
from a purely descriptive point of view. The only reason we
have been able to find for this is the wide diffusion across
countries of the same stereotypes. And this confirmed to us to
put a priority upon the role and the inadequacy of the
cultural endowments and of the ability to understand the
functioning of our socio-economic systems upon which we are
presently relying for regulating our societies.
1 ° · Wner e_we _ar e_w¿t h_unemp.l_o yme η t_and_¿ab_qur _Eol¿c¿e s
In this section we will attempt to summarize, in the most
complete but compact way, as the end-result of our previous
analyses, where we are - in Europe- in the domain of
unemployment and unemployment policies:
(a) the problem is that of unemployment, not of youth
unemployment. This is now becoming increasingly evident, as
long as in some countries adult (mainly male) workers start to
be squeezed out by (mainly female and/or young) workers. This
was correctly forecasted, however, by our previous Reports,
which pointed out
(a.l) that youth unemployment was only the most visible
manifestation of a major allocation disease. This
forestalls the use of idle (human) resources for the
satisfaction of still unsatisfied needs;
(a. 2) that, given the inability to raise the activity
rate of our economic systems through aggregate economic
policies, most of specific youth employment policies were
likely to result in a mere redistribution of available
jobs (see point c below);
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(b) although some specific labour policies appear to have had
positive effects, the whole of public policies, together with
the associated consistent strategies adopted in the domain of
industrial relations (increased labour flexibility and wage
moderation), do not appear to have substantially alleviated
unemployment problems, despite the fact that such policies
and strategies have been actively and widely practiced all
throughout Europe. Several hypotheses can be made for
explaining such a failure:
(b.l) the theories upon which labour policies are based
are plainly wrong;
(b.2) such policies (and the theories behind them) are
correct only in so far as they succeed in affecting
relative competitiveness; this could not happen because
all of the competing countries adopted the same policies,
reciprocally eroding the gains in competitiveness
produced by the adopted policies;
(b.3) restrictive macroeconomic policies have compensated
the hypothetical positive effects of labour policies.
(c) the fact that labour policies and strategies have had some
positive effects in lowering the specific unemployment of the
directly affected population, while their overall effects have
been poor or null, makes it clear their substantially re-
distributive nature. In other words, either such actions are
ineffective or, when they are effective, this is due to the
fact that those who are hired because of the policies are
actually squeezing out some other worker. Since this overlaps
with other forms of ongoing labour substitution processes,
and the substitution effects which are produced by labour
policies may be very indirect, it cannot be ascertained who is
substituting whom (direct enquires have established, however,
that youth policies are affecting employers' recruitment
policies, while careful statistical estimates have shown
evidence of substitution effects). Labour policies are thus
not neutral from a distributive point of view; despite this,
however, nowhere such policies appear to have been evaluated,
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labour (and social) segmentation are
convenient to single out six different
(e.l) the highly paid, productive and stable workers.
These tend increasingly to Overwork', daily, weekly,
yearly as well as during their life-time;
(e.2) the low paid, low productive but relatively stable
workers. These tend to be concentrated in the public
sector (of the majority of considered countries), and in
other sectors which are sheltered from (mainly
international) competition. It is within this group (but
also within the previous one) that double jobbers are
more likely to be found;
(e.3) precarious workers -mainly but not only young- who
frequently alternate situations of employment and of
unemployment. In other words these people have a high
probability of finding as well as of loosing jobs. Only a
part of them succeed, after a period within this cluster,
to move to one of the previous ones;
(e.4) the adult workers who lost their job, because of
industrial restructuring or sectorial decline, and did
not succeed in finding a new job within a short period of
time. Usually these people did not rank very high in the
job ladder, had very low or very specific qualifications,
were female or elder workers. Such workers are among
those who are most likely to be squeezed out by younger
workers and as a consequence of youth employment
policies ;
(e.5) the young people who are socially stigmatized. The
stigmatization could derive directly from social
interactions (like in the case of poverty and
CHAPTER I 11 86230
deprivation, and in the case of racial discrimination),
or be due (or reinforced) by educational or training
processes. Sometimes youth policies could paradoxically
contribute to the stigmatizatlon process. These young
people get precarious jobs for short periods but face
long spells of unemployment;
(e.6) the physically or mentally handicapped.
While we do not pretend that the above list is exhaustive,
it is worthwhile to remark that many of the people within the
groups outlined above may not belong to the labour force,
according to the traditional statistical definition of it. In
fact this definition is no longer sufficient to capture the
whole of the people that, under different circumstances, would
accept to work at prevailing pay conditions.
A second important observation is that the groups who face
unemployment and social problems are, and are likely to remain
for the next few years, minorities: dramatically relevant
minorities, if considered from the viewpoint of the
psychological conditions and the quality of life of the
involved people, let alone the loss of potential output, but
certainly minorities from a political point of view. And
because of several reasons, such minorities are likely to
have little or no 'voice' at all, which makes them a
relatively uninteresting clientele from a political point of
view, with possibly the only noticeable exception of cases of
huge territorial concentration of unemployment, as it happens
in traditional backward areas or in areas in which declining
industrial sectors are concentrated (see g.4 below).
(f) In fact most of the European governments appear to have
downgraded the priority of fighting unemployment; most of them
appear to rely upon demographic self- adjustments. This
attitude might result short-sighted, in face of the growing
tendency of women to enter the labour market and to keep
staying within it, and given the relatively low rate of female
activity rates all throughout Europe and the growing tendency
of employers to hire women.
(g) The phenomena considered above have been associated with,
or accompanied by, relevant changes
(g.l) in the industrial strategies of firms. Largest
firas decreased their employment, while new small firms
were created, either independent or controlled by the
largest ones. New networks of collaboration among firms
have been created. The embodiment of new technologies,
often labour saving, accelerated. Only smaller firms show
a positive balance in terms of jobs creation;
(g.2) in personnel management and industrial relations
strategies. Many firms are dropping the previously
prevailing strategy of internal labour markets, while
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others tend to narrow the scope and the range of
application of them. A new prevailing pattern has not
emerged yet, and it is not likely to emerge soon:
while the need for flexibility and the search for
cheap and disciplined labour push for a wider adoption
of external labour market strategies, the high quality
of technologies and, above all, the organizational
complexity of the production processes might push in
the opposite direction (these observations, however,
which mostly apply to manufacture and to large and
advanced service industry, must be reconsidered in the
light of the changes occurred not only in the
prevailing size of firas but also in the sectorial
composition of economic activities). Correspondingly,
labour unions strength arid coverage tended to decline
practically everywhere. Partly as a consequence of
this, there has been a relevant wave of 'concession
bargaining' , according to which workers gave up not
only shares of wage rates, but also many of the rights
they had previously obtained in the sphere of working
conditions (job security, job guarantees, seniority
rights, etc.);
(g.3) in the sectorial composition of economic
activities. Everywhere manufacturing activities declined
in favour of services. Part of the phenomenon is someway
spurious, since is due to the fact that part of the
service activities, previously performed within
manufacturing industries, have been transferred to the
service industry and are now bought froa it; but part of
it is genuine, and aade for the invention of the new and
rather queer expression of 'de-industrialization'. Within
the enlarging activities, that of training has to be
aentioned. Almost everywhere the number of people whosejob consists in training activities has increased, both
within firms and in the public sector, creating a network
of vested interests around such activities;
(g.4) in the territorial distribution of expanding and
declining economic activities. This makes for an uneven
territorial distribution of unemployment rates, usually
not compensated by labour territorial mobility;
(g.5) in the composition of public sector activities and
tasks. Here the patterns are partly differentiated among
countries, in the sense that the decline of welfare
provisions induced in some countries a decline in the
public employment in such domains, in others only a
decline in transfer payments.
On the other hand, the most coaaon patterns concern the
feet that alaoet everywhere there has been either the creation
Of new agencies dealing with the various forms of labour
policies, or the. attribution of such tasks to previously
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existing institutions, which thus had to reconvert themselves.
In the latter case, often, the new asks have been additionally
and/or improperly attributed -like when they were attributed
to local authorities, which were not prepared or trained for
them, without giving them a consistent set of juridical,
financial and human resources- sometimes producing negative
backlashes upon their efficiency in performing their ordinary
institutional activities.
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CHAPTER II
THE BACKGROUND
1 · Introd.uct.iqn
In our 1986 Report we expounded and criticized in a very
detailed way the features and the pitfall» of the presently
prevailing aacroeconoaic aodels, using as a target for our
critical evaluation the 1985 CEPS Report (0. Blanchard, R.
Dornbusch, J. Dreze, H. Giersch, R. Layard, M. Monti,
ISfilSXBentand_Grqwth_in_EMroßei_a .
We consider those arguaents as available to the Commission,
and we will not return upon thea here. However, we feel the
need, on the one hand, to illustrate the aajor changes
occurred in the aacroeconoaic background and 'in the
aacroeconoaic policies around thé first half of the Seventies
and, on the other hand, to integrate our previous analysis by
a better description of the basic rationale of the on-going
strategies at the international level. We will accomplish
this task in a synthetic way.
2 · íii£-EaílIí_Sevent¿es_as__a_t urn¿ng_22¿nt
We consider 1972 and 1973 as the crucial years during which
a sharp change in the structural functioning of our econoaic
eyeteas occurred. The events that we consider as crucial are
the following ones: (a) the abandonaent of fixed exchange
rates, and (b) the first oil shock.
Notice that we do not consider such events as the causes of
the aajor factual changes we considered in this chapter, but
as the events which concluded an era and began new one; at the
same time we consider such events as the catalyst of a
transforaation which was prepared by a sequence of events
which had been occurring during the late Sixties. Furtheraore,
and obviously enough, we do not consider the present situation
as close to that which iaaediately emerged after the events
recalled above, but as the end result of a sequence of
further adjustments and transformations that began with those
events.
3 · !he_aood_qf the__SJLxt les
The sixties were the golden age of the Keynesian outlook.
An unprecedented growth had been occurring in Europe since the
late Fifties. In the first half of the Sixties all EEC
countries reached what they considered as full eaployaent.
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Th· economy appeared to perfora according to the theories
of Keynes. The expansion of public expenditure or the money-
supply invariably produced a growth of output and eaployaent,
with low effect« upon the dynamics of prices and aoney wages.
The new affluence produced a sharp increase in international
trade v The coaaon aarket fraaework in Europe was
consolidated. European economies becaae increasingly
interdependent.
Each of the European countries pursued à policy of
stabilization which aostly concerned ita own business cycle.
The swings of the business cycles were generated aainly by
internal events, such as investaent cycles, wage drifts, etc.
However, since the dependency upon international trade was
growing, the equilibriua of the trade balances becaae
increasingly iaportant, acting aainly as an additional
constraint upon the intensity of expansive policies. On the
whole, however, the business cycles of each country were not
fully synchronized. Furtheraore, each country appeared to be
positioned along a substantially expansive trend.
It is iaportant to notice here that this positive attitude
towards sustained growth, which was likely to heavily
influence the aood of coapanies' expectations, by no aeans was
rooted only to the prevailing aacroeconoaic philosophy. Quite
on the contrary, this aacroeconoaic philosophy constituted an
appropriate environaent, within which specific progressive
industrial and, above all, social policies were pursued, as
the result of cultural and political attitudes and pressures.
The need to fight against dualisa and poverty, to get rid of
various foras of underdevelopaent enclaves, the need to
strengthen the position of the weaker parts of the population,
the need for laproving labour standards and labour conditions,
for providing better housing and transportation, for having
aore and better education, etc., were all felt and shared by a
vast aajority of people; and this was something which went
beyond the contingency of the political majorities which
existed in single moments in single countries.
Thus, it was this climate, such well rooted and diffused
attitudes, that formed the basis both for expansive
expectations and expansive policies. On the other hand, it is
likely that expansive expectations created a tendency for the
firas to widen their productive capacity quite in advance,
creating thus a favourable environaent to respond, rapidly and
without strong tensions, to expansive policies by an increase
of their outputs. Macro-policies confiraed the expectations of
firas, and their success reinforced favourable attitudes
towards their continuation.
These tendencies, that prevailed in each of the countries
which were becoalng increasingly interdependent, aade for a
positive circuit of lnterdependency aaong policies at the
international level. In other words, although the need for
equilibriua in the international trade acted as a new
constraint, this did not produce excessive pressures towards
sharp coapetltion. If a country happened to be in a sluap,
while' the other interdependent ones found themselves in a
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relatively better position, this helped the first country to
avoid a sharper recession. On the other hand, if a country
happened to face an exceptional booa, the constraint of
international trade could be cared for by the aeans of a
aoderate slow-down of growth, given the expansive trends of
the other connected countries.
There was only one 'black cloud' in this happy landscape.
It was given by aoney wage push, or drifts, due to full
eaployaent .
4 · The_aodel._of._the_.aood
Let us consider briefly how the situation considered above
was stylized by standard economic modelling. The prevailing
standard picture was given by what we could call the 'fix-
price' Keynesian aodel. The econoaic systea was represented aa
perforalng in the following way. Neither relative çoaaodlty
prices, jnor the ratio between aoney wages and prices, nor
expectations, play any relevant role. The only thing which
aatters is the level of output which is demanded. The
aggregate supply is perfectly elastic up to the level of full
eaployaent; beyond this, it becomes perfectly rigid.
A situation of equilibriua is characterized by the fact
that the output which is produced in each period is fully
sold. Selling all the produced (and therefore planned) output
is a proof for the firas that their decisions about how auch
to produce were correct; therefore, such decisions are
confiraed for the following period. There are no systeaic or
spontaneous reasons why this equilibriua output should be a
full eaployaent output. Therefore there can be uneaployaent . A
situation of uneaployaent equilibriua tend to reproduce itself
period after period. There is no reason, in fact, for the
firas to revise their decisions. This is seen by the theory as
being due to a sort of Inf oraational gap. If, in fact, all
producers could be convinced to produce aore and to hire aore
workers, this would deteraine an increase in the wage bill,
and, as a consequence of this, in the level of final deaand.
And this increase in deaand would aatch the increased supply.
However, no single producer would aake by hiaself the
decision to increase his output and to hire aore workers,
since this decision would not produce an increase in the
deaand for his own output. And each of the producers has the
saae attitudes. Thus, not only are the producers unaware of
the systeaic interdependency àaong a coaaonly shared decision
to produce aore and the aggregate consequence of this in terms
of increased final deaand, but, even if they had such an
awareness, they could not have any guarantee that the decision
to produce and hire aore, aade by one of thea, would be
followed by the reaalning set of producers.
In such a situation, any public intervention aiaed at
increasing the final deaand perforas as an order, or a signal,
conveyed to the econoay. Newly produced aoney, introduced in
CHAPTER II 17 86230
the econoay by public spending, which has not at the beginning
of a period a corresponding aaount of output, aaounts to an
order, given to the producers, to produce the additional
output which corresponds to the additional aoney; therefore,
at the end of the period, increased aoney supply and increased
output will aatch, without producing inflationary result. Any
other intervention alaed at increasing private deaand, like
for exaaple a lowering of the rate of interest through an
appropriate increase of aoney supply and a consequent increase
in the deaand for investaents, would perfora a siailar role.
That this aodelling constitutes an eaasculated iaage of the
auch richer environaent described in the previous section
could hardly be denied. However, the features and the possible
roles of aacroeconoaic interventions are captured quite
effectively.
European governaents behaved 'as if' such a aodel actually
captured the fundaaental perforaance of the econoaic systea,
and this helped to maintain the economies . along a
fundamentally expansive trend and to pursue full eaployaent.
The 'black cloud' of aoney wage inflation gradually began
to overlap not only on the facts but on the aodelling of
thea. The existence of an Inverse relationship between the
level of uneaployaeixt and a positive rate of wages and price
inflation was first observed, and, later on, over- imposed
upon the above described model (the so called Phillips curve).
It is not by chance that for many years the Phillips curve was
interpreted, by a causal point of view, either as a
aanifestation of a conflict of power between employers and
wage earners (and their unions), which were considered as
being reinforced by full employment, or as the aanifestation
of the effects of pure aarket forces; in this latter case,
wage inflation was considered as the result of a noraal deaand
pull in a situation of labour shortage produced by the
proxiaity to full eaployaent.
What it is worthwhile to be stressed here - since this has
tended to be forgotten later on - is that in both cases wage
inflation was strictly linked to the fact that full eaployaent
was a celling to deaand expansion. In other words, the
Phillips relationship, at least at the beginning, in no way
altered the 'fix-price' nature of the basic model; it was
only a sort of 'trap', which could be elicited by the fact of
having reached the proxiaity of full eaployaent.
On the factual ground, the eaerging of inflationary
pressures acted as a constraint upon expansive policies and
produced an increasingly frequent interruption of thea. We
argue that it is extreaely likely that such repeated
interruptions heavily contributed to change the expectations
of coapanies, slowing down the rate at which productive
capacity was being built up. We consider it as equally
probable that such a lowering of s the rate of increase of
productive capacity heavily contributed to aake the aggregate
supply increasingly rigid towards expansion, aggravating
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inflationary pressures in the occurrence of expansive spells.
This 'good sense' possibility was coapletely overlooked by
prevailing analyses.
5· ï&£_âàqçks_.qf_the_eârl___eV"^
At the beginning of the Seventies the international
situation becaae suddenly quite turbulent. While the
regulatory framework of Bretton Woods was fading away, the
prices of aany primary goods and raw aaterials, imported by
aost of industrialized countries (and, among thea, by the EEC
countries), began to rise; a sharp increase in oil prices was
the end-result of a process started soie years earlier, a
process which was generated by socio-political factors which
were in aotlon in the International arena, and in particular,
within the North-South relationships.
In this new situation the external balance constraints
acted upon the whole block of industrialized countries -and,
in particular, on the EEC countries- in a way rather different
froa the past (see section 3 above).
Each industrialized country found Itself in the need of
readjusting, both rapidly and substantially, to the fact that
the saae aaount of laported prlaary coaaodlties, used as
inputs in order to produce their output, costed substantially
aore than before. The required adjustaent was very specific:
the iaport of aore expensive inputs could not be reduced but
aoderately, since it was necessary for producing final goods;
the problea becaae thus aainly that of exporting aore final
goods towards the area of raw aaterial producers and that of
decreasing the iaport of final goods froa other industrialized
countries. The appropriate strategy was found, on the one
hand, in the reduction of internal aggregate deaand (both in
order to reduce the iaport of final goods and in order to
create an appropriate space for the export of final goods)
and, on the other hand, in the pursuing of the aaxiaua of
coapetitiveness of national final goods (both in order to
acquire a larger share of the iaports of final goods Bade by
the group of countries exporting basic prlaary goods, aainly
OPEC country, and in order to export aore toward the other
industrialized countries, or to iaport less froa thea).
Therefore, the changes occurred in the international arena
produced a situation in which all the industrialized countries
adopted equal strategies in the very saae aoaent. The business
cycles, aainly induced now by governaent policies, becaae
thus perversely synchronized, while restrictive aacroeconoaic
policies becaae theaselves ' competitive ' . In other words, the
restrictive policy adopted by each of the industrialized
countries was weakened by the fact that the others adopted the
saae policy in the saae aoaent. But the loss of effectiveness
of each restrictive policy could only reinforce the intensity
of the very saae restrictive policy.
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The iaperativa became, fpr firas as well as for
governaents, that of becoaing aore coapetitive than the
others. Although it acquired a different set of aeanings and
iaplications for the firas, for the governaents, and for the
attitudes and behaviours of ordinary people.
For the firas it iaplied the beginning of a process of
technological and organizational restructuring. This process
was at the saae tiae wide,, deep and long lasting. Companies
changed the strategies concerning industrial relations, hiring
and upgrading procedures, and, aore in general, personnel
aanageaent. The division of tasks and roles between firas
changed; larger firas started to reduce their eaployaent,
while the vertical integration of the production processes
was diainished. Firas started to adopt strategies based upon
the coapleeentarity of network of different saaller firas.
Labour-saving techniques were widely invented, through
deliberate activities of research and developaent, and
adopted. In many sectors the strategy of coapetition becaae
increasingly based upon continuous Innovation.
One of the aggregate result of this effort was a structural
decline in the aaount of iaported prlaary goods. This
contributed to re-establish a balance in the international
trade, with respect to the countries exporting prlaary inputs.
The restoration of aore favourable teras of trade between
industrialized countries and prlaary goods producers was
partly the result of this structural adjustment and partly
added its own effects to it.
The consequences upon governaent policies deserve aore
attention, since they are rather counter-intuitive. As we
recalled earlier, the tendency of the teras of trade was, in
the aain and in the long run, to realign to the parity which
existed before the first oil shock.
Governaents on the one hand had to fight against a raising
rate of inflation and, on the other hand, they had to proaote
the adjustaente, considered earlier, to the new teras of trade
between industrialized countries and raw aaterials and prlaary
goods producers. In principle they aiaed at obtaining this
result through a aixture of restrictive and regulatory
policies: increase of taxes, lowering of public expenditure,
aonetary restrictions, wage moderation. In practice
governaents aet difficulties in lowering public expenditure; a
good deal of the public expenditure, in fact, depended upon
decisions undertaken aany years earlier, during the period in
which aore progressive legislation was adopted and expansive
expectations appeared to allow (and to reward, both
econoaically and politically) generous public provisions and
the growth of eaployaent in the public sector.
Wage aoderatlon was pursued because of two distinct but
converging goals: controlling inflation and lowering the cost
Of labour, in such a way as to improve international
competitiveness, m other words, the control of inflation and
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external balances becaae everywhere the prlaary target of
aacroeconoaic policy.
At the saae tiae, the control of uneaployment practically
disappeared froa the set of aacroeconoaic targets; even though
aany experts would not agree about the latter statement,
since the official arguaent was that more unemployment in the
short run constituted the strategy, and at the saae tiae was
the cost, to obtain aore eaployaent in the long run.
Without entering. in this chapter, into a critical
evaluation of the arguaente and the theories which stay behind
such attitudes and behaviours, the situation described above
aanifests two paradoxes. As we . saw, the drive towards a strong
search for international coapetitiveness was generated by the
worsening of the teras of trade between industrialized
countries and prlaary goods and raw aaterials producers. But,
once the gaae of aggressive coapetition had been put into
aotion, the gaae continued to sustain itself even when the
teras of trade were re- equilibrated.
The second paradox is given by the arguaent of 'less
eaployaent today for aore eaployaent toaorrow' . The underlying
thesis is that the country, increasing its coapetitiveness,
could gain wider shares of the world aarket; less eaployaent
today would increase productivity and allow the gain. The
obvious point is that what is iaportant is relative, and not
absolute, coapetitiveness. Since all countries are playing the
saae gaae, the relative coapetitiveness in the long run cannot
be stable, and the only gains could be in the short run (which
is the very saae short run during which less eaployaent is the
aean to obtain higher coapetitiveness), and not in the long
run, as it is instead claiaed.
6 . Sqae_8_B t gaiç_negat i ye f eedbacks
As we saw earlier, restrictive macro policies resulted to
be effective aainly In the fiscal and Monetary sphere (apart
froa the regulatory actions aiaed at aoderating wage
dynaaics), auch less in the sphere of public expenditure. In
the latter one, however, the cíalas that public expenditure
should be reduced continued to be conveyed as a signal to the
economic agents. despite the difficulties to iapleaent the
asserted intentions.
All of the above actions were interpreted by firas as an
unaabiguou« signal that the intention of the governaents was
not to allow either high rates of growth or long-lasting
expansive cycles. As a consequence, the expectations were
such as to lead firas not to enlarge, and possibly restrict,
their productive capacity. Investaents were thus concentrated
on increasing the level of productivity and on substituting
labour, rather than on the widening of capacity.
This produced further negative feedbacks. On the one hand
firas were not interested in creating the conditions for
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expanding production in response to the residual expansive
stiBuli deriving froa the effects of a relatively high,
although declining in its trend, public expenditure; therefore
they tended to respond in teras of higher prices, contributing
thus to aaintain a relatively high rate of inflation, or,
anyway, resisting to the pressure for curbing it. On the other
hand the stagnation pr the reduction of productive capacity
contributed to create conditions of rigidity for the
««régate supply of commodities; this, in turn, created the
conditions for a dynaaic shortage of supply in face of
expansive spells, and thus for inflationary pressures .
Both these effects fed-back upon the attitudes of
governaents, reinforcing their tendencies towards restrictive
policies. The overall restrictive attitudes had further
negative consequences. Many of the previously practiced public
aacro and alero policies had been . conceived and practiced(therefore producing a learning process) in an expansive
environaent. Many of thea, thus, had to be changed or
substituted, others becaae ineffective, others, eventually,
becaae contradictory.
All this contributed to raise the turbulence of the systea
and the degree of uncertainty about the future, reinforcing
thus negative expectations and producing an overall cliaate of
Biatrust about the ability of the etate to undertake effective
aeasuree and to regulate the systea. The above described
phenoaena added up to a long run tendency to a growing
Ineffectiveness and inefficiency of State activities, about
the causes of which we devoted soae attention in our 1985
Report. Our arguaents can be suaaarlzed as follows.
Host social policies were devised during a period in which
there existed a relative homogeneity of people who constituted
the aain clientele of social policies. The transf oraations of
society and its increased affluence were accoapanied by a
process of articulation and differentiation of social deaands ,
aspirations and needs. Unfortunately, the tools of social
policies failed to be updated in order to take into account
such transf oraations . The flows of expenditures continued but
their effectiveness decreased, and left people increasingly
unsatisfied.
The second reason is the vicious circle of the procedures
upon which the foraation of the public budget is based. The
aajor problea of those who are responsible for each line of
expenditure is to aaintain the ratio, or at least the level,
of their financial resources through tiae. This, together
with the concentration of the politicians' attention to the
financial flows, contributed to the obliteration of attention
to the substance of the actions and the concrete
effectiveness of the strategies with respect to which the
financial resources should be only a permissive factor.
Finally, spontaneous trends and the very saae phenoaena
that we are describing conjured in fragmenting the political
CHAPTER II 22 86830
Clientele and, therefore, the Interests which are cared for by
the political sphere.
All this made for a cultural and political cliaate
unfavourable to the regulatory activity of the state (while
the deaand for transfer payaents, quite obviously, continued
and was even reinforced by the deterioration of the econoaic
and eaployaent situation)'.
7· T-fee£S££tBt._â.i.ïo_s^
x -
In this section we will consider briefly how the econoaists
reacted to the challenges of the new environaent described
above. Theoretical thinking is characterized by selective
abstraction. It is of extreae interest, thus, to exaaine the
lenses through which the above scenario has been considered by
influential econoaic thought.
While before the early Seventies the conceptual fraaework
of general reference was basically unique (the fix-price
Keynesian aodel), the following period is characterized by a
flourishing of apparently differentiated approaches: neo-
Keynesian aodels, neo-aonetarist aodels, general equilibriua
and rational expectatiqns aodels. Besides such 'key-stone
theories', there has been an extraordinary development of ad
hoc applied aodelling, aostly econoaetric. Furtheraore , often
the leading econoaists belonging to the 'noblest' schools
recalled above, aanifested their influence writing on the
ordinary press; in such cases, however, they tended to use ad
hoc arguaents, quite far away froa their abstract theoretical
thinking and closer to the eclectic evidence accuaulated
within the set of applied econoaic analyses.
In our 1986 Report, we devoted auch attention to the most
iaportant features which characterized the process of change,
the transition froa the old fix-price Keynesian aodel to the
new set of leading aodels which declared theaselves as
Inspired by the Keynesian thought. Using the CEPS' Influential
papers as a critical target, we outlined the main turning
points of the theoretical transition and we deaonstrated the
anti-Keynesian nature of the final results. Therefore, we will
not deal with the issue here. However, we will try here to
outline the biases in the relationships aodels/facts of the
various approaches, with regard both to econoaic
interpretation and policy orientation.
Despite alleged differences, the main theoretical
approaches have in coaaon, a nuaber of relevant features, the
aost outstanding of which is that in none of thea the
international diaension plays a crucial role. We do not say,
by this, that such aodels do not allow for taking into account
international interdependency ; what we say is, «imply, that
the International diaension could Iconstltute a coaplication ,
or a coapletion, of the aodel, but the performance of the
aodel, which gives account of the phenoaena upon which the
interest of the aodel is focused, is already entirely
deterained by the structure of the relationships which stylize
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the system as if it were a closed system. In other words,
according to such models, we could have had exactly the saae
perforaances if our countries had continued to be only
aoderately dependant upon external trade and relationships, as
it used to be until the Sixties.
The second iaportant coaaon feature is the coaaon focusing
of attention upon the causes of inflation. Uneaployaent , in
all aodels, is soaething which happens to exist only in so
far as soaething wrong happens with regard to price
equilibriua. For the neo-aonetarists the disturbing factor is
given by an excess of aoney, for which the state is the direct
responsible'; for the neo-Keynesians the 'wrong variable' is
given by the level of noalnal wages (or of the noainal wages
dynaaics), which is too high. But in both cases, once the
price equilibriua conditions are broken, uneaployaent will
result as a consequence of it.
The third coaaon feature is given by the coaaon
microeconoml c specification of all these models, which pivot
on the hypothesis of diminishing returns to scale. This point
is crucial; so crucial that, should one withdraw the
decreasing returns hypothesis, all of the main results of the
above mentioned models would fall to hold.
Tn our 1986 Report we discussed this point at. length; there
we showed that Keynes himself accepted as an axiom such
hypothesis but that, his model, and above all his 'vision of
the world', did not depend on It. Tn fact the Hickslan version
of Keynes's model, and all the subsequent f1x-pr1ce
spécifications, did not depend on that hypothesis. Tt was
this, Incidentally, which allowed to fit 1n such models more
up-to-date theories of production and oligopolistic behaviour,
which not. only Integrated the theory hut. contributed to make
the whole building more realistic.
As we noticed several times, all the theories which at the
moment dominate the academic arena have gone hack to the
ninetieth century ml croeconoml c assumptions. The hypothesis of
diminishing returns was borrowed by the agricultural process
of production, to which It. applied because of the existence of
different land fertilities. Already the classical economists(and Ricardo 1s certainly the most representative of them from
this point of view) assumed that industrial production
processes had constant, productivity with respect to the scale
of production. The underlying consideration was that, should
the productivity hegln to decline beyond a certain scale of
the plants, additional plants would he constructed, since in
Industry, differently from agriculture, productive capacity
could be reproduced, at the same conditions, without any
limit; industrial processes can be replicated, while land
cannot .
The last common feature Is given hy the neglect, for the
numerous processes of Innovation and transformation outlined
1n the previous section; more in general such approaches do
not deal, and are not endowed to deal, with truly dynamic
phenomena .
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This odd phenomenon can he explained quite easily (and we
did it in our 1986 Report) as a consequence of having
attributed a pervasive role to the pretended law of
diminishing returns. Once It Is assumed, as It is, that the
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he level of production la larger than that
to minimum coat output; the output could he
nereaaed, with any additional output costing
than the previous one; and that 1a all. That,
neept of productive capacity- disappears. Quite
ry, the concept of productive capacity had a
in Keynes's analysis, since It was only in its
Inflationary pressures could arise.
As we observed 1n our 1986 Report, the authors
Report hold that, since the late Seventies, It has begun a
process of relative ' deeuau 1 a 1 1 on ' of capital; In other
they hold that, we are facing a lack of productive
We consider this statement aa being absolutely
think that. this 1 η tuition, given the
authors, is extremely important.
of CEPS
» un
words
capaci ty .
true, and we
influence of the
However, 1t aeeaa to us that this statement 1s made within
an analytical framework which could not allow for it, given
the above mentioned obliteration of any operative concept of
f ul 1 capaci ty.
Furthermore, 1t la obvious that we cannot agree upon the
alleged causes of the decline of capital accumulation. Tf
exeeaa wages were actually responsible for It -as the CEPS
economists hold- the adjustment processes which are described
by them In terms of substitution of capita, for labour,
should have already produced a compensation for excessive
oalnal wages, through an Increase In productivity. Therefore,
exeeaa real wages could not explain the lack of Incentives tn
Invest .
We think, on the contrary, that. a problem of incentives
exists, hut it. derives from he nature of prevailing
expectations, and mainly depends on the perverse action of
the governaents upon thea. This is why we consider as
Illusory the Idea of promoting an expansion of capacity only
through fiscal and monetary Incentives, without any action
aimed at molding suitable expectations.
Since the second half of the Seventies, both of the above
recalled approaches tended to transform themselves 1n general
equilibrium aodels. Fach of the approaches carried its basic
features with Itself. However, the really new thing was an
attempt to generalize the role of expectations, through the
so called 'rational expectations theory'. We Include such a
theory In our critical consideration because of the
implications that auch an approach has on policies, as we
will presently see.
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The theoretical foundations of rational expectations
theories can be summarized as follows. Given the uncertainty
about, the future, economic agents have to form expectations
about It. The traditional hypothesis of rationality of
economic agenta is thus transformed 1n such a way as to assume
that each agent has a 'model' to form his own expectations.
However, since rationality 1s unique, people share the saae
'best' model of the economy (a general equilibrium model with
rational expectations). Not only will the agent form his own
guesses ahout the future, hut he can do so because he knows
that the other agents have the same model and the same
guesses. Each one will then know the future behaviours of
other agents.
What is important 1s that people will have expeet.at.1ona
about policy makers. Tn other words, . elementary economic
agents know which would be the policy undertaken by
authorities In given circumstances and can, thus, adjust to
them in advance. However, this amounts to say that policies
have little acope.
This conclusion 1a substantially the same of that, of the
neo-monetar i st , although it eon Id he based on different
grounds. A alight difference exists however. While within the
neo-monetar 1 st approach policies are not only useless but are
the main responsible for our present, disturbances and evils(and this 1a the triumph of 'laissez faire'), within the
rational expectations framework there la still some room for
policy making; but the only effective policy would be a
'surprise policy'; that. 1a, a policy original (and irrational)
enough to be a surprise for economic agents, displacing thus
their (rational) expectations. Tt. Is 1 ntul t.1 ve , anyway , that,
this aaounts to a radical narrowing of the scope for economic
pol Icy making.
There Is st.111 an Important difference between rational
expectation« conclusions about policy and those of the neo-
monetarlst approach. While it. 1« true that activa policie«
are regarded by the latter approach a« being not only
Ineffective but. damaging, the recommendation that the neo-
monetarlsts make to the monetary authorities about the need
of announcing a given rate of aoney expansion and to stick to
this announcement, ia, in Itself, a policy; a policy -notice-
that highly stresses the problem of credibility on the «1de
of policy authorities. While doing so, even If It Is beyond
their scope, neo-monetar 1 st.« are actually ending up,
paradoxically, with a new kind of policy, based uniquely upon
a message of certainty with respect to economic agenta. This
point 1a important for u«, since one of our main point« will
be about the need that, the policy maker« «end credible
signal« to the economic agent«.
We nan now turn to the more heterogeneous knowledge
constituted by applied econoaic« and économie policy. A large
part, of It has heen heavily Influenced by the above recalled
main theoretical lines. This explain« why, also here, It is
possible to notice certain récurrent features.
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The prestige of the ao«t fundamental schools makes for an
eclectic view about, the sources of Inflation and the policies
to* take care of them. The responsibility tends to be
attributed to both factors alternatively outlined by the main
currents of thought: excess of expenditure and excess of
money on one side, excess of nominal wages on the other. Tn
hoth case« the attention 1« ma ini y. focused on the financial
flows which characterize, the economy and about the
'arithmetic«' of the rates of growth of nominal wages, labour
productivity, price« and labour coata.
Tt 1« In thl« context that we find the propositions which
are more adopted by government«, and, in particular, the one«
which underlie the moat adopted «trategle« of aggressive
competition, which constitute the central critical target of
the present Report.
Other 'applied economies' or 'applied policies' position«
are too contingent and differentiated to be dealt with here.
The only thing that 1« worthwhile to he mentioned here 1s the
fragmentations of conceptual framework« underlying
aleroeeonnalc policies, which 1« the mirror-Image of the
already noticed fragmentation of macro and micro-policies in
the reality.
Many of the supported meaaures , auch a« training policies,
marginal employment. subsidies, temporary labour hiring and
meaanrea aimed at. making the labour relationship« more
flexible, financial transfer« to the firm« to help their
reatruetnr 1 ng, have In general a broader «cope than the one
constituted hy the increase In labour productivity and the
lowering of labour costs; however they fit Into the
conceptual atructnrlng of macro-policies only In «o far a«
they 'appear' to Increase competitiveness and to lower
Inflationary pressure«.
Thle la clearly a «hort-«1 ghted position, since a wider
knowledge of the Impact« of such aeaaure« could suggest that
«ueh provi «Ion« are not a« affective a« they appear at a
firat look, while a deeper scrutiny could «how better
approaehe«. There 1«, however, a «eeond range of applied
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CHAPTER TTT
KEY-STONES FOR AN ALTERNATTVR APPROACH TO THE PRESENT CRTSTS
1 · _HVgh_j3 r o d u c t¿ VA ί ϊ*ί r.Äi-2EifiÄ51ld_u hemp,¿oye ent
Time has come to state In the simplest possible way the
basic rationale of the problems we are-facing. Tn order to do
it without ambiguities, we shall support our considerations
with extremely simple algebraic formulas.
The national product, Q, may be «een as the product of the
average labour productivity ν (how much a worker produces on
average per unit of time) times the number of employed
workers , Ν :
Q - ν Ν
Call N* the number . of workers corresponding to full
employment;
Q* - ν N*
would thus be the maximum possible output of our society.
We have unemployment, presently, in our societies.
Therefore we have an output which 1s less than the maximum
poss 1 hl e one :
Q~vN<Q*-vN*
The fundamental reason which 1« alleged for this, and that,
pushed the governments to adopt the presently prevailing
policies, i« that such policies Improve the competitiveness of
the countries which adopt. them, raise their average
productivity, and therefore their national product. Tt is
admitted that the choice of a compet.1t.1ve path could produce
unemployment 1n the short run; but this is regarded to produce
more employment 1n the longer run, since it. is held that the
gains In competitiveness will enlarge the national shares in
the international world trade.
«pi oyi
v2 N2 > Q1 « vi N*
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Obviously NI
un em pi oyment :
N* > N2. Therefore with strategy 2 there is
II - N* - N2
2 · Xhe_njíoea.8.a_y_nond¿t¿on^
Çî..ta.ï.egy...
Tn order to have a higher output with strategy 2, in such a
way that the statement [1] could hold, to have a higher
productivity associated with such strategy -is not sufficient.
The positive productivity differential must he large enough to
compensate for the fact, that less people are actually working;
in other words this differential must be someway proportional
to the level of unemployment which 1s associated with the most
productive strategy.
Very simple algebraic elaboration of [1] allows to state
such proportionality condition: 'in order that the most
productive strategy 2 can produce a higher output, the
productivity associated with It must exceed the productivity
associated with the less productive strategy 1 by a proportion
equal to the ratio between the unemployment and the employment
associated with the most productive strategy 2' (see appendix
1). Which simply means that, If the ratio between those who
are employed and the unemployed ones produced hy strategy 2
is, for example, 10%, the average productivity associated with
the most productive strategy 2 should exceed that, associated
with the less productive strategy 1 by at least 10%.
As we said earlier, European governments 'chose' , around
the mid of the 70's, type 2 strategies. As a consequencex
labour productivity began to grow very rapidly, almost twice
as fast than, e.g., in USA, and unemployment began to grow as
well. We are hound to suppose that, when each government did
that 'choice', It estimated that the proportionality condition
for preferring the most productive strategy held. And perhaps
governments were right at. the beginning. Rut how could we he
sure that. the pref erabi 1 1 t.y condition continues to hold true?
We simply cannot.
What suggests, anyway, that a negative answer to the above
question 1s more likely to be true than a positive one is the
observation that not only the level, but. also the rate, of
unemployment, kept growing.
As a matter of fact. the purely descriptive (and basically
tautological) 'model' presented ahove Is too simple to allow
to deal with the fundamentally dynamic and anyway complex
problems which are posed by the choice of strategies which pu
our countries along a competitive 'path', and therefore man
further considerations should be developed; but the model u-
the advantage of helng very clear, and
continue to use It, at least for the moment.
therefore we
t
y
has
wi 1 1
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3 . M¿xed__t r a tegy^ 0fit¿qn s_a nd_d¿f f ¿cu¿t¿e s .
Let us suppose that the proportionality condition stated
ahnve as being sufficient to prefer the most. productive
strategy 2 holds, and that strategy 2 Is. feasible. Any wise,
Imaginative, and non-economist. reader would be likely to
suggest. a third strategy (stratiegy 3), conceived as a
combination of the previously considered ones. Tn fact we
could employ N2 workers at an average productivity v2 -as It
1s possible with strategy 2- and then employ, although at the
lower average productivity vi , those who are left unemployed,
II. Tn this ease we would have in fact
Q3 = v2 N2 + v1 U > Q2 * v2 N2 [2]
Retter than that, we can state an even more general
proposition: 'It is always convenient, from the point of view
of output maximization, to employ an unemployed worker, at. the
only condition that his productivity is non- negative'. Tn
fact.
Q3 = v2 N2 + ν II > Q2 = v2 N2 for any v>0 [3]
Tn fact strategy 3 Is the one which would be selected -and
is actually adopted- in any non-market system (or sub-system),
provided only that there exists a set of social rules for a
proper allocation of people among jobs and for a commonly
accepted way to divide the system's output among the people
who contribute to its product, i on . Th 1 s 1s what, happens in any
administrative institution, In any family, in any rural
environment, 1n any community household; In brief, in any
social aggregation In which a direct attribution of tasks 1s
poss 1 bl e .
This objection can be resisted, though containing some,
and unfortunately quite persuasive, elements of truth. We will
delay to section 5 a full development, of this issue, except,
for one single point, dealt, with in the remaining part of this
sect 1 on .
The Implicit assumption hehlnd the above mentioned
ohjection is that the whole output is produced under strict
market conditions. Tt. would not. apply, therefore, under a
different regulatory regime that could allow a suitable mix of
different allocative and regulatory mechanisms.
This is not to deny the theoretical and technical
difficulties, not. to mention the political ones, that, would
hinder the invention of such a regime, but simply to stress
the essentially regulatory nature of the problem, and to argue
that a solution exists, as the basic wisdom of formula [3]
above clearly shows.
As a matter of fact, formula [3] 1s nothing else than the
rationale of a part of the presently attempted job creation
strategies. As It is well known, such strategies are not only
meeting heavy practical difficulties in their implementation
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and severe political opposition, hut. they are often criticized
on the nasi« that, they lack economically rational foundations.
Thi« 1« not true, and not only on the basis of the argument
of formula [3], but also on the basis of a more correct use of
the analytical tool« provided hy the most established
tradition of political economy, a» we will convincingly «how
in the next section.
* · Te.£h n^ c aj versus., ¿a^
The second reason was that we were Interested in showing,
since the beginning, that the system's performance always
improves as Its employment level grows, at. the only condition
that the additional worker« have a positive productivity. And
we consider this point as being very crucial, since It 1s the
obliteration of this simple and perfectly common sense truth
which has made persuasive the opposite message: that is, that,
a strategy which associates more unemployment with a higher
productivity 1s the best one to adopt. And 1t was an excess
of complication, embodied precociously Into the analysis,
that has allowed the concealing of the ohvlous truth stated
above. Time has come, now, also for us, to complete the
analytical set-up.
")
Commodities compete in terms of their market, price, which
depends not only on physical productivity hut also on input
prices, and, 1n particular, on wage«. Suppose that labour ia
the only input; as we saw earlier total output will then he Q
V N, the total cost of which will be C « w Ν . Therefore, the
unit cost, e , will be
c*C/Q»wN/vN«w/v [4]
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that. 1s, the unit cost 1s positively related to wages and
negatively to the productivity. Tt will be lower the lower 1«
the wage rate and the higher 1s the productivity.
Since the price will anyway be some function of unit cost
(1t will be, in fact such cost, plus a margin over 1 1. ) , this
implies that one can Improve his competitiveness either
Increasing productivity, v¿ or lowering the wage rate, w.
The competitive game between firms (or between sub¬
systems) can thus be started either because some of them
succeed in increasing their productivity, or because «ome of
them succeed 1n cutting the money wage« paid to their
empi oyees .
Tt. Is not very important, t.o establish who (which firms,
which sub-systems, which countries) began the competitive game
sometime in the mid Seventies, nor It. 1« Important t.o
establish how -whether In teras of productivity increases or
in terms of wage cuts. What matters 1s that, once the game, had
been started, both strategies were used and wage cuts are not
likely to have played a secondary role, with relevant social,
as well as economic, negative feed-haeks.
5 · A_f urther_deye¿q_men t_o_ _the_eqmn.et¿t¿venes sargument .
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We will try to demonstrate here that, this argument is not.
only Insufficiently specified, hut. that, it cannot, stand any
relevant, test, of 'realism', In the light of how modern systems
of production and labour and lahour market, relations actually
work In industrialized societies. But. before doing so, notice
that, the argument, does not say anything, in itself, about
whether the system will have or not full employment. The
reasoning, in other words, applies only t.o the 'transition'
among differently productive (or 'efficient') techniques.
Whether there will be full employment depends on other things,
which are not. directly considered hy the argument, but that
we have already recalled in the previous chapter, and treated
at length in our 1986 Report: that is, It will depend -at
least within a system 'closed' to international competi t 1 on-
on whether money wages are set in the 'right.' proportion with
the average price of commodities, 'given' the productivity.
Therefore we could have -according to this argument- or have
not, full employment with both strategy 1 and strategy 2. The
above perspective, that, is substantially shared by both neo-
aonetarlst and neo-Keynes1 an schools of thought,. strictly
depends on the hypothesis of decreasing returns t.o scale,
which Implies a model which makes the scale of the system
depend only on real wages: the higher is the average level of
commodity prices with respect to the average level of money
wages, the higher would be the output and the employment.
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w(i) / v(1) [5]
where x* is a constant equal for each of the techniques 1, and
this result. can be ensured by any combination of higher wages
for the workers associated with better techniques and lower
wages for the workers associated with worse techniques.
What the above considerations make clear 1s that the thesis
that differently productive techniques can not. coexist
strictly depends on the hypothesis that one of the following
assumptions hold:
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(a) wages paid for equal jobs are strictly equal and depend
only on the subjective skills of every single, potentially
highly mobile, worker;
(b) wages paid hy differently productive firms can be either
equal or different, but that, once established, they are
rigid, that 1s, they are not. subject to change 1f
productivity differential between firms changes, as
consequence of the adoption, hy some of them, of
productive techniques.
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As we saw, the competition between differently efficient
techniques requires, in order to he possible, that wages have
to be relatively rigid, so that they do not adapt, rapirily and
in a smooth way, to the substitution of techniques.
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This change of perspective, however, has further relevant
our ' transi tionimpl 1 eati ens for
of ' Inf ra-«y«tem ' competitiveness and within a
'inter-system' competitiveness. Such Implications
developed 1n the next section.
problem, both within a ease
ease of
will be
ft · £fi.*i.tiye_a nd...ne.ga t j_v e_sum_gaaes. .
The basic rationale of standard econoa 1 e .theory Is that the
gaae of competition 1s one which maximizes the prizes which
are available for the whole of the participating gamblers. Tn
other words, the game allows the gamblers to produce (as a
part of the activities of which, the game Itself consists); If
the gamblers adopt, a compet.1t.1ve strategy, the resulting total
production will be larger than the 'production that would
result as a consequence of the .. adoption of alternative
strategies (as, for example, cooperative strategies).
Present as well as past, history tends t.o demonstrate the
opposite. Full employment 1s In fact, rather the exception than
the rule; furthermore, high levels of employment, have been
attained only under regulatory frameworks which controlled and
Integrated purely market forces. More 1n general, the forces
of cooperation and social solidarity have contributed to the
structuring and the development. of our economies and of our
societies -a« they presently are- certainly not less than the
purely antagonistic forces which dominate market, interactions.
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The reasons why we prefer t.o use these factual arguments 1s
that they should be convincing enough here, while we could not
pretend t.o survey or not. even to summarize the whole of purely
theoretical arguments which have been raised against the
theories which hold the opt.lmality and sel f-snf f 1 el ency of
market allocation. We shall limit ourselves to very few and
very specific arguments, connected -as anticipated- t.o the
'transition' argument explored ahove in section 5.
Suppose that, each 'firm', or sub-system, S(j) (so that. S(1)
1« 'firm' 1, S(2) is 'firm' 2, etc., as j * 1,2,...) has a
«hare Q(j) of the total market (of the whole system) Q 'which
depend« on the ratio between the price of Its output p(j) and
the average level of prices, p* : the lower Is such a relative
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price, the larger 1s Its market. share, as 1t 1s shown -for
example- In the following prospect:
P(j)/P* 1 .00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80
1 ncrea se in
market, share: 0 .00 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.30
Suppose, furthermore, that such a price results from the
application of a fixed coefficient m>1 to the unit cost, so
that
P(j) n(j) [ w(j) / v(j) ] [6]
Tt 1s obvious that the gamble can not. succeed 1f the other
players adopt, in reaction, a similar strategy; in fact, In
so far as each of the players will succeed in cutting their
prices, the average level of price will decrease, and thus
tend t.o restore the previous levels of relative prices. Any
gain in the market. shares Is thus bound to he transitory.
Nevertheless, 1f each roiind of the game 1s long enough, and 1f
the players are not conscious of their reciprocal
interdependence, these transitory gains will he sufficient t.o
make the game last.
We have, thus far, a basically zero-sum game, which, once
put into motion, tends to last. This result, however, strictly
depends on the fact. that we did not consider the systemic
effects of the changes affecting, because of the game, wages,
productivities, and possibly the overall levels of demand and
productive capacity.
Once we take th
manifest Itself
basi ca 1 ly due to
with aggregate de
levels and labour
negative λ urn game
necessarily to ea
referring to the fi
EEC 'system' 1a bo
some of the ERC
off. 'Better off'
respect t.o other
completely alterna
em Into co
as he 1 ng
two diffe
mand, the
standard«
we refer
c h of th
uropeah ar
und to be
countries
, however,
ootintr i es
tive game
nslderat
a nega
rent can
second
Obvio
to th
e 1nvol
ena , we
worse of
could f
with
cert« 1 η
1 « Inst
1 on ,
tive
ses ,
dea
usi y
e w
ved
say
f. w
Ind
re
ly
end
the
-sum
the
1 1ng
, wh
hol e
par
that
hi le
hi
spec
yea;
rath
gam
on
fir
wl
en
sy
ties
the
no
mse 1
t. t
wl t
er d
e 1s
e .
st o
th
we t.
«tem
wh
rie
be
w
re
Uk
This
ne ri
empi
alk
an
tha
ol e
ny 1 η
i ng
hat?
spec
oubtf ui .
e 1 y to
is
ea 1 1 ng
oyment
of a
ri not
t la,
of the
g that
het ter
With
t to a
The 'game trap' stay«, Indeed, in this bla« of
perspectives. The first possible bias 1s given by the fact
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The only thing they perceive, while unconsciously playing
the game, Is that if they. succeed 1n being more competitive -
and as long as they keep succeeding- they are better off than
they would be If they stopped to practice the search for
competitiveness. And this perception -1s the first of the
factors that. make the game continue, as it is difficult to
shift t.o a different game.
The second possible h1as Is given by the fact that none of
the players 1s conscious of the situation in which he will
find himself, should a completely different game exist. Anri
this 1s the second factor which, hiding the very same option
of changing the game, forestalls a major change of. the rules.
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For any given time-rate of increase in productivity, either
the time-rate of increase in riemanri and output, is at. least as
large, or the level of employment is bound to fall. This is
exactly what. happened in the EEC countries in the last, decade
or so .
On this Issue we have different schools of thought.
According t.o those who totally believe In the self- regulatory
mechanisms of market forces, the real wage rates are st.111
exceedingly high; should they lower more than they actually
diri, the activity rate of the system would Increase, up t.o
full employment. Historical experience seems to militate
against, them; unemployment has kept growing 1n the last decade
or so, while real wage rates have kept decreasing or, at.
least, remained stähle.
According to us, the two constraints mentioned above cannot
be considered as being similar. The external balance
constraint depends on the International competitiveness game;
more exactly It is a part of It (that is why we talkeri of
'strategies' since section 2 above). Tf this 1s true, It can
be released or softened only through more international
coordination and cooperation; a form of coordination and
cooperation that could Interrupt, or at least, regulate, the
international negative-sum game.
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As far as inflation is concerned, we have to recognize that
the argument is very serious, and that economic theory has not.
been able, until now, t.o deal with the Issue in a way that
conici result. at the same time satisfactory and wiriely
accepted .
Tn sections 2.7 and 2.8 of our 1986 Report we attempted to
develop a suitable dynamic explanation of the sources of
inflation. Such explanation, had the advantage of giving a
consistent account. of several contextual phenomena which
appear t.o have -or have had- a role In determining the present,
scenario: not only the inflation but. also the search for
flexibility, the réduction of employment, and the reduction of
productive capacity (what the experts of CEPS correctly
stress, calling it. 'capital decumul a 1 1 on ' , failing, however,
to give a consistent, explanation for It).
We can summarize It here (hut we will develop it. further in
the course of next. chapter) by saying that the set of
strategies previously outlined, together with their systemic
effects, are perceived hy firms as signals against the
likelihood of a widespread recovery. Such negative
expectations' w1 1 1 lead firms to concentrate their Investments
on productivity gains, without wlriening their productive
capacity (unless indicated by the prospects for expansion of
specific commodity markets which do not depend on the
possibility of a generalized recovery). This makes for a
rigidity towards; expansion of aggregate supply, and makes the
systems more vulnerable to inflationary pressures.
Tn the meantime countries continue to compete each against,
the others. However, since the possibility of increasing
productivity 1s limited, the competition increasingly affects
wages and lahour standards, which constitute, under certain
circumstances, the only 'free' variable left, as we will argue
in the next section.
Within and across socio-economic systems, an equilibrium
coniti establish itself that allows for a certain level and
structure of labour and social standards, which on the one
hand guarantee relatively fair, or at least acceptable,
working conditions, protection against arbitrary lay-offs,
social security benefits, etc., and, on the other hand,
contribute to maintain a relatively good standard of leaving,
a relatively acceptable distribution of Income, wealth and
jobs, good standards for the reproduction of the labour force
and of human resources in general, and a suit.ahle market, for
growing production.
Such an equilibrium existed around the sixties, and had
been built up along the previous riecaries; many scholars regard
this as the source of the second post-war affluence.
'Equilibrium' is intended here In a rough sense, and does
not. Imply that, lahour and social standards are equal, and not.
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even homogeneous, acros« competing systems (regional,
sectorial, national). Tt simply implies that the repercussions
that the standards have upon the relative competitiveness of
systems are such as not to produne. major Imbalances in the
exchanges of commodities that take . place among them.
Within each system the standards can be maintained so long
as strongly shared -or Imposed- sodai or legal common rules
are respected, and «o long, a« f ree-r 1 d i ng . 1 a repressed. This
lapllea, In other word«, that production costs Include a share
of what we can call 'solidarity costs' -or 'solidarity hill * -
that la accepted and does not alter eompet.1t.1ve equilibria so
long aa all of the competitive agent« hear them more or less
homogeneously.
This kind of equilibrium among countries 'is ohvlously much
more fragile, and it 1« more easily kept when the levels of
international trades are relatively minor and as long as trade
balance« are effectively regulated through appropriate
coordination instruments. However, the possible help of common
social and cultural concerns, or more in general of social
and political values, should not. he overlooked.
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Th1« 1s what appear« to have happened since the Seventies
at the International level. Tn fact the aoRt industrialized
countries moved along a path of progressive deregulation of
their labour markets, dismantling their welfare systems and
labour standards.
This game, which was begun hy governments, which helleved
they could contribute in thia way to keep under control
Inflation as well as external imbalances, and hy employers,
who had evident vested Interests In doing so, ended up in
Involving even trade union«, «o powerful Is the strength of
cultural stereotype« («ee our 1985 Report).
The nature of negative-sum game of auch patterns of
Interaction« 1« obviou«, a« we noticed before, once one puts
himself in a ayateale perspective. The perception of this,
however, 1« unfortunately not sufficient to revert the
presently prevailing att.1t.udea, given the apparent certainty
of the immediate gains earned through the continuation of
selfish adjustment«, the convenience of free-riding, the
unlikelihood and the difficulty of reaching cooperative
solutions, and finally given, the lack of Immediate political
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rewards associated with the construction of a proper
negotiation set-up.
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As ant.1dpat.eri, we will attempt, in. the remaining sections
of this chapter, t.o reconcile the macroeconomic reasoning of
sections 1-4 with the problem of the criteria for evaluating
puhlic actions Involving additional employment.
Can we accept, without f nrther . qua 1 1 f 1 cat. 1 on« , the
proportionality nond.ition we stated . 1n section 3 above as
being 'sufficient' for preferring the most productive strategy
2 ? Tn order to say that a situation Is better than another
one, 1« It really sufficient that the level of output Is
larger? Would we really be ready tri accept any rate of
unemployment 1n order t.o have more output?
No policy maker -we believe-woulri dare to provide a
straightforward positive answer to the ahove questions.
Though, the very same policy maker would he likely t.o refuse a
job creation project, the benefit/cost ratio of which 1s, for
example, 0.99. But how the cost« and henefits are computed,
even according t.o our best cost-benefit ordinary techniques?
Here Is the answer,
language. Suppose we have
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RC p(T) Τ + w1 NI + w* N2 < FC [β]
The project will be
larger than or equal to
purely financial cost,
of value' is the real
perfectly corresponds
adopted If what is produced, R, is
Its real cost RC, 1 nriepenrient 1 y of the
Therefore, In this case, the 'standard
value of the product. This 'rule'
to the 'sufficient.' proportionality
condition Illustrated In section 3 ahove.
However it is also evident that no positive value
whatsoever 1s attached t.o lowering unemployment, despite what
policy makers might officially state in an opposite
direction, when they are directly questioned about
unemployment; at least, as long as the ahove described way of
performing eost/henefit analyses will continue t.o be adopted.
Tf a positive value were actually attached to lowering
unemployment, this should result in the feasibility (that is,
acceptance) of projects for which RC > R (computed as in
formula [8]), at. the condition that the elimination of that
uneaployment Is estimated to have at least the same value of
the loss of production (RC - R) associated with the adoption
of the project.
Tn fact, saying that. something (unemployment) 'has a
value', Implies that one Is ready to give up something else
(production) 1n order to get. some more of the former. This is
not new. Tf one has several partially incompatible goals, so
that one can not reach them all, one has to 'trade off' (as
economists say), or to 'sacrifice' (as ordinary people say),
some of the goals 1n order t.o oht.aln more of the remaining
ones .
Nothing new, as we said. Do you remember the Phillips curve
regarded as 'a menu of economic policies'? Since less
unemployment, appeared to produce higher Inflation rates, the
policy maker had to choose between some point less of the rate
of unemployment. and some point more of the rate of inflation;
and the actual choice depended -it was said- on the relative
Importance that the policy maker attributed to lowering
unemployment In relation with the stability of prices.
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T t. is of no importance, here, whether the above described
perspective was right or wrong. Tt was widely shared among
both, economic experts and policy makers. And since most of
the countries, then, accepted to have some inflation, this
Implies that, policy makers attached -then- some positive value
t.o the reduction of unemployment; 'then' -notice- when the
unemployment rate was much lower than now. Why should it. have
no value at all today?
1 ° · P.EU.dne.t¿ye_and._un^ 	 Soma_8.ugge8..t¿ons.._f_rom
the classical scheme
The point Is, 1n
strongly hiased, from a
system of values which
looking at. market,
aggressiveness we have
chapter .
our opinion, that we are presently
cultural point of view, hy an unsound
pivots around a distorted way of
efficiency and the competitive
dealt with in the course of this
The current situation, from the perspective of the labour-
force structure and composition; can he better interpreted if
we adopt - though 1n a critical way - some analytical
suggestions originally developed hy classical economists. We
refer, In particular, to the concepts of productive and
unproductive labour.
Let. us start hy expounding, very briefly, what Classical
economists (Smith, Ricardo, but also Marx) Intended by
'productive lahour'. Tn brief, lahour 1s productive if it is
employed hy capital and, In the process of being employed,
gives rise t.o a profit, I.e. a monetary surplus, a value
exceeding that which has been advanced by the capitalist
entrepreneurs t.o hire labour Itself and to huy raw materials,
machines, etc. On the contrary, all labour that does not
produce a profit for its employers has to be regarded as
'unproductive' (namely, unproductive of a profit).
Tn these definitions, the qnal1t.at.1ve attributes of the
produced goods (and/or services) do not play any role. Workers
producing the same goods can he productive or unproductive. Tf
they work under capitalist rules they are proriuctive.
From this point of view, for classical economists, all
workers which are employed by the state are unproductive.
Although they produce useful and Indispensable goods and
services, they do not produce a profit since the state is not
concerned with obtaining a profit, hut only with ensuring an
orderly functioning social system and with providing those
Infrastructures which allow the society as a whole to
reproduce and grow. Unproductive lahour Is useful (1t produces
use-values) hut. 1s not. employed in view of obtaining a profit.
Classical economist«, however, realized that ' some
qualifications were required. They Introduced, though not.
explicitly, a third kind of labour which we may call
'indirectly productive' labour. Tndirectly proriuctive workers
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are those whose produce (goods or services) contrihut.es t.o
raise the rate of profit in the capitalist (market.) sector.
They do so hy lowering costs of production for firms. Obvious
examples are to be found in all those eases of state workers
which are employed to produce goods and services which enter
Into the productive processes of capitalist firms: building
road«, bridges, railways, etc. Tn all these cases, the state
takes care of production (because no private firms would start
such productions in that they are not regarded as profitable),
and then provides those good« and service« either fraa or at. a
price which 1« below their 'natural price' (that 1s , the
price that would ensure a normal rate of profit for the
supplier). Thus the capitalist sector 1s enabled to acquire
some of the required means of production at a price which is
below that. which would prevail If those means of production
had heen supplied hy the capitalist sector itself. Costs of
production are lower and hence, the rate of profit is higher.
Tn order that the state play th i a role it Is of course
necessary that. the goods and services produced by it are of a
kind that are used, directly or indirectly, in other
productive processes. Ry using modern terminology we can
define indirectly productive worker« in a more precise way.
They produce haslc commodities which are made available hy
the «tate at a price which i« not Inclusive of a profit.
Tndirectly proriuctive workers do not. produce any monetary
surplus for their employer but allow the capitalist sector
(and, hence, workers employer! In 1t) to give rise t.o higher
return« .
So far, 1n «pita of some simplifications and without paying
attention to differences among classical economists, we used
concepts and Ideas which have been present. in economic
thought for almost two centuries. Let us now see, whether
those concepts can he useful t.o our current, purposes.
Modern market. economies are characterized by such a
pervasive state Intervention 1n the economic field that, the
classical concept of indirectly productive lahour appears
quite useful, Indeed more significant than 1t might have been
when nl.aaalnal economists wrote. Tn fact, In a way or
another, this concept has heen recently used and referred to
In the debate on the economic role played by the state In
Western economies.
But there is another aspect, which deserves attention and
leads ua to some aspects that appear significant in our
current context. Tf the category of indirectly proriuctive
applies to all those workers who proriuce means of production,
why should It not. apply to those workers who play a role in
the proces« of production and reproduction of the 1 ahour-f orce
itself (eg. education, health care, etc.)? Public Intervention
In these sector« lowers the cost of production/reproduction of
the labour force for the capitalist sector. Tt. provide«
worker« whose productivity 1« higher without making the
private sector pay for auch a 'higher quality' output. Thus,
also workers employed in these areas of the public sector have
to he regarded as Indirectly proriuctive. From this
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perspective, the economic meaning and relevance of state
Intervention acquire new dimensions. It is easier to
appreciate the Importance which state intervention has - and,
presumably , has always nari - In market economies.
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We may conclude hy saying that, although the disti
between proriuctive and reproductive labour is no Ion
relevant, as It might have heen in the classical perlo
puhlic sector intervention certainly does not.
represent a waste of resources. Resources (workers) whi
'subtracted' from the market, sector are not. merely devo
unproductive (wasteful) uses hut. they might. be
productive from a glohal systemic point. of view. A f o
this statement should In general apply to workers
under normal circumstances, are kept, unemployed, that
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Tf we apply this approach to the Issue of puhlic
employment, job creation through public spending immediately
takes on a different meaning. Public job creation would not.
be simply a 'cooperative' diversion of resources (from the
private to the public sector) to alleviate sodai problems
and tensions. Tt woulri also he a form of 'social investment':
those resources publicly employed would determine an overall
higher productivity at the aggregate level.
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Rut if this approach, on the one hand allows us to look at.
state Intervention from a more general -and a more correct-
perspective, it, on the other hand, also implies greater
responsibility for the public sector Itself. What, we said
about public employees does not mean, in fact, that any form
of public employment. 1s 'indirectly proriuctive'. On the
contrary, in many areas, public employment. may represent a
mere waste of resources, 1n that the output does not. affect,
the aggregate national output. in any positive way. Tn these
CBses puhlic Joh creation- Is likely to be an Inefficient form
of income redistribution. Therefore, labour policies aiming
directly to create jobs must be very careful in the choice of
the areas and of the outputs to be provided through the newly
createti jobs.
There 1s a last Issue which has to he dealt, with. Public
goods and services which are 'functional' t.o production and
reproduction at. the global level also affect the living
standards of the recipients in a very evident and clear way.
Tn the case of the working classes, In particular, 1t is a
form of riemanri for higher wages/services. Therefore It Is not
at all surprising that the demand for these puhlic goods and
services has grown fast.
Rut here we have the same contradictory aspects that we can
see In the roles played by wages paid hy the market sector. On
the one hand, wages are 'functional' to the process of
reproduction in that they allow the labour- force to reproduce
Itself and to ensure this fundamental means of production; on
the other hand, wages -and, In particular, wages increasing
too fast- imply negative effects on the economic system as a
whole, to the extent that they jeopardize profits and the
profitability of proriucing and investing.
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We might Interpret the recent. confrontation over
dismantling the Welfare state In many Western countries from
this perspective. Many feel that the current, situation 1s
characterized by unacceptable distortions in the basket of
goods provided hy the puhlic sector: there are too many
services and goods which, though useful to the labour-force,
are 'unproductive' for the economic system.
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CHAPTER TV
CHANO TNG THE GAME TO CREATE A NEW ENVIRONMENT
1 · ÏL(-_£l.Ç5P.l-3_ifiL_.,lÊïi5ÎîlEa_S3-î5J-nEïii.·.
Tn the previous chapters we have accumulated a wide and
articulated set of elements which can be utilized In order to
frame and t.o hullri up a complex strategy, or, rather, a set.
of coordinated strategies suitable to attempt. a way out from
the present crisis. We find 1t 'useful t.o summarize them here.
1. There is a set of negative i nterriepenrienc i es , acting at the
International level, which proriuces, and contributes t.o
maintain, a negative sum game. The main features of such a
situation are the following ones.
1.1. Various economies (and among them, in particular,
EEC countries) have become heavily integrated, up to the
point of having substantially generated a real new
system. Such a system, Instead of having a unique
decisionmaker and regulatory agency, as it would be
appropriate for any system, is actually ruled by many
governments, which act In an uncoordinated and
conflicting way.
1.2. The economic systems, which formerly competed only
at the level of international trade, increasingly
compete at. the level of economic policies.
1.3. Tt. is difficult. to abandon the present game. While
the continuation of aggressive and competitive strategies
promises some, although transitory, advantages, the
hehavlours which are needed to ahandon the game appear
to generate possible losses, which are higher the larger
1s the risk that, other countries keep on playing the old
game. Furthermore, the perception of the advantages
possihly deriving from a new game requires a good deal
of imagination, trust, and intelligence.
1.4. The aggressive attitudes which have been developed
at the international level reverberated at the level of
domestic national arenas, eroding the attitudes
favourable to cooperative strategies, both at. the
national and international levels.
1.5. Tn each of the Involved countries there are
pressures in favour of autarkic strategies.
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2. Dornest, i c macro-policies conjure with the above described
international situation to create an extremely turbulent,
negative and uncertain framework for firms' expectations.
2.1. This climate produces negative attitudes, on the
side of the firms, towards expanding their productive
capacity (their capital as well as their labour 'stock').
Such attitudes are perfectly rational, since the
framework described above is i. far from suggesting the
likelihood of an enduring expansion and of the fact that
policy authorities would not interrupt expansive spells.
2.2. Inflationary responses to expansive spells are
generateti either by a dynamic shortage of supply, due to
lack of productive capacity, or to the fact that, firms,
given such a context, anticipate the events hy 'betting'
on price Increases.
3. This systemic 'disease' was initially generated by a series
of changes occurred in the international arena and in
macroeconomic policies. Further causes and associated events,
however, enter into the picture, contributing to structure the
overall final result.
3.1. There has been a deterioration of industrial
relations, due to a sharper conflict upon wages and a
more Intensive search for flexibility on the side of
firms. There is now a major uncertainty about, the most,
appropriate strategies for personnel management.
3.2. There has been an acceleration
and technological changes.
of organizational
3.3. There has been a deterioration of the technological
envi ronment .
3.4. There has been a deterioration of the qualitative
trends concerning policies about human resources. The
progressive educational and sodai policies envisaged
between the end of the sixties and the early seventies
failed to he maintained and/or Implemented; their formal
structure, when maintained, was gratinai ly fi lieti hy
different aims and contents. The efforts towards the
promotion of general and higher education were
substituted by narrowly conceived training policies.
3.5. There has heen a loss of control upon the trends of
public expenditure, while its quality deteriorated
anri/or the public interventions became less effective.
The Image of the puhlic sector among ordinary people
deteriorateti as well.
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4. We know that production would he larger if we succeeded in
making 1t possible for the unemployed to work, only provided
that their productivity is positive, though smaller than the
'normal' productivity In the sphere of marketable goods (see
the last two sections of chapter 3 above). Such production
might Increase the level of well being of the population, or
result in a higher productivity of the system, or both,
Independently of the fact. that such positive results are
acknowledged or not in terms of market values.
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The main policy implications are the following ones:
(1) Labour policies, and 1n particular the youth unemployment,
policies which have been widely adopted hy EEC countries, are
fundamentally useless, since none of them 1s appropriate to
deal with the set. of problems which have been - in itself and
within the present context - outlined. Some of the lahour
policies could result, useful, hut. only within the framework of
an entirely different setup.
(2) No policy, if undertaken hy a single country
coordination with the other connected ones, could obt
relevant result. The main difficulty, however, is t
countries to collaboration and coordination. Recause o
1 1. is better to avoid attempts t.o get very wide agr
among countries, and to search for effective agreement
a limited number of countries, at least at the beginni
Irieal target. would he to reach suitable agreements am
countries; but even a more limited coalition could con
a good! starting point.
w i t. h o u t.
a 1 η any
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sti tute
(3) The most Important. target is to estahllsh a climate of
credibility about the undertaken policy arrangements. This, in
turn, implies
(1) that. the agreed structure of international
coordination be credible; in order to have this, the
hehavlour of most. countries should obey t.o clear
automatic rules, that should be establisheri through
CHAPTER TV 50 86230
national laws before Implementing
parts of macro-expansive policies;
the discretionary
(11) that
gratina 1 ;
the pursued expansion should be Moderate and
(111) that. the pursued expansion should he announced
mostly in real terms, that is, It should be openly
translated 1n terms of programmes about 'things t.o he
done ' .
(4) Macro-pol 1 d es should he supported and Integrated by
consistent micro policies, fostering the effects of the former
upon the needed increase 1n productive capacity, while
discouraging bets on prices and rewarding firms that, choose to
expand real output and employment. The structural design of
such, entirely new, micro-policies will be actually
desc*riberi 1n section 6 below.
(5) The fifth implication is that the policy of coordination
and cooperation at the International level should be
replicated within the single countries. A new launch of
cooperative strategies and of cooperation among otherwise
conflicting parties would contribute
(1) t.o stabilize positive
framework of certainties;
expectations, reinforcing the
(11) t.o corroborate
macro-po 1 1 e i es ;
the credibility of the adopted
(i11) t.o corroborate
cooperation.
the climate of international
This implies a strict collaboration/negotiation between
planning authorities and social partners, to set the likely
and/or desired values of the main macroeconomic magnitudes,
to stipulate the set. of consistent. behaviours to which the
negotiating partners have to comply, and to define the
sanctions for failure and the rewards for success (the past
Austrian experience is very suggestive in this respect.)
(6) Macro policies should be Integrateti hy additional
policies, aimed at. forestalling the Idleness, and thus the
deterioration, of labour and human resources in general,
through special job-creation programmes. The feasibility
criteria for the choice of such programmes should be agreed
internationally, along the lines suggested 1n the previous
chapter of this Report. For each Individual there should be
the guarantee that It will not. he allowed that he remains Idle
for longer than a predetermined and clearly defined length of
time; Incidentally, this would contribute 1n Itself to keep a
favourable climate of expectations, since firms (as it. is
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presently happening In Sweden) woulri reati in that a serious
plea, on the side of policy makers, towards a high level of
employment and towards expansion.
(7) The extent, of direct measures for special joh
programmes, anri not only their evaluation criteria, s
agreeri at the International
adjustments, that such measures
eoulri reverberate upon prices
competitiveness. Recause of this,
to he pursued in the longer run
1 evel
make
and ,
the
, wou
measures by an Increase In Indirect tax
ariri1t.1onal tax on consumption goods),
borne by exported commodities;
Inconvenient, in the shorter run,
develop a pressure on prices In
policies begin t.o take off, which
(8) More in general the efforts
macro-pol 1 d es and towards adri1t.1
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(9) A good way of weakening the effects of the contradictions
rieserlberi unrier (8) woulri be that of reconverting the use of
European funris, In such a way as to make more resources flow
towarris the countries which have higher unemployment rates or
infra-European trade deficits.
(10) A further important Implication (the ninth one) Is that
the whole group of agreeing countries should aim at. reflating
the foreign demanri for the goods proriueeti within the area.
This can he pursueri by two coorril nateti sets of measures. On
one sitie proviriing a system of guarantees anri loans almeri at.
fostering the trade between the area and a relevant, group of
new developing countries. On the other side by promoting long
term contracts between such countries and pools of firms
belonging to different, countries within the area.
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(11) More in general, the whole of agreeing countries should
promote a 'fair' degree of competitiveness with respect to
the rest. of the world, meaning hy this the fact that the
ability to compete should not. be based, as it. tends to be
presently, on the erosion of labour standards and on the
compression of wages, but rather on systemic efficiency, on
the maximum exploitation of intelligence and culture, on well
planner! Industrial coordination policies aiming at the
valorization of the complementarities and sinergies which
appear to he potentially available wl.thln the European area.
(12) This requires to devote the maximum of efforts In favour
of education anri research, while deeply revising the
presently prevailing tendencies favourable to low-profile
training policies. Such policies, 1n fact, while possibly
effective in the short run, not only reduce employment, but.
contribute to make the system more rigid, since the
tendencies towarris continuous Innovations tenti to make any
specific skill rapirily obsolete. Education, on the contrary,
tends t.o make the lahour force potentially more flexihle and
to mold the social environment In such a way as t.o become
more creative anri ready t.o accept innovations and their
fruits. This does not Imply skipping training activities, hut
rather avoiding to overstress their role and importance,
shifting resources from training to general and higher
education, making training vicarious t.o education.
(13) Many of the previous policy suggestions require a real
leap in the quality of public action and, therefore, in
Intelligence and culture of public administration. Many of
the suggestions imply also a widening of state Intervention.
Should the extension of the traditional sphere of state
intervention and the quality of puhlic administration remain
as they presently are, the emergence of a negative attitude
towards the proposed measures among ordinary people, mass
media and politicians, would be likely to occur. This is why
the whole of the proposed measures have not. only t.o be
accompanied by, hut rely on, a profound revision of the
philosophy of public action. The range of direct. Interventions
should narrow, while that. of regulation should widen; the
state should directly rio less things anri become more capable
t.o order t.o do things t.o third parties and to control that
they properly and timely comply to such orders; in short,
thus, less 'doing', anri more 'regulating anri controlling'.
Tn the first two sections of the chapter we have provirieri a
synthetic anri condensed exposition of the basic structural
characteristics of our suggested guidelines. Tn the following
ones we shall reconsider most, of these suggestions in a more
rietal ieri way anri In a more relaxed style. We hope that some
inevitable repetitions be compensated by hett.er
understanding.
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Even if there is no moral solidarity between the
nearly related races of Europe, there 1s an
economic solidarity which we cannot disregard. Even
now the world markets are one '. (...) This 1s to put
the issue on its lowest grounds.. There are other
arguments, which the most. obtuse cannot Ignore,
against, a policy of ..spreading and encouraging
further the economic ruin of great countries. (J.
M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace,
1919)
The present situation can also be depicteri by saying that
it Is character 1 zeri by a very high degree of countries'
selfishness. Each single country relies on the hope to
achieve more positive resulta at the domestic level by
shifting the burrien of the present situation onto other
countries: 1f the country is successful 1n achieving a higher
productivity It becomes more competitive with respect to
other countries, and enlarges 1 1. a share of the world market;
then it 1s able to rise its level of activity and, hence, its
level of employment.
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Thus, overcoming this situation seems to require, that all
countries rely on solidarity, cooperation, and coordination
much more than they are presently doing. Tn fact, the
rationale which underl les our proposals is founried on
emphasizing the social anri economic relevance of solidarity,
coordination, and cooperation at. the domestic as well as the
international level.
Our proposals aim to lead t.o positive-sum games, with
countries/social groups earning in the medium/long run,
although possibly paying some prices In the short.' run.
Moreover, it is quite evident that the countries which should
be bearing the heaviest burden In terms of losses in the short
run are necessarily those that are better off In the current
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situation. Thus, what, we believe is required Is a high degree
of clairvoyance as opposite t.o shortsightedness. Only if
countries prove to be ahle to go beyond the mere short, period
we can justifiably hope that the present, critical situation
will he overcome .
4 · ífiHfir.Üs_£fi.9.EíÍÍB.&t¿on_a.n^^
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operati on ,
countries can
of -coordination, c o -The way toward a higher degree
and homogeneity of policies among European
be made easier anri more rapiti if the Communityi.iiuiii.i ι «s an ne ane asier no ore apid if t e om unity
itself gives rise to policies which go In that, direction; in
other words if it takes measures that can induce single
countries to take the new approach to economic policies.
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the evaluation of single countries' policies with
some pre-estahl 1 shed and commonly agreed targets
countries (or groups of them). Here we shall
ine some suggestions concerning joh-creat.i on
r suggestions are articulated in a number of
may he distinct from the temporal point of view.
four different steps: (1) acquisition of
(ii) development of common objectives anri
li) comparison between targets anri actual
; (1v) measures t.o he taken by the Community in
countries' performances. Let. us look at these
more tie tai led way.
( 1 1 	 íhe__aoau¿s¿t¿o_n 	 Û.t 	 ¿n.f_í>rmat¿on . The Community could
establish a sort of data-bank to collect data concerning job-
creation In all country memhers. The information provided by
countries should he about. the outcomes of their policies in
terms of new jobs createti, 1n terms of expenditure,
concerning the territory, sex and age of people involved. The
outcomes are actual or expected according to whether a policy
has been already implemented or has to be undertaken in the
future .
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(111) GP.ÜEñr-iSfiílS. · Once the employment-rate targets have heen
fixed, they hecone a standard to which the policies that each
single country intends to unriertake are contrasted. Thus, the
policy options can he ranked according to their 'merits' in
terms of job- creation.
( 1 v ) XHâUSÍer-Sj	 lE£«2.ílíl?.-L_a.JlíÍ 	 AESHâl-tinSl^. A further step -
prohahly the most crucial one but. that which presupposes
already a good deal of solidarity- can be possibly taken: that
of distributing European solidarity f unris . proport 1 ona 1 1 y to
the gap which exists between the actual unemployment rate of
each country anri the unemployment rate which 1s commonly
stipulateti for each country.
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For many reasons, most. of which have heen already
considered, the traditional expansive policies rio not. seem to
he able to give rise to those processes which should lead to
higher levels of employment anri Income. What Is required 1s
policies based on a new and more advanced notion of what the
public sector should rio In a rapidly and deeply changing
framework .
The traditional macro-policies which were followed
late 1950's and 1960's, though successful in several re
naive never heen completely Keynesian in their spirit
policies, for a number of reasons, some of which ha
recalled earlier, have successfully ensured an 'ex
framework' and a satisfactory enough control of b
cycles by using fiscal and monetary tools but, 1n t.
state intervention has lacked one aspect which, In Κ
spirit, should he regarded as essential and primary: t
that. the state ahoulri play in market economies
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contribute to lower the
1 nevi t.ah 1 y characterize s them.
degree of uncertainty which
Uncertainty is an essential characteristic of market,
economies and It 1s the fundamental reason why the private
sector 1s more likely to leave resources Itile Instead of
using them t.o promote higher levels of production and
employment. The level of income and, hence, of employment
crucially depends on the volume of Investment that 1s riedrieri
by the private sector (firms). Investment Is a highly risky
activity, it 1s marie 1n view of profits and implies the
transformation of liquid resources Into fixed plants,
whose perspective · expected returns are
is 'easier' not. to invest and leave wealth
1n its liquid form (money and/or qiias i -money ) .
a large extent, means to bet. against. the
made 1n view of profits that depend on many
cannot he known and controlled in advance by
machines, etc
u η eer ta i η . T t
and/or Income
Investment, to
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Tn advocating a larger state Intervention anri the
establishment of international Institutions to promote a more
ordered working of markets, Keynes had prohahly 1n mind a
kind of national states and international bodies that probably
1a very far from those which actually exist. Keynes envisaged
state apparatuses managed and controlled by committed
professionals and politicians who give the highest priority
to the general interest as opposed to self interest. Tn
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reality, very different is the world: the conflicting
Interests of different national states, of different parties
and social groups, of politicians,
all too easily lead to using the
apparatuses anri the international
special Interests rather than the
the national anri the international
h u rea 11 c rats, lobbies, etc.
powerful national state
Institutions to serve
general Interest both at
1 evel s .
Perhaps, Keynes's vision of the state
simplistic, so that advocating an effective sta
actual ly requires a much deeper and wider cont
of how real state apparatuses work. However,
fundamental lesson from Keynes's works
experiences. Twice in his life, Keynes faced
crises which involved the international syste
reconstruction after the two World Wars. Tn
relentlessly worked to help develop policies to
crises in such a way as t.o avoid the risk to h
1n a relatively short, span of time. A.t the ve
Indications there has always heen the idea
was most required: t.o overcome the crisis
neither a single country nor a- single soci
possibly think of having the others to pay the
hear the whole burden of the crisis Itself.
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At. least 1n the developed countries, the current, situation,
from whatever point of view, Is not as dramatic as the one
Keynes had t.o deal with. However, unemployment 1s a very
serious desease which affects the social body In many ways,
and the need for curing 1t is still great, anri pressing.
Solidarity and more effective ways of state Intervention are
1 η order .
Solidarity, cooperation and coordination themselves are
elements that. strongly concur to the determination of a more
stable environment, I.e. to reduce the degree of uncertainty.
However, one should be very
principles can be actually
and positive environment. If
pnssihle, from ideology and
gu i del Ines.
clear about the fact that these
vehicles to get t.o a more stähle
they are freed, as much as
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As we have already pointed out, we need not. only a policy
which engenders expectations of a permanent expansive
environment but. also a policy which is ahle to efficiently
ensure that the private sector responds to the stimuli in the
'right, way', I.e. by enlarging capacity and employment.
Tn other words, the efforts directed to creating a
permanent expansive framework do not seem to be a sufficient,
though necessary, condition t.o Induce firms to really take the
path of growth. Tt. is also necessary that the adopted
expansive macro-policies are associated to measures at the
micro-level which provide governments with the ahility to
check and influence firms' responses. Thus, 'old things'
(expansive macro-policies) must be done In a new way. More
precisely, traditional ways of stimulating private activity
cannot be followed any longer and the new stimuli to
aggregate growth must, he associated to controls concerning
their effects also at. the micro-level.
Traditional 'Keynesian' macro-policies have been criticized
for their lack of adequate and theoretically satisfactory
consideration anri analysis of the economy's micro-
foundations. These criticisms, as well known, have led to new
developments based on the so-called 'rational expectations'.
Here, It is not possible to enter into a detailed survey anri
theoretical critique of this literature; hut it is
interesting anri useful t.o concentrate on Its policy
Implications, 1n order to contrast it. with our viewpoint,
which -though appreciative of the relevance of m i ero-aspects-
arrlves at. substantially different conclusions with respect,
to pol 1 cy .
'Rational expectations' approaches, with very few
exceptions, arrive at. the conclusion that public interventions
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in the economy essentially represent, disturbances which, as
auch, negatively affect otherwise rational (and satisfactory)
market, performances. Tt would thus he pointless - if not.
counterproductive - to try t.o alter the rate of unemployment,
that the market, has established as 'natural' through macro-
policies; 1n fact, their result will not be a lower
unemployment rate but, for example, only a higher Inflation
rate. Keynesian macro-policies have not. been successful
because they have failed to correctly understand behaviours
at the micro-level anri, hence, how the private sector
responds to the stimuli which come from the. government .
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What does this mean in more practical terms? Here we do not.
pretend to provide full-fledged and well detailed policies,
ready to be implemented by governments. Rut we can outline
some examples of policies Inspired t.o the need of creating a
climate of stähle expansive expectations and of having
efficient
responses
anri effective techan i sis to control market's
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The first example la given by new ways of rooting fiscal
incentives. Tn what follows we develop two cases.
( 1 ) ?ñw.3.JlíÍ
with the
growth 1s
is gi ven
numerator
between th
of output
same year,
suggest 1 on
firms, ual
are ennsd
performed
output. Tt
s_t.o_rea¿_p.Htput growth .. Stat 1 st. i cl ans are familiar
measurement of real output growth. Real output
measured through a ratio, the denominator of which
hy the value adrieri 1n a given year, while the
1s a more complex, expression, that. 1s the difference
e sales of the subsequent year deflateri by an Index
price minus the money value of* purchases of the
deflateri by an index of -inputs prices. Our
1s to estimate a similar magnitude at the level of
ng this parameter as a basis for tax rebates. We
ons of the difficulty of the task; however 1 t can be
exactly In the same way as estimating national
1s difficult, hut. 1s usually done! The firms which
are Interested In getting fiscal benefits In this way, should
declare th
control o
assistance
(ii) ñesar.
have their
»agn 1 tude
Therefore ,
them 1s g
this case
Another wa
i nerease
expansi on
e 1nt.ent.1on t. o do so, and collect, under the
f fiscal authorities and with the technical
of them, the necessary accounting Information.
ris 	 for_the 	 expa.na.¿on_.of 	 ea_pa o¿t.y . A 1 though firms
own notion of what constitutes capacity, this
1s difficult to he estimated by a third party.
one Is obliged to use indirect evidence. One of
iven by the expansion of real output; however, In
we are back to the scheme outlined under (i) above.
y 1« to deriuce this Information hy the actual
in labour stock, tinder the assumption that an
of capacity Ir likely t.o require an increase In the
labour stock. But. this deduction is not necessarily true,
since empi
same level
It usually
oyment can he increased, also by maintaining the
of productive capacity when the the latter is, as
happens, underutilized. Furthermore, if there is
an Increasing capacity hut this Is associateti to a process of
substitut 1 on of machines for lahour, the level of employment.
could remain steady or even diminish. Subsidizing an
1 ncreas 1 ng
attitude 1
A third
i nerease
Investment
employment, however, would not he a negative
η any ease, given the high level of unemployment.
way 1s that of combining the evidence about. an
in employment with a rate of Increase in the
flows ahove certain target values (e.g. the average
mte of growth of investment In the sector, a pre- determined
arhi trary
should he
value, etc.). The increase 1n Investment, however,
measured In real terms; therefore, appropriate
Information about price Indexes of capital inputs should be
made ava 1 1
suitable f
able. Furthermore, a yearly rate of growth is not.
or It could produce artificial delay of investments
and a strategic concentration of them 1n a certain year, in
order to
es tabi i s h e
difficulty
growth in
have a rate of growth of investments larger than the
d standard threshold. One way of coping with this
would be t.o rely upon measures of average rates of
a perlori of several years, e.g. three years.
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As to the way in
private expectations,
make it. known that. It
which the state could positively affect.
an example might be. that governments
1s their firm intention not t.o tolerate
any longer levels of unemployment beyond a certain threshold,
and that they will fo
achieve such an ohjec
pol 1 ey of thi s kl nd
1 1 ow the required expansive policies t.o
t.1ve. An illustration of a satisfactory
may be the . following. The government
states in an unambiguous way that 1n the next, say, five
years no rates of unem
will be tolerated ; (1 )
active expansive poli
t.o expand aggregate d
rebates, etc.) t.o the
the 'right way ' , I.e.
dementi in an efficient
As t.o the measures
ployment higher than, say, four per cent
1n order to achieve this objective,
cies are undertaken. These policies, aim
emand and allow for 'rewards' (e.g. tax
benefit of those firms which behave In
they expand their capacity anri labour
way.
to expand demand, they have t.o he such
that firms perceive that the Increase in the demand for their
outputs will he permanent and not erratic. To this purpose,
the government could
¿fííl_Huntra.c¿8_ with f
supply goods and serv
rely on a more extensive us.e of ¿ong-
irms -or, better, pools of firms- which
ices to the public sector in connection
with clearly stated long-term programmes. Tt. Is the long-term
nature of the contracta and their connection t.o large long-
term programmes which
strategy woulri more
expectations for a
stipulation of a long
firms to widen their
contract, is defined 1
in terms of a given
possibility that f1
contributing in such
expendí ture .
The main problem
are most Important, In that. this
easily engender reasonably certain
relatively long span of time. The
run contract. should in itself Induce
productive capacity; especially If the
η terras of things t.o he done rather than
amount of money. However, there is the
rms could play bets upon prices,
a way t.o the deflation of the scheduled
is that long-term contracts usually
provirie clauses for the revision of prices. Such clauses can
be utilized for bet.t.1
avoided. The way out.
possibility of Indurii
ng upon prices anri this shoulri he
from this rianger 1s given by the
ng in the contract clauses which reward,
through appropriate fiscal rebates, behaviours which favour
the Increase In real
fulfillment of this
mechanisms that. have
output and productive capacity. The
target Is possible, using the same
heen described ahove with regard to
possible fiscal automatic incentives to the expansion of real
output. Tn this case, however, one coulri think also of the
possibility to punish inflationary behaviours.
The firms, or the pools of firms, involved 1n contracts
concerning long-run programmes, should accept. a regime of
special accounting, allowing for the informational control of
the prices of outputs and Inputs Involved in the process of
implementation of the contracts. The revision of prices
(1) This four per cent target could, for example, he
established by referring t.o the 'European average employment-
rate target' we envisaged above.
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The government might deal with these di f fi cu 1 ti es -which
are real- hy selecting, for Instance, only firms which, up to
that moment, have been mainly operating in the private market
and have demonstrated t.o he able to score satisfactory results
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in terms of growth, efficiency, exports, etc. (2) The selection
of firms according to this criterion would represent. a
guarantee that public contracts are not. benefiting
enterprises which, thanks to the protection of the puhlic
sector, are less dynamic anri innovative.
As to the risk of engendering inefficiency in th
which produce for the public sector, other mechanism
he devised; for instance the government might draw co
only with a single firm (or possibly with a consort
firms) which, in turn, could partly contract out to
Tn such a way there woulri he more guarantees tha
efficient, anri competitive firms are. Involved in the ρ
Tn fact, it Is In the Interest of the firm which co
out. that the other firms are ahíe to supply the ri
inputs or Intermediate goods at the best. avail ahi e t.
themarket.
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(2) Of course, many rilfferent Indicators could he chosen. For
example the rate of growth of the value added, the number of
new johs created in the last year(s), and so on.
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the market.
cs we can Identify three theoretical attitudes
activities and expenditures. They, though
om many points of view, share never, the less a
inability to draw satisfactory ri 1 st i net i ons
rent. sort, of state activities anri expenditures.
and -especially among Keynesian economists- all
te activity anri expenditure are regarded as
imllar: all of them, though possibly In differing
multiplicative effects on Income; on the other
ially among economists more free-market oriented
f state activity and expenditure are regarded as
similar: all of them, though possibly in
rees, produce negative effects on the correct,
functioning of the market. Therefore, the
eyneslan stand Implies that, state expenditure In
ri be increased in order to promote the growth of
ployment, whereas the market oriented philosophy
opposite conclusions. Finally, another viewpoint
t.o the two ahove mentioned, the radical/Marxist
activities and expenditures are all
' hut at. least. some of them are socially
therefore they must be expanded as much as
Improve the conditions of those sodai groups and
h are mostly damaged hy the free functioning of
Tn our opinion, all these three stands are unsatisfactory
and theoretically flawed. Although we do not Intent! to
dismiss the relevance either of the multiplier effects, or
the distinction between productive and unproductive
act.1v1t.1es, or the sodai welfare Implications of state
activities, we helieve that. the three positions fail to
perceive that puhlic activities must, also he differentiated
according to their a i eroeeonnmi c Implications.
The traditional Keynesian position appears to us too
simplistic in its treatment of public expenditures "as all
essentially similar 1n that all produce multiplier effects.
Even though It is true that, in the short period, whatever
kind of expenditure determines similar mu 1 1 1 pi 1 eat i ve effects
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on Income, 1t 1s also tru« that. different kinds of
expenditure rietermine anri proriuee very different impacts on
the economie system, namely on the growth potent 1 a 1 1 1 1 es of
the economy. Expenditures devoted to the development of
scientific research, for example, produce 1 onger-per 1 ori
effects which are very riifferent from those proriiiceri by, say,
transfer payments to households in order to maintain their
income. Analogously, expenditures aiming t.o build new and more
efficient infrastructures . determine effects on the global
productive capacity and productivity that are different from
those created hy expenditures devoted to final consumption.
The failure of the traditional Keynesian policies can be
partly explained by their failure t.o correctly understand and
evaluate the longer-period effects of public spending, with
the result that the private sector responded tn them in a
'perverse' way at the micro level.. Tf we take also account of
the unsatisfactory way in which expenditures were made (i.e.
In a way which was not such as to create stable and permanent
expansive expectations) our ability to provide a reliable
explanation of the global failure of 'Keynesian' policies
1 nereases .
As to the market-oriented point of view, what. is to he
pointed out is that its advocates, in their drive to dismantle
the existing state apparatuses, and t.o discard any form of
intervention in the economic sphere -or, at. least, t.o
minimize Its activities and influence- fail t.o perceive that
some state activities and expenditures have indeed very
powerful anri positive effects on the private sector of the
economy. Obvious examples can be marie by referring t.o the
effects of the presence of a large puhlic sector on the
functioning of financial markets: the very existence of
public bodies contributes to reducing the degree of
uncertainty in these markets. But many other examples can he
made with respect t.o the 'real' sector.
Ts it really possible to hold that, the private sector of
the economy would he better off if state intervention were
indiscriminately reriuoeri or abolished? Ts It really possihle
t.o think that, the private sector would be able t.o provide
moat, of the infrastructures, utilities, puhlic goods and
services now supplied by public bodies and agencies more
efficiently, or even with the same efficiency as the puhlic
sector? Not. even Adam Smith, the moat radical critic of the
state's interfering in economic matters, was so certain of
the possibility anri convenience of leaving all the economic
activities of the state t.o the private sector.
Tt 1s necessary t.o recognize that a wide range of state
activities and expenditures, far from being merely
'unproductive' and fetters t.o the market economy, produce
strong positive effects on the growth potentialities of the
economy, just hy affecting the micro framework within which
private firms operate. Efficient and effective
Inf restructurai policies, expenditures devoted to promote
scientific and technological progress, etc. can significantly
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Tt 1s from this point of view that we advocate new forms of
state Intervention. Tt is not as much a matter of finding out.
new areas or new activities aa that, of looking at. already
existing activities with a fresh attitude, by paying more
attention t.o the Issue of the relationship between micro anri
macro aspects anri implications of the policies to be
Implemented. We believe that, such an attitude would allow us
t.o avoid the shortcomings of the positions recalled above. Tt.
1s posslhle to escape either the temptation to carry out
indiscriminate expansive policies merely based on unqualified
increases of public spending, or to follow the ideological
chimera of a pure market economy with ties truet i ve
consequences at. the economic anri social levels, or t.o provide
only assistance to the disadvantaged strata, which is an
ultimately Ineffective and self-defeating path to follow.
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are polluting. Correspondingly, t.o Intervene t.o prevent, such a
degradation, or simply to mitigate it, has been regarded as a
sort of 'luxury' (i.e. an unproductive activity): to fight
pollution might improve our living standards anri, in some
cases, 1s inevitable to limit, the 'freedom' of polluting
agents, but. so rio ing w.e put. obstacles to growth, employment,
etc. Tn other words, a trade-off between growth anri a
pollution-free environment is ass u meri.
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To fight pollution anri natural degradation is
'luxury' which our societies cannot, afford, especially
present situation, Tt is just the other way around, an
state should Intervene in this area much more heavil
extensively. Tn this way puhlic activities would ρ
positive effects on the economy as a whole anri,
specifically, woulri Imply also higher levels of aot.ivi
employment in those proriuctive private sectors wh i c
paying growing attention to the environment (e.g. indu
involved In recycling refuses, alternative technol
etc . ) .
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Another example of new possible approaches to the issue of
state Intervention anri activities concerns the area of
professional training. Tn this flelri, since a long time ago
the need for some forms of public Intervention has been
recognized, so that our suggestions are mainly concerned with
the need for new approaches to the issue rather than with the
need for the intervention itself. Public intervention to
provide professional training is regarded as 'productive' anri
efficient only if is distinct from education in general.
Professional training t.o specific johs is regarded as
alternative to general education. Rut. do modern societies,
increasingly characterized by high flexibility and mobility in
the economic sphere, actually require such a form of
professional training? Tn a world In which workers are more
and more required to adjust to new productions anri
technologies which keep on changing anri developing at. a very
fast pace, the traditional professional training does not
seem to represent, any longer a positive or useful public
contribution to the process of production anri reproduction of
the labour force. A kinti of activity which might, appear as
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very much oriented to favour productivity anri economic
efficiency has become In reality obsolete anri 'unproductive' .
More general forms of education, more adequate to respond to
the need of mohilit.y and flexibility could prove far more
' product i ve ' .
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People are Increasingly unsatisfied with public
interventions. Dissatisfaction concerns hot.h regulatory
activity and the sphere of the direct production of public
goods and services. As to the former aspect, people complain
the exeeaa of rules anri their excessive formalism. They
complain at. the inahllity of puhlic goods and services to
effectively satisfy their needs, at the Inefficiency anri the
wastage which characterize the process of production of
public goods and services, at. the unnecessary complexity of
procedures to follow to have access t.o them, at the vexadous
attitudes of the bureaucrats.
We think that the reaction against regulations 1s a very
specific and limited case of hostility, basically Inspired and
'Inflated' by few powerful lobbies acting in a limited number
of sectors, like telecommunication and transport. The
'deregulation campaign', led in the ordinary press by such
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lohbiea, found a wide sensitive audience only
were fed up with the dissatisfaction they had
sphere of puhlic goods and services.
because people
concerning the
Τ f we are right,
good deal of attent
proposals envisage a
this 1s accompanied
ways In which the sta
new tasks but. also w
its normal performane
reactions 1s far from
attention, In earlier
causes which generateti
like the state to rio
we need now 1s to find
of the basic philosoph
aa we think we are, we should devote a
1on t.o the Issue, since many of our
wirier role for the state; thus, unless
hy a tangible contextual change in the
te behaves, not only with respect to the
1th respect t.o the traditional ones and
e, an upsurge of negative political
being unlikely. . We devoted enough
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a growing gap between what, people would
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y of public actions.
The state, due to its sovereignty, has both the right to do
things and to order that things be done. The tendency for the
state has been, and still is, to chose mostly the first of the
two alternatives. The simple reason was that it. believed that
1t was easier t.o control what the state was directly doing,
than to control 'orders to do' given to third parties.
Historical experience has demonstrated that this belief was
wrong. On one side the political process is not usually able
to ascertain and Identify the needs, their articulation and
processes of changes, nor is it able to find the appropriate
responses t.o them in a systematic and satisfactory way.
Furthermore, also in the ease of the state, there is a
diat.lnct.lon between the snhjeets who give the orders (the
government, the parliament, the ministries, etc.) anri the
agencies (organizations operated hy dv1l servants) which
have t.o Implement. the orders. Civil servants and the
organizations themselves are endowed with their own specific
cultural attitudes and Interests and, therefore, the process
of Implementation of the juridical orders given to them might,
be, and usually 1s, variously distorted. The state, up to now,
has not. been able t.o learn to control itself.
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What we
culture of
need to do, in other words, is to develop a new
control. Should thia need he fully linrierst.ood anri
accepted, and the culture of control developed, completely new
possi b1 1 1 t.i
of collect!
convenient,
process of
es woulri he opened to state action. The 'provision'
ve goods could be separated, whenever suitable anri
from its 'production'. The effectiveness of the
satisfaction of needs woulri be guaranteed not hy
the fact. that, the state directly produces such goods and
aervlcea, but by the fact that the state is (has hecorae) ahle
to control
of whether
delegating
in ρ a r 1 1 c u 1
Tn this
that, the pursued objectives are met, Independently
the state Is directly performing the joh or Is
the concrete production process t.o third parties,
ar to f i rms .
new context, civil servants woulri increasingly
hecome agents of direction anri control. Tn other words, they
would i nor
de 1 egat 1 ng
eaaingly specialize in the intelligent tasks,
the purely executive anri material tasks to others.
Puhlic organizations would become increasingly flexihle anri
woulri Increasingly perform mainly intelligent, roles, in
co 1 1 aborat 1
he subject
on with thirri parties, which woulri, In any case,
to effective and penetrating controls. The state
woulri increasingly became a 'buyer* of specialised goods anri
services, that woulri 'provi rie' to the collectivity through
the buri get,
activities.
The main
given hy s
1s reqiiireri
s ρ e c 1 ficai 1
proposed t.o
the others.
subcontract
subcontract
but. avoiding or limiting direct. * proriuct 1 on '
tool to implement, this change of philosophy is
pedal Izeri contracta. The precise performance which
by the state should be defined very carefully and
y. And this should become the object, of a contract
external agenta, put in competition each against
Tn the same way as the state is now accustomed to
the building of a road or a bridge, It could
many other activities, having defined qualitative
standards and under the condition that It is ahle to control
the correct.
This app
execution of the contract.
roach has also some relevant anri more riirect.
implications on job-creation policies. To the extent, that the
public sector becomes a 'buyer' of goods anri services aiipplieri
by private firms, it. will obviously become also less involved
1n the process of riirect creation of johs. Rut. this is only a
first aspee
the pubi i c
wide range
t of the implications on job- creation. Tn fact,
sector will continue t.o provide a more or less
of services directly, that is to say to use labour
directly. This, however, in our opinion, should not. imply to
create permanent. and, in many cases, very little flexible
puhlic jobs ,
Tn the same way aa the state huys goods from firms without
establishing permanent relationships with them, It
choose to hire workers on a temporary hasis 1n order to
out specific projecta with apeclflc objectives (eg
provision of certain aervlcea, 1n a certain area,
certain time). The public sector, ahoulri be careful to
coni ri
carry
the
at. a
make
It very clear that. the jobs so createti are i nri i sputar·! y
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However, It ahonld be clear that, the kinri of approach to
expansive policies we have suggested necessarily presupposes
a certain degree of international solidarity, cooperation and
coordination, aa we have pointed out since the beginning. Tn
fact, It Is quite evident that, no single country can possibly
hope to be really successful in the Implementation of the
policies ahove 1f there is not. a reasonable degree of
international cooperation. The adopted expansive policies
create or worsen external as well as Internal imbalances if a
country Is left alone to try to solve the prohlems of growth
anri unemployment. Moreover, the policies we suggest are not.
only expansive; most of them are also auch as to yielri
positive anri 'v1s1hle' effects only in the medium/long run,
ao that it would be even more difficult for a single country
- namely for politicians - to bear the Inevitable Imbalances
which, on the contrary, would manifest themselves rather
qu i ckl y .
Thus, it 1s not reasonable t.o expect that. any single
country will be willing to take an expansive path 1f It does
not expect that other countries will follow the same sort, of
strategies. On the other hand, even though - for any reason -
a single country deci rieri to take an expansive att 1 tude and
started these policies, it seems very likely that the arising
of serious imbalances will lead, sooner or later, to their
dismissal. This would Imply all the negative consequences
that we already considered; in particular, the t.enability anri
credibility of future expansive policies would be seriously
pre jiiril ced .
What is needed, then, is some form of agreement. among
countries to give rise to a co-ordinate set of expansive
policies along the lines depicteri ahove. And coordination
requirea solidarity in that It means that, some countries have
t.o give up some of their privileges to help other weaker
countries overcome their difficulties. Solidarity is a moral
as well as an economic positive principle, so that countries
shoiilri be able to perceive the future advantages of being
lesa selfish today in exchange for future heneflts.
However, at this stage, to rely only on the force of moral
values does not seem enough. There 1s much evidence that
countries are not. currently behaving In a satisfactory way
from this point of view. Thus, some forms of control and
guarantee should he i ntroriiiceri : the countries which accept. to
implement expansive measures should also accept. that some
automatic forma of control are Introriuced in order to ensure
the persistence and consistence of the strategy adopted.
A possible scenario might be the following,
countries agree on Implementing simultaneous expansive
policies. They are initially successful: Income anri employment
rise, hut 1n «ome countries the rise in Income anri employment
is associated to increasing external Imbalances (balance of
payments deficits) to the benefit of some other countries
within the group. The latter »re exporting
towards the former. The way to cope
European
more and more
with auch a ai tu at ion may
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he to have the advantaged countries t.o revaluate their
eiirrfinciea In order t.o reduce their surpluses so that the
disadvantaged countries are favoured. Tn order to have the
guarantee that this would happen, the group of countries
might agree in advance that. no country's external trade
surplus with respect to other countries In the group can
exceed a certain threshold. Should this happen the surplus
country must automatically revaluate its currency anri/or take
other measures which yielri the same result, of reducing its
surplus. This, of course would be a short-term measure: if
the external Imbalances are of a structural nature, then
other more radical measures should be taken.
The foregoing, of course, is only an example. Tt. 1s also
Important t.o emphasize that the measures taken t.o control and
regulate rates of exchange (within and among economic areas)
should essentially have the nature of a deterrence. Tf
countries Involved know that their possihle attempts to hreak
the agreements (being too 'aggressive' and non co-operative
toward the other partners) will he frustrated hy automatic
and inescapable offsetting measures, they will be less
inriiiceti to he non co-operative. Tt. 1s for this reason that
automatic measures are Important. Governments might select a
number of parameters anri establish that as soon as these
parameters reach predetermined critical valuea offsetting
measures will automatically taken. (3)
There Is another Important aspect that has t.o be taken into
account. Tf countries tend to implement, homogeneous policies
anri fix common targets anri parameters (e.g. a certain rate of
unerapl oyment. which cannot, he exceeded), it. is clear that the
countries which begin with a worse initial situation woulri be
put. under stronger st.resa anri pressure to perform in such a
way to fulfill their commitments. Other countries'
aollriarit.y, In this case, woulri he crucial. Tt. coniti take the
form of creating a pool of funds devoted to help countries
encountering significant. difficulties; the pool should be fed
by transfer payments coming from the countries that, at any
given time are better off.
However, In order to overcome thia kind of difficulties It
1s not. wl'ae to rely only on mechanisms based on solidarity.
Tt Is also necessary to be realistic anri be aware of the fact.
that, the chances of success of the expansive policies grow if
they are decided anri implemented in a careful and gradual
way, just. 1n order to avoid that. countries have to suffer
unbearable pressures anri stress causeri by having initially
fixed overambl t.lous targets. Gradual policies may be less
appealing In that they offer lesa impressive outcomes in the
short, run; hut certainly they help avoid the risk of being
grossly unsuccessful anri, then, they promise more
(3) For Instance, some of the parameters selected by EEC
countries might be: Imports and exports (among EEC countries
and between EEC anri other countries); employment. anri
unemployment rates ( ri i saggrega teri with respect, to age groups,
sex, etc.); average wage-rates, etc.
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a1gn1ficant, atahle, anri permanent, resulta in the longer run.
Moreover, grarinalneas concurs to increase, the ereriibility of
policies just because It reduces the risk of their failure.
Tn other words, gradualneas Itself is a way to engender
stable and permanent expansive expectations.
1 ° · Xhe_need__or_cooper.at¿o
¿fi_y_¿
Solidarity, cooperation and coord 1 nat i on . are very necessary
at the International level, but. the importance of these
principles at the domestic level too cannot he underrated. Tf
social and economic parties respond t.o expansive policies in a
'selfish' fashion, merely pursuing their Interests, no many
hopes of success are left. Firms' responses leading t.o
inflation, inefficiency, etc. would he as socially negative as
unions' responses leading t.o excessive wage increases, more
rigidities in the lahour market, etc. On the other hand, also
politicians' and bureaucrats' selfish attitudes - aiming t.o
exploit the new expansive framework to strengthen their
power, clienteles, etc. - would be damaging and socially
negat.1 ve aa we 1 1 .
These observations always apply, and prohably lack of
solidarity, cooperation and coordination partly explains the
failure of past, traditional expansive policies in several
Western countries. But the need to respect these principles is
even greater for the sort of policies we advocate. These
policies, as we argued, aim both to promote the growth of
Income, employment, and social productivity anri to improve the
qualitative living standard of the lahour force anri the
population In general. (4) The efficiency anri effectiveness of
these policies crucially depend on the existence of a proper
halance hetween the two different sets of ends. Lack of
solidarity and cooperation can easily lead t.o breaking such a
halance when a group is ahle to bias the adopted policy to
pursue its own interests. As a consequence of this,
Inevitable economic and/or social tensions woulri arise:
policies excessively favouring private firms may easily cause
unions' opposition anri social disruption; policies
excessively biased in favour of welfare may fail to engender
the required expansion of private Investment and employment.
The conflicting interest groups should realize that, the only
possible way out to the current situation is through a
'social bargain' which necessarily Implies t.o give up some
privi legea and advantages in the short run in view of overall
gaina In the longer run.
Tf there is no s___r¿oi*¿ reason to hold that one particular
party acts in a more socially satisfactory way and that, quite
on the contrary, all Involved parties are led first, of all by
the thrust to pursue their particular Interests, 1t 1s only
through cooperation and coordination - which, In turn,
(4) Policies like those concerning the environment, health,
and education are good examples.
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APPENOTX
We have to demonstrate that, 1f we call dv=v2 - vl ,
riv/vl > U/N2
1f It has to he Q2 > Q1 . Tn fact this implies
v2 N2 > v1 N1
Since v2 = v1 + riv, and N1 » N2 + II, we .will have
(v1 + riv)/v1 > (N2 + U)/N2
Vl/v1 + riv/vl > N2/N2 + 1I/N2
1 . riv/v1 > 1 + U/N2
riv/vl > H/N2
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Hartmann, Sweden
TO OVERCOME YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT:
YOUTH EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND THEIR EFFECTS
IN THE CASE OF SWEDEN
1 	 Youth Employment in Sweden: a Success of Employment Policy?
As in most OECD-countries, youth unemployment rates in Sweden showed a
steady increase during the 1970s and the early 1980s. Though more and
more young people continued to secondary education, the unemployment
rate for those aged 16-19 rose from 4.3 % in 1970 to 10.6 % in 1982. Al¬
though these figures were fairly low in comparison to some other EC-coun¬
tries as the UK or Italy, the increase in youth unemployment caused a
lively debate among Swedish politicians and the general public leading to a
variety of measures to curb youth unemployment and to keep young peo¬
ple off the streets.
Contrary to the majority of EC-countries in which youth unemployment -
despite the efforts of governments to reduce unemployment - is still on the
rise, the measures taken by the Swedish government effectively lowered
the unemployment rate for youth aged 16-19 to 4.1% in 1985. This figure is
still about 50 X higher than the unemployment rate of the total working
population 16-74, but is very close to the youth unemployment level dur¬
ing the 1960s and early 1970s and might be considered as a "normal" level
of frictional unemployment for the age group concerned.
What then is the secret behind this successful struggle against the rise of
youth unemployment in Sweden? Are there possibilities to export the in¬
struments of an active employment policy for youth to other countries?
In order to answer these questions we need to give a fairly detailed de¬
scription of the development of Swedish macro-economic planning with
special attention to the labour market policies carried out in Sweden. Fur¬
thermore, we must speak about the cultural and historical background
against which the Swedish youth employment policy has to be analyzed. In
this context, the structure of the educational system and the enrolment in
secondary education is of special concern, as differences in the organization
of vocational training (either as full-time programme in the school system
or as dual responsibility of school authorities and employers) create differ¬
ences in the interpretation of national statistics and the instruments avail¬
able to influence youth participation on the labour market.
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A summarized description of the range of policy measures carried out and
the organizational framework for these measures will enable the reader to
evaluate the results of the policy and to understand the reaction to the
policies among youth, the actors on the labour market and the general pub¬
lic.
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2, The Active Labour Market Policy and Economic Planning in Sweden
As pointed out by many researchers in the field (Wick man, 1980; Axelsson
et al., 1983; Berglind & Rundblad, 1978) there is a tradition in Swedish
macro-economic planning to see labour market policy as the core of the
planning system. Meidner fc Niklasson (1973) showed that a number of
secondary goals were linked to employment policies, e.g. individual social
welfare, reaching a balance between full employment, price stability, allo¬
cation of resources, balanced income distribution.
The dominant position of the labour market policy within the process of
macro-economic planning in Sweden can be explained by the unique com¬
bination of academic reasoning represented by names like Wikseli, Lindahl,
Olin in the Stockholm school of economics, open-minded politicians like
Wigfors and Myrdal in the Social Democratic Party and the actual need to
overcome the depression in the early 1930s. Combined with an early ac¬
ceptance of Keynes' ideas of an active governmental policy to overcome un¬
employment and depression, the economic success achieved by state inter¬
vention during the 1930s and the centrally planned war-economy of the
1940s led to the establishment of a Central Labour Market Administration
(AMS) in 1948. The increased importance of AMS as a tool to achieve the
political goal of full employment is reflected in the increase of resources
given to the Labour Market Administration which rose from 0.9% of the
Swedish GNP in 1959 to 3% of the GNP in 1977. (Wickman 1980, 99)
Another factor in favour of long-term macro-economic planning in Sweden
derives from the importance of the big corporate sector which, according to
Wickman (1980) along with the growth of a large public sector, can explain
the acceptance of concerted guidelines for economic development and state
intervention in Sweden. As both, large private corporations and govern¬
mental administration share the need for stable conditions to secure in¬
vestments in new production lines or in social reforms, sudden distur¬
bances induced by developments outside the country have to be counter¬
acted by planned structural change and adjustments inside the country. A
gentlemen agreement concluded between the trade unions and the employ¬
ers association in 1938 formalized this common interest in planned growth
and constituted the ground for a widely accepted policy of long-term plan¬
ning and restructuration of the Swedish labour market.
Named after the economic experts of the trade unions, Meidner and Rehn, a
model of labour market policy was adopted from 1950s onwards, that not
only accepted structural change in industry, but actively tried to move
workers from enterprises with low efficiency to more productive areas of
economy. Combined with a "solidarían wage-policy" implying higher annual
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wages for low-income groups, this produced a very low wage-differentia¬
tion after a period of 20 years, with ratios of 1:3 in public administration
and 1:5 in private enterprises. As Swedish employees are unionized to
about 80% and the wage-agreements guaranteed the same income-level
throughout the whole country, a continuous process of structural adjust¬
ment in the direction of the most profitable industries and a decline of
branches with low performance as e.g. the textile industry was the result.
But the application of the Meidrier-Rehn model also meant a strife for cen¬
tralization and advantages for large corporations which could adjust their
modes of production to the newest technology. In order to identify areas of
economic growth, long-term planning surveys were conducted regularly
from 1948 onwards, which coordinated the forecasts made by private and
governmental research institutes. Though the results of the surveys only
could be seen as information and recommendations by independent
economists, their wide acceptance as a guideline for corporate investments
and governmental intervention almost created an institutionalized link
between the government and corporations in Sweden.
The common interest in planned development also paved the way for a
general acceptance of an active labour market policy by the Swedish gov¬
ernment. The government was given the final responsibility to guarantee a
sufficient labour supply to the corporations in times of economic expansion
and for full employment of the labour force in times of recession.
Thus, instruments for interventions on the labour market and in restruc¬
turing the qualification of the labour force were created during the 1950s
and 1960s under the impact of economic expansion within the Labour Mar¬
ket Administration. A variety of interventions as vocational retraining, re¬
lief-work, sheltered work, wage-subsidies and financial aid for those mov¬
ing to other areas of work were supposed to ease the adjustment of the in¬
dividual to the needs of a restructured economy and were the prerequisite
for the acceptance of these transformations by the trade unions.
Furthermore, there was a common understanding to give priority to mea¬
sures securing employment (work-option) instead of only securing the in¬
come of a person (benefit-option). Gainful employment was seen as the
prerequisite of full citizenship in Sweden. The right to employment has not
only been a goal for the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party, but
has been a dominating goal for all political forces in Sweden during the re¬
cent 30 years. This shared belief in the importance of full employment has
resulted in the acceptance of a high inflation rate, repeated depreciation of
the Swedish currency and tight legislation securing the rights of the em¬
ployees on the labour market.
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3. The Current Structure of the Swedish Labour Market
In accordance with the societal goal of secured employment for everybody.
Sweden shows the highest global labour force participation rates. From a
population of 8.3 million inhabitants, 4.4 millions were in the labour force
in 1985 and of the age group 16-74 76.6 % of men and 68.1 % of women
were part of the labour force (SCB 1985:2). But the increase of persons ac¬
tive on the labour market has not been followed by a simultaneous increase
in working hours. On the contrary. Sweden shows a decline in yearly
working hours by 6% between 1970 and 1980, while the number of em¬
ployed people rose by 10% during the same period.
The reason for this development has to be seen in a variety of reforms in¬
troduced during the 1970s and the opening of the Swedish labour market
for part-time employment. Since 1978 the minimum holiday period is 5
weeks, there is the right for paid parental leave of 1 year, paid leave in
case of a sick child up to 60 days per child and year, a legal right to reduce
the work of parents to 75% without remuneration, a legal right for unpaid
leave in case of further education and various laws regulating the right of
leave for political and union engagements. On the whole, the dominating
concept of full-time employment - 40 hours a week during the year over
the active life-span - has been eroded. Mainly women engage in part-time
employment, on average 31.5 h/weekly in 1984, but even men show a de¬
cline in working-hours and shorter spans of participation during working-
life.
Also changes in the economic structure, e.g. a greater variation in produc¬
tion techniques or the liberalization of shops' opening-hours during the
1970s created the ground for a growth of part-time employment. Unions
often were reluctant to accept part-time during evenings and weekends,
but especially young women with children and students found it attractive
to take on these jobs which paid up to 100% more than normal employ¬
ment. Thus, concentrated shift-work during the weekend may pay as much
as 5 days normal work during the week.
Part-time work, reduced weekly working-hours, prolonged vacation peri¬
ods and the right to paid and unpaid leave for various reasons coincide
very well with the cultural habit of Swedes to maintain a strong link to the
informal or private economy. Hunting, fishing, berry-picking and gardening
considerably contribute to the Swedes' daily consumption and as it is a tra¬
dition to build cottages by oneself, a large part of the population spends its
leisure-time in a very productive way. (Ingelstam. 1979)
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While the opportunities of the already employed labour force to vary their
work-load in accordance with other personal interests increased during the
1970s, the introduction of the Employment Security Act in 1974 weakened
the opportunities of persons outside the labour force to be hired for a per¬
manent job. (Vogel, 1983) The Act, which almost established tenure-like
conditions for those already employed, created a division of the labour
force in what in Sweden is called A-, B- and C- markets.
The -labour market is reserved for the well-educated and trained work
force who have been able to obtain permanent positions. They can be said
to "own" their work-places as they enjoy all the legal rights linked to em¬
ployment, may take leave for various reasons and are, to a high degree, se¬
cured against being fired. Even if they are given notice in case of lack of
work, they are the first in the queue for new jobs.
The B- market is constituted by those well trained and able to perform ac¬
cording to the demands on the market, but who have failed to obtain a
permanent position of their own. They are hired for short-time vacancies
and move between various jobs and fields of work during a long period ofi
their lives. Many women working part-time and young people with low
working-life experience are to be found in this B-group.
The C-market consists of those who cannot perform in accordance with the
demands of modern working-life and therefore cannot expect to be hired
on the open labour market, but have to rely on sheltered work or relief
schemes run by public agencies. In addition, early retirement-schemes re¬
move persons who no longer can fulfill the labour market requirements
from this market. According to several studies, the number of persons on
this C-market has increased considerably and exceeds overt unemployment
by 3 to 4 times. (Axelsson et al.. 1983; Berglind and Rundblad. 1978)
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1 	 Youth on the Swedish Labour Market
4.1. The rise of youth unemployment in Sweden
The responsibility of the state for full employment and for a smooth trans¬
formation in times of structural change in economy was generally accepted
by all groups in society. Therefore, instruments for labour market inter¬
ventions already existed when the economic crisis with increased unem¬
ployment, especially among the young generation, affected Sweden in the
middle of 1970s.
For a period of more than 30 years, the Swedish labour market was char¬
acterized by a shortage of labour which had to be compensated by immi¬
gration. During the same period both, the unions and the employers agreed
on a labour market policy which not only accepted closing down non-prof¬
itable industries, but also facilitated structural changes directed towards a
higher national productivity and by that towards a higher standard of liv¬
ing for all Swedes. For young people, the only problem was to get a quali¬
fied training which enabled the individual to adapt to the on-going devel¬
opment in economy.
"School was supposed to give a good education to everybody.
Anybody with good education was thought to get a well-paid job.
By that schooling would contribute to solve unemployment, to
raise material standards, and. as almost everybody would attend
the same school, it would produce the anticipated material
redistribution in society."
(Adler-Karlsson 1983.47)
To fight youth unemployment, one only needed to expand the training
system and to increase the quality of education and vocational training.
Consequently, all Swedish youth have to attend a comprehensive compul¬
sory school until the age of 16 and in addition, an integrated secondary
school providing both, theoretical programmes and vocational training was
introduced in 1971. In 1985, about 98% of all 16-year-olds in Sweden
started secondary schooling, 37% in theoretical programmes 3 years or
longer and 61% in vocational training and 2-year programmes. While the
vocational training offered during secondary education expanded, most
other forms of training as apprenticeships or company training pro¬
grammes disappeared.
	
Hartmann. Sweden - 8 -
But despite a rise in the quantity and quality of youth education during the
1970s, which lowered the general participation rate of youth on the labour
market, youth unemployment became higher and higher.
Graph 4.1 about here
4.2. The Causes of Youth Unemployment
In Sweden, as in most other countries, various causes of the growth of
youth unemployment were discussed among politicians and the general
public. High cost of youth labour, low level of vocational training, lack of
work experience and a low individual motivation of young people to obtain
jobs were mentioned as causes, along with the eiternal influences of a de¬
cline in economic growth. For a detailed discussion of the economic theories
and the diagnostic debate see Bruno and Lindner. 1987.
In general, the demand for labour or the existence of unemployment can be
explained by applying two concepts:
(.
a) Factors influencing the supply of youth labour as e.g. cohort-size,
structure of schooling, qualification levels among youth, legislation
concerning youth employment;
b) factors influencing the demand for youth labour as e.g. economic
growth, technological change, wage-levels, competition with other
employable groups as women or migrants.
In the case of Sweden, the first set of supply factors had some limited in¬
fluence on the employment situation of young people during the last
decade. While the increase of the number of youth aged 16-20 augmented
the competition for attractive secondary education and available jobs, the
rise of secondary education lowered youth labour force participation and
the existing industrial safety regulations made it more difficult to employ
persons below the age of 18.
However, all these factors can neither explain the rapid rise in youth un¬
employment in the late 1970s nor the establishment of a secluded, publicly
administered youth labour market. It is the change in labour demand that
predominantly has led to the change in the youth employment structure.
The decline of economic growth as an effect of the oil-crisis, structural
and technological rationalization in industry and cut-backs in public ser¬
vices brought recruitment of new personnel almost to a stand-still. In line
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with the stipulations of the Swedish labour market regulations, employers
were obliged to give priority to the continued employment of already hired
staff. Seniority rules, the principle of 'last in - first out' and the so-called
natural decline of staff by retirement placed the burden of unemployment
on the shoulders of the young, not yet established on the labour market. In
addition, a rise in~beginners wage-levels made young people without
working experience less attractive on a labour market with a surplus of ex¬
perienced older workers. (SCB 1987:2. 33)
Higher demands regarding the vocational training and qualification of
youth, often mentioned as a limiting factor (ERS. 1986), have only marginal
influence on the employment of young people. Compared to the already
employed labour force, most young people have a higher level of formal
education and vocational training, but still cannot meet the qualification
levels required by employers.
The Swedish system of separated vocational training in full-time courses
might add to the development of different sets of expectations among
youth and their teachers or supervisors in schools, and the representatives
of industry and commerce. Especially in times of fast technological change,
vocational training in schools cannot keep up with industrial development,
especially with the use of new technologies, e.g. working with the most re¬
cent computer generation. Prolonged vocational training m )might, on the
contrary, lead to further adjustment and adherence of young people to the
demand of the educational setting and result in a growing distance to the
reality of the open labour market. (Hartmann, 1985) Improved relations
between employers and local vocational training courses and a greater en¬
gagement of companies in the specialized training of young people are seen
as a solution to bridge the gap between skills taught in school courses and
skills demanded by the employers. (Andersson ¿c Hartmann. 1986)
4.3. Public Programmes to Ficht Youth Unemployment in Sweden
The steep rise of youth unemployment in the middle of the 1970s was in¬
terpreted as a temporary decline in economic growth by most politicians.
Therefore, it was assumed that unemployment could be overcome by intro¬
ducing short-term training courses and relief-work for the age-groups Ιο¬
ί 8 who were mainly affected by unemployment and did not voluntarily
prolong their education.
The prolongation of schooling, based on the assumptions of the human cap¬
ital theories developed during the 1960s, has absorbed a large percentage
of young people and steadily decreased youth labour market participation
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in Sweden. While further education in the beginning had only been seen as
investment to promote the future collective and individual development in
society, it was soon discovered that prolonged education also was an inex¬
pensive way to keep young people off the labour market.
As early as 1977. the local school boards were given the responsibility for
labour market introduction and a follow up of the living conditions for
those aged 16 and 17. and in 1980 the Swedish legislation transferred the
total responsibility for young people under 18 from the Labour Adminis¬
tration to local school boards. (SCB 1987:2) The transfer of young people
into the sole responsibility of the school, though the formal school-leaving
age remained at 16, discloses the official exclusion of those under 18 from
the open labour market. (Magnusson, 1981)
This step meant also an end to an era in Swedish labour market policy.
From the 1930s onwards, there had been the trust that the Labour Admin¬
istration was able to cope more instantly and effectively with the problems
on the labour market than any other institution in society. But the rising
costs for youth relief work programmes and expensive work introduction
schemes forced the government to look for other solutions. This became
even more urgent as more and more young people had found out that it
was quite profitable in financial terms to leave school at 16 and immedi¬
ately receive a guaranteed income (in 1975 about SEK 2500/monthly) from
a relief-program me whereas the study-grant for continued secondary edu¬
cation was SEK 250/weekly in the same year. (Hartmann. 1977)
Table 4.1 about here
Table 4.1 shows a great variety in the kind of intervention measures, but
also in the levels of remuneration paid to the individual participating young
person and to the organizations accepting young people. The differences in
payments become understandable if one bears in mind that the majority of
young people covered by the programmes are those unwilling to voluntar¬
ily continue secondary education.
Even though the Swedish government in its 1980 'Youth Bill" had envis¬
aged a 100% participation of all 16-17 year-olds in regular secondary edu¬
cation, in 1984 about 9% of all youth under 18 participated in some kind of
external youth follow-up programme, administered by municipal school-
authorities. As many youngsters are reluctant to stay in any type of pro¬
longed schooling, special youth centres are created, where vocational
training assistants, welfare officers and psychologists develop individual
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schemes to overcome their resistance for further training or to find a possi¬
bility for the young person to enter the labour market.
According to several studies, most of the young people involved in these
schemes would prefer some type of in-house- training, an apprenticeship
system combining work and continued vocational training, as this would
satisfy both, the need for a regular income provided by one's own work and
the need for more and closer contacts with the adult world. Such a solution
for youth tired of schools is also favoured by most organizations on the
labour market, but the total number is marginal compared to the other
types of intervention described above. The relatively high wage-level
(about SEK 5000/monthly in 1986), the regulation of the Employment Secu¬
rity Act to accept these apprentices as permanent staff in the company and
the absence of a dual system of vocational training and work might be seen
as obstacles for the introduction of apprenticeship in Sweden.
Instead, youth employment limited in time, with its lower remuneration in
1985 comprised about 7% of youth aged 16-17 and is welcomed by many
employers who get a high subsidy if they employ youth temporarily in¬
stead of hiring permanent staff. (SCB 1987:2)
Table 4.2 about here
With the dramatic rise in youth unemployment for those aged 18 and 19 to
moré than 11% during 1983, it became obvious that the measures con¬
tained in the Youth Bill of 1980 could not successfully bridge an only tem¬
porary employment gap. They just postponed overt youth employment for
two years. The political response was the introduction of a law, effective as
of January 1984, which guarantees all young people aged 18 and 19 at least
4 hours daily employment at regular, union agreed wage-rates. Work in the
"youth teams" is organized by each municipality and financed by a state-
subsidy covering not only 100% of the wage costs, but also taking care of
parts of the administrative over-head expenses incurred by the local au¬
thorities. The work of the youth teams should not compete with regular
employment in public services and the young people participating have to
leave the teams if they are offered regular employment or reach the age-
ceiling of 20 years. (AMS-Information. 1985)
At the same time other measures, especially relief-work providing for full-
time jobs with normal wages were discontinued and the young people aged
18 and 19 were first referred to the youth teams. Statistics show that the
programme has effectively cut overt unemployment and offers at least
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meaningful work and training to otherwise idle youth on a rather low level
of income for the individual (about SEK 2500/monthly). but also at a re¬
duced expenditure level for the Swedish government. Since 1984. even jobs
in the private sector can be defined as youth team jobs, but the scheme
remained predominantly linked to the public sector, where budgetary cuts
prevented a permanent employment for young people.
To stimulate the creation of new jobs in the private sector by recruitment
subsidies and 'insertion-jobs', new schemes were developed in 1984 and
1986. but faced a number of difficulties as unions protested against the
competition with normal jobs and the wage-lowering effects of the youth
schemes as experienced in Great Britain. (Cóffield, 1986) The other provi¬
sions for this age-group are of less importance, but a subsidy paid to "new
entrepreneurs" for starting their enterprises might be mentioned here.
Table 4.3. about here
In 1984. the unemployment rate of those aged 20-24 was more than 3
times higher than the rate for those 25-64, but from 20 years of age on¬
wards, no special programmes are offered for young unemployed persons.
Instead, the general instruments of the Labour Administration are applied.
That means that relief-work or retraining measures are connected with a
remuneration enabling the participants of that age group to Uve on an av¬
erage Swedish income level (SEK 5000-8000/monthly). According to labour
market statistics, about 2% of the age-group 20-24 were engaged in relief-
work, about 2.5% in labour market training, whereas about 5% were overtly
unemployed. (AMS statistics, 1985)
The general schemes described above are complemented by some other 15
measures designed to meet the needs of certain disadvantaged groups of
young people as e.g. the handicapped, migrants or youth with deviant be¬
haviour or drug problems. In addition, there are local job opportunity
schemes and benefits to match the conditions of local or regional labour
markets, often combined with the financial or personnel support of local
governments or the cooperative movement (for details see Hartmann,
1985).
Hartmann, Sweden -13
5, T The Outcome of Youth Employment Measures
From a merely statistical point of view, the result of the Swedish measures
to cwb youth unemployment and to keep young peopte in an acceptable
social environment has been very successful. According to OECD-reports
Sweden, along with" Norway and Switzerland, was one of the few OECD-
countries (not considering Luxembourg and Island), where unemployment
in general was below 2.5% and where youth accounted for only 8% of the
unemployed, as compared with youth unemployment amounting to 69% of
total unemployment in Belgium, 48% in France. 32% in the FRG and 41% in
the UK. (DN 87-10-01)
Yet. official statistics can only give a distorted view of reality as methods of
defining and counting unemployment differ between the countries and.
even more aggravating for an interpretation, the societal background and
basis of evaluation of certain statistical data are not available. Therefore, I
will try to evaluate the outcome of the Swedish employment measures di¬
rected towards young people by reflecting the Swedish debate on the ef¬
fects of youth policies.
5.1. Continued education: Warehouse or qualification for the future labour
maikeiZ
The rise of enrolments in secondary education from 75% in 1975 to 97% in
1984 was predominantly motivated by the need of a more skilled labour
force meeting the needs of the technological revolution in the future econ¬
omy. But in reality, prolonged secondary training - especially in the shorter
two-year programmes with vocational training - has become an alternative
to overt unemployment. While it is impossible to quantify the size of "pull-
effects" in detail, the attractiveness of secondary training becomes ques¬
tionable when compared to "push-effects", i.e. the lack of acceptable alter¬
natives. The statement of 44% of youth in secondary training that they
would leave school immediately, if they could obtain gainful employment,
is an indicator for the warehouse or parking-space effect of secondary
training in Sweden.
According to Adler-Karlsson (1983) it is an irony that just in a situation
where distinct job careers are difficult to find and the future of employ¬
ment opportunities is difficult to forecast even for specialists, young people
are predominantly forced into specialized training. Instead of using the
time of prolonged schooling for developing personal skills and to prepare
young people to find a personal coping strategy for the problems of change
and insecurity in society, they are forced into a rigid training programme
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often leading to dead-ends regarding the skills required in future working
life. In times of rapidly changing production techniques in economy, the
concept of secondary vocational training based on the vocational structures
of the past has become obsolete. Instead of allegedly receiving the voca¬
tional skills for a life-time job during 2-3 years of training, young people
should receive an education enabling them to accept continuous learning in
the future and to adjust to a non-linear process of training, work, and
leisure time in the future. (ERS. 1986; Hartmann, 1984)
Prolonged secondary schooling comprising all young people up to 18 im¬
plies also a tendency to adjust to the rules of the educational system, to
peer-group relations and to the development of specialized youth cultures
which might be opposed to the norms of working-life and therefore hinder
a smooth transition from school to work.
Even if jobs are available, there is a tendency among young people in Swe¬
den to reject jobs in industry as they do not correspond to their acquired
attitudes and aspirations. In 1987. the Swedish industrial employers asso¬
ciation was forced to start a campaign in order to convince youth to take on
jobs in industry though there are still young unemployed. (DN 87 09 30)
One of the causes for this increased distance between the aspiration of
youth and the reality of working-life is attributed to the Swedish system of
full-time vocational training in schools. Increased study-visits and new
forms of dual responsibility of schools and employers for the vocational
training are under discussions, as industries which have kept up their own
vocational training schools do not have any problems in recruiting youth.
5.2, Youth Employment Schemes! A Risk for a Special Career
The main goal of the multitude of governmental interventions on the youth
labour market was to avoid overt unemployment with idleness and high
risk of deserialization and stigmatization of the young people concerned. It
was also in line with the goal of creating jobs instead of merely securing in¬
come. Evaluation studies undertaken by the National Board of Education
show that of those born in 1967 and enrolled in the follow-up activities of
local school boards, 43% were continuing education or vocational training,
2% were overtly unemployed. 9% were engaged in other activities, whereas
28% had been successful in obtaining gainful employment. (SCB 1987:2. 39)
However, the evaluation also shows that the percentage of young people
who are able to move from youth team work to permanent employment is
rather small and the measures are more efficient in motivating reluctant
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youth to continue to other forms of education. The tendency to 'lock-up'
young people in the public system of an artificially created youth labour
market is very pronounced. In order to avoid overt unemployment and a
long duration of relief-work, young people tend to shift between different
types of programmes and shorter temporal jobs offered by the Labour Ad¬
ministration, without being able to obtain a permanent job on the open
labour market. They are caught in what might be called the unemployment
career.
Graph 5.1. about here
While the governmental system of differentiated programmes directed to
certain age-groups leads to a steady increase in wages received for the
participation in schemes, the young people, after 10 years in the system,
might still be at the same point: unemployed. (SCB-välfärdsbuiletin. 1985)
The creation of a marginalized youth group outside the ordinary work
force, perhaps even stigmatized and excluded from employment on the
open market because of their participation in the public schemes, has been
a special feature in the discussion of the effects of youth teams. Contrary to
the younger age groups, it cannot be claimed that these 18 and 19 year-
olds lack vocational training, are not fulfilling the requirements of indus¬
trial safety regulations and therefore are disadvantaged in the competition
for work. But their failure to obtain gainful employment after secondary
education in the field of their trade and placement in a youth team in the
public sector gives them even fewer chances in the job competition with
those employed on the open labour market.
While the average unemployment rate among the 20-24 year olds was 6.4%
in 1985, those who had left youth teams the year before experienced overt
unemployment amounting to 12% and in addition another 8% were engaged
in new types of schemes. Although overt unemployment of youth has to be
regarded as the worse alternative, the lock-up effect of the schemes is the
natural outcome of the comprehensive system. (Fasth, 1985)
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As stated in a report of the Statistical Bureau of Sweden the transition from
education and vocational training to the ordinary labour market is delayed
by:
- placement in a youth team as the first measure taken by
employment services,
- predominant creation of youth teams in the public sector which,
as a result of budgetary restrictions, cannot hire more young
people even if there is a demand for work,
- active search for a job decreases during placement in youth
teams,
- youth team work replaces jobs on the open market.
(SCB 1987:2.43)
The replacement of relief-work schemes and other former measures for
unemployed youth aged 18 and 19 by youth teams only securing half-time
employment was heavily criticized by many young people, as their ability
to make a living of their own on the pay from youth team work decreased
considerably.
Interestingly enough, the income from jobs in fast-food services in the USA,
a source of job -creation mentioned in most USA - Europe comparisons, has
the same effects for the young people employed as the earnings from half-
time youth team work in Sweden: youth cannot make an independent liv¬
ing on these earnings.
Compared with the average population, the income development in the age-
group 16-19 was 35% lower in Sweden in the period 1980-1984. Young
people increasingly depend on the support of parents and relatives and
cannot afford to establish their own household as they used to do during
the 1970s. In addition, the young people are well aware that a placement in
a youth team job does not mean real employment. As negotiated with the
labour unions, youth team jobs should not interfere with the normal labour
market and the hiring of ordinary staff in public services or private indus¬
try. In reality, youth team work does replace jobs, but due to the limita¬
tions of budget there is no chance to hire more staff in most public services
anyhow.
Psychologically, the awareness of the intermediate role of the youth team
work becomes an obstacle, especially for young people who do their job
well and are highly integrated in the informal relationship with the regular
staff. Irrespective of their own performance and the reactions among their
work-mates, they have to leave their positions when there is a vacancy
somewhere else or if they reach the age-ceiling of 20. (Hofren et al.. 1986)
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Remaining in different employment schemes over longer periods also facil¬
itates the creation of alternative life-styles among certain groups of young
people. They have learned to combine the limited income from schemes
with earnings on the black labour market or with the exchange of goods
and services in the private economy, especially in remote areas of Sweden
where hunting and fishing still play an important role for the life-styles of
the male population. As a side effect, these areas show a high surplus of
unmarried males whereas women from the same age-cohorts have moved
to the cities with better employment chances in care and personal services.
The experience of survival on a relatively high level of welfare even with¬
out permanent employment within these groups and the freedom to plan
their daily activities without the restrictions of an 8 -hour working day may
erode the protestant work ethics still dominating in the Swedish society
and lead to a new mix of temporary work, engagement in voluntary organi¬
zations and in peer-relations, welfare benefits and leisure which, in the
end, might result in difficulties to convince young people to work. Espe¬
cially if the work is not in line with the social expectations and aspirations
of young people, companies experience difficulties in hiring young people.
The provisions of a welfare society have opened an alternative for some,
though only a small minority within the youth group, who might come to
the conclusion expressed by one of the respondents in a local survey:
"I cannot afford to take on gainful employment. I will run my
own life. Youth team wage plus some side-earnings give me more
flexibility and income than a full-time job."
(Andersson & Hartmann, 1986)
In times of decreasing availability of paid labour, it would be wrong to stop
these new. innovative forms of combining welfare provisions on a low eco¬
nomic level with work in the informal economy or the private exchange of
services. The goal of full-time employment in the traditional sense of an 8-
hour working-day during 46 weeks per year and for almost 50 years of
one's life cannot be reached in a society where everybody is expected to
participate in the work-force. Alternative styles of work-organization, new
combinations of private and paid work, combined with engagement in vol¬
untary associations can be facilitated by the provisions of governmental
employment schemes. The outcome will not only be an improvement for
the individual well-being, but also create a climate for innovation both, in
economy and in public services. The experience of local employment initia¬
tives and alternative work schemes in Sweden and in a number of Euro¬
pean countries does not solve the immediate problem of mass youth unem¬
ployment. Nevertheless, it can be seen as the nucleus of future develop-
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ments and areas for experimentation with new forms of entrepreneurial
thinking. (Hartmann. 1985; ERS. 1986) On the other hand, the plethora of
employment measures also gives rise to a huge bureaucratic apparatus of
administration with its own set of rules and objectives which might be
rather distant to both the aspiration of individuals and the needs of society.
In a local study it was noticed that different employment measures within
a municipality had led to the growth of competing organizations looking for
unemployed youth and placing them in various types of employment
schemes. If the same number of young people had been employed as ordi¬
nary staff in preschools and other municipal services, the public would
have saved about 10% of the costs due to the reduction of administrative
personnel within the schemes. (Hagberg et al., 1986) However, a transfer of
resources to local authorities would also mean a transfer of power and
steering-ability from central government to a variety of local decision¬
makers who rather follow their local preferences than keep in line with the
economic planning interest on the national level. Permanent public em¬
ployment would also include a higher risk of overemphasizing the role of
public services and of preventing the available work-force to change over
to growing sectors in private economy.
In general, the policy measures to avoid youth unemployment in Sweden
have led to very low overt youth unemployment, a rise in secondary edu¬
cation and vocational training in schools, a further decrease in youth par¬
ticipation on the open labour market and a shift of problems from the
teenage-groups to the twens in the age-brackets 20-24.
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& general Implications of Swedish Youth Employment Policies
Looking at the outcome of Swedish macro-economic planning and the inter¬
ventions of an active labour market policy which tries to avoid overt un¬
employment by the massive creation of public employment schemes and
relief-work, one has to acknowledge that the result has not verified the
prophecies of the critics.
While Sweden has avoided mass unemployment, especially among youth,
and the creation of the "new poor" with the negative consequences of indi¬
vidual marginalization and social disturbance, economic growth has been
well in line with other European countries. During 1982 - 1987. inflation
has been cut by 50%, the balance of payments has improved from -5,8 bil¬
lion SEK to +27,0 billion SEK. the budget deficit has been reduced by 70%
and the stock market is flourishing with a value increase of 350%. (Dagens
Industri 87-10-03) Thus, low unemployment does not automatically lead to
high inflation, as stagflation might occur even in countries with rather high
unemployment. Economic growth cannot only be achieved by rationaliza¬
tion at the expense of the work-force, but might be strongly influenced by
the agreement of employers, unions and politicians on the steps needed to
increase production. The transfer of people from industries of low economic
performance to areas of economic growth is eased by the existence of pub¬
lic employment schemes and the active intervention of government in the
creation of future employment opportunities.
Though Sweden has succeeded in avoiding the most negative effects for the
individual in cases of structural changes in economy, the transfer of the
work-force from traditional parts of economy, e.g. the manufacturing in¬
dustry, to public services where there is a demand for labour, is hindered
by the existing structures of unions and employers, taxation, the unem¬
ployment insurance system and regional imbalances. The acceptance to pay
people who are not working unemployment benefits instead of using the
potential work-capacity of the unemployed for the demands of labour can
only be accomplished to a minor degree by the employment schemes.
The schemes rather allocate the work-force in line with administrative
preferences within the Labour Market Administration than to allow public
agencies to directly hire staff with the help of the financial means allocated
by the Labour Market Administration. While the administrative system of
the Labour Market Board facilitates the central steering and planning of the
national economy, it, at the same time, favours a national perspective on
the employment situation as reflected in nationwide statistics on employ¬
ment.
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National statistics on employment often disguise more than they disclose
the actual employment situation of a country. Regional imbalances, with
lack of labour in rural areas and a surplus in densely populated parts of
Sweden and a high demand for youth in industry and private services in
the big cities are immense problems at present.
Sweden, with its large area and small population is currently facing a drain
of youth to the big city areas which boom in economic growth. Housing, not
jobs, is problem number one for young people in Stockholm, while youth in
the north of the country have no problems regarding their housing, but fail
to get gainful employment.
Campaigns by industry to attract more young workers, the prognosed
growth of the building industry and private services will worsen these re¬
gional imbalances. Only new types of macro-economic measures, steering
resources to remote areas can prevent a population crisis in large parts of
Sweden.
Regional imbalance is only one indicator which points at a future dualistic
development in youth employment. A rise in the qualification requirements
by employers, the tendency to overestimate technical skills in relation to
humanistic knowledge, wage-differences between workers in public em¬
ployment and in high-tech industry lead to dualism on the labour market.
The use of micro-electronics- and robots in manufacturing opens the way to
a future where fewer and more specialized workers can produce more and
more commodities.
While this, in the traditional sense, productive part of the economy will
employ a minority of the work-force, the majority will find a job in ser¬
vices, generally regarded as unproductive, resource-consuming parts of
economy. The highly trained and productive work-force might not accept to
leave a large share of their surplus to a demanding majority of low-pro¬
ductive workers in services and will demand a larger share both, in eco¬
nomic and political influence. A new labour aristocracy might evolve. In or¬
der to avoid a divided labour market, or perhaps even a divided society,
there has to be a structural change of the education and vocational training
system which does not trap people in certain trades, but will allow for the
application and acceptance of constant re-training during a persons whole
life-span. Furthermore, we have to rethink the whole value-system and
ideological basis of work in modern society. The question, which type of
economic performance is productive and which is resource-consuming has
to be reflected against the background of ecological requirements, basic
human reproduction needs and long-term effects of production- modes on
the social structure of society.
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Thus, macro-economic planning cannot stop at the goal of full-employment,
but has to ask about the societal need of the work demanded, the outcome
of the production-process both, in physical and social terms, and the possi¬
bility of alternative ways of organizing the work-force of each society. The
results of the Swedish macro-economic planning process show very clearly
that the economic envelopment is not the outcome of an Invisible hand',
but the result of a concerted effort of all groups in society to combine their
skills and knowledge in order to avoid economic and social decline and to
promote individual and social welfare.
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STATISTICALrAUNHl·
SOURCE: SCB-Statistics of Sweden. Yearbooks 1984-87
Social Indicators concerning the age groups 16-19 and 20-24 in Sweden
mi
Activity rate (total working population as % of total population)
age: 16-19 46.4%
20-24 82.4%
The unemployed as percentage of the total population
age: 16-19 4.9%
20-24 5,6%
Unemployment rates (the unemployed as % of the working population)
age: 16-19 10.4%
20-24 6.8%
Ratio between rates of specific age groups and total unemployment rates
age: 16-19 3.0
20-24 1,9
Students as percentage of total population
age: 14-19 76.5%
20-24 23.2%
Heads of household as percentage of total population:
age: 20-24 80.0%
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Selected indicators concerning population, activity rates and employment in
Sweden
Specific age groups as % of total population - 1 98 1
under 15 years 19,1%
15-24 years '13,8%
Activity rates (total working population as % of total pop.) - 1984
total 16-74 years 52.6%, thereof part-time: 3.6%
females 16-74 years 47,2%. thereof part-time: 45.4%
Proportion of sectors of economic activity in total employment
agriculture 5,1%
industry 29.8%
services 65,1%
Employers, self-employed and family workers (as % of total employment) -
1984
7,7%
Employment in community services (as % of total employment) -1984
44.7%
Inhabitants/employed in community services - 1984
5.2
Teachers as % of employed in community services - 1983
9.0%
Pupils per teacher (comprehensive and secondary education) - 1983
9.1
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Austrian Economic Policy 1970 - 1985
During the recovery of the world economy in the seventies
Austria enjoyed a favourable position. The average rate of
economic growth of 5.9% in the years between 1970 and 1974 was
1.7 percentage points higher than the the average rate of the
European OECD countries. The rate of inflation could be kept
under the European average. The rates of unemployment during
the sixties and the early seventies was the lowest of the
postwar period.
The rapid economic growth in Austria was not, however, as in
other countries, accompanied by a "growth-euphoria". The
scepticism towards the idea that economic growth could be
sustained indefinitely is explained by the strong historical
consciousness of the social -democratic government. Therefore
economic and employment policies reacted early when faced with
the economic stagnation of 1974/75. This rather special
approach may be called the "Austrian way" .
Because of these arrangements, but also because of better
objective starting points, the effects on the labour market
were small, although the world stagnation in the mid-seventies
did not pass Austria without leaving its marks.
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At this time the service sector had unsatisfied employment
capacities. Therefore most of the job losses in the other
economic sectors could be compensated for. In the public
sector, new jobs were created as well. The lowering of income
taxes as well as the reduction of the workweek to 40 hours were
also part of the improvement of the situation in the labour
i
market (Novotny, p.39).
But the most important reason for Austria's successful economic
performance was its expansive use of financial policy. Although
it was already apparent that the growth forecasts for the mid-
seventies were too high, the spending programs which had been
planned on basis of these forecasts were fully carried out. The
growing deficit was financed by foreign credits.
The direct employment effect resulting from the increase of
deficit spending is estimated at 0.5% to 1.5% of the total
number of employees (Butschek, p. 32).
But because of the length and intensity of the worldwide
economic crisis this employment-orientated financial policy
could not be sustained much longer. The increasing indebtedness
became a serious problem. Since 1983 the consolidation aspect
has received priority so that the net deficit may be decreased.
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Another feature of the "Austrian way" was the use of incomes
policy in order to prevent large price increases. The financial
authorities tried to stabilize prices by a strict linking of
the shilling to the German mark. But the Austrian government
also had to face the negative effects of the price
stabilisation policy. The optimistic growth forecast had led to
high wage increases by the middle of the seventies. Because of
this and the higher rate of inflation compared to the Federal
Republic of Germany, exports decreased and imports increased.
The consequence was a rapid deterioration of the balance of
trades. The deficit rose from 5.6 Mrd. Schilling in the year
1975 to 26 Mrd. Schilling in 1976 and 49 Mrd. Schilling in
1977 (Scharpf 1982, p. 476).
Because of the hard currency position it was impossible to
transfer the increased labour costs fully to prices. At this
time it became apparent that this development had to be
changed. A new course of action was adopted which relied on
moderate wage increases and not on fiscal contraction.
While average wages increased between 4.5% and 8.5% per year in
the first half of the seventies, the wage increases strongly
fell off after 1976. Therefore the increase of the average
labour costs in manufacturing (which amounted to 15% in 1975)
just came to 0.5% in 1976, considerably below the rate of
inflation. The development of wage movements had now become
rather an inflation-dampening factor without raising
unemployment .
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2. The "Austrian Way": The System of Social Partnership
The fact that Austria, in comparison to most of the OECD
countries, was able to absorb the economic shocks of the
seventies relatively well has caused many observers to speak of
an "Austrian way". The core of this "Austrò-Keynesianism" is
the Social Partnership's incomes poricy. Although in most of
the European industrial states considerable economic recessions
occurred in the seventies, with mass unemployment, real -wage
losses and budget cuts Austria seems to have been spared. The
economic crisis led to massive political changes in the
countries concerned. This phenomenon may be called the end of
the social-democratic era. Here again Austria seems to be an
exception: in 1979 the Social Democrats won the election.
£ocial Partnership means the cooperation of employer
organisations, unions and the state. The efficacy of the Social
Partnership is seen less in a direct influence on the wage and
price formation as such but rather in the implicit imperative
to negotiate over these matters.
The Social Partnership came into being when the Joint
Commission for Wage and Price Questions was founded in 1957.
Since then practically all decisions on economic and social
policy are prepared in a large number of committees where the
"Social Partners" are represented.
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An important field of negotiations is the annual wage setting
process: Increases of minimum wages are bargained over
collectively by the unions and the business associations. These
wage increases are essentially uniform since they are based on
the average productivity growth of the economy and not on the
growth rate of certain sectors or industries. Also, a common
forecast of the expected inflation rate is taken into account
in the negotiations (Wagner 1985, p. 192).
This wage policy is designed to prevent mass consumption power
from differing too much from GDP. A side effect of this policy
is the stability of the personal "income distribution of the
employed. Business profits and the incomes of the self-employed
vary greatly depending on the industry concerned, because firms
with productivity data below average are forced to achieve an
increase in productivity growth.
In periods of economic prosperity, mostly the trade unions have
gained from the system of Social Partnership. Certain variables
which are normally determined by market forces here depend on a
bargaining process which means a redistribution of power. Even
strategic decisions which are elsewhere the sole right of
capital owners have to be co-determined by workers in Austria.
Therefore the initiative to keep the system of Social
Partnership alive has mostly come from the unions (Marin,
p. 45).
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Since the beginning of the eighties, which are characterized by
stagnation and growing unemployment rates, the system of Social
Partnership has been challenged (Gerlich/Grande/ Müller). One
reason for this development is the crisis of the nationalized
industries. These firms are highly concentrated either in
sectors struck by the economic recession or in politically
controversial sectors such as electricity, chemicals, and
housing construction. Recently a large number of workers has
had to be dismissed from the nationalized firms, which has led
to a deterioration of the public sector's image.
- 7 -
The Role of the Government
In this system of Social Partnership, the government has a com¬
pensatory function: As long as the bargaining partners are
perpared ex ante to conduct both wage and employment level
negotiations with the intention of maintaining full employment,
the state is prepared ex post to make up the costs for any
imbalance in these levels.
This willingness to compensate, which is seen as a sort of
"immanence" by business and the unions, is intended to promote
business confidence.
Specific compensatory measures include the awarding of public
contracts, subsidies of investment credits and direct support
of jobs.
3. The Austrian Labour Market Agency
Labour market policy in Austria is determined strictly on a
federal level and is pursued directly by an administrative
authority, the Labour Market Agency (Arbeitsmarktverwaltung),
under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The
Labour Market Agency has three levels of organisation: the
Ministry, a regional employment office in each of the federal
states, and the local employment offices. The ministry is
responsible for the formulation and planning of labour market
policy which is then carried out by the provincial and local
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offices.
The offices of the Labour Market Agency are assisted by
specific advisory bodies to ensure that the offices' activities
reflect the interests of the Social Partnership. This informal
consensual orientation has strongly influenced all of Austrian
postwar labour market policies, such that, on an international
comparison, there has been relatively little state regulation
of the labour market. The decision-makers work the agreement
that compromise on one level saves intervention on another.
The Council for Labour Market Policy
The Council of Labour Market Policy is the Ministry of Social
Affair's advisory comittee within the Social Partnership. This
council thus includes six members from each of the employer
organisations (Chamber of Commerce, Association of Industria¬
lists, Chamber of Agriculture) and employee organisations
(Chamber of Labour, Trade Unions, Chamber of Agricultural
Labour). It further consists of one representative each of the
Chancellory, the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, Agriculture
and Forestry, Construction and Technology, Internal Affairs,
Education and Art, and Transportation and of representatives
from the fields of economic and social sciences. This
constellation is expected to represent the interests of the
economy as a whole, which the state's labour market policy is
equally required to support.
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The council is chaired by the Minister for Social Affairs, a
quorum is constituted whenever more than half of the members
are present, and the resolutions are passed by simple majority.
Although these resolutions are merely recommendations and thus
not legally binding, Ministers have until now always taken
their decisions in accordance with the resolutions. Analogous
to this council, the other two levels of organisation of the
labour market agency also have their advisory committees which
decide in regional and local questions. The prime function of
these committees is to gather information and to encourage
contact and cooperation between businesses, employee represen¬
tatives and local interest groups within each region.
There are several points which make the framework of the Labour
Market Agency quite different form that of other countries.
Especially the method of raising financial resources for active
labour market policy should be mentioned. Virtually all of its
means are drawn from the Unemployment Insurance Fund, which is
financed through a percentage charge on wages and salaries.
This levy, borne by employers and employees at equal shares, is
fixed by the Minister of Social Affairs. In doing so, he
cannot, however, exercise unrestriced discretion. He has to set
the charge such that the estimates for incomes balance those
for expenditures of the Unemployment Insurance Fund. The
persistent slack of the economy since 1979 forced the Minister
of Social Affairs to raise the charge from 2 per cent (1980) to
4 per cent (1983). However, most of this increase had to be
spent on unemployment benefits rather than on active labour
market policy ( Piche lmann/Wagner 1984, p. 215).
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To realize its intentions the Labour Market Agency runs
programmes which can be divided into four main types: training,
employment creation (wage subsidies als well as low interest
credit facilities), apprenticeship and youth training programs,
and assistance to the handicapped.
The most centralized type is employment creation. In this area,
it is the Minister and his special advisory board who direct
the allocation of funds. The frequency and intensity of the use
of labour market policy instruments vary according to the
political situation. Policy measures can be amended and brought
up to date when they are no longer appropriate to the problems
at hand.
On the basis of such amendments, the Labour Market Agency then
tries to plan the optimal use of instruments by integrating
long- and short-term elements in its programme.
Each year a new list of policy measures is worked out to take
into account both current problems and the implementation of
long-term goals. The programme is examined and endorsed by the
Advisory Council.
These policy measure programmes are viewed as declarations of
intent and provide an orientation for the allocation of budget
funds for individual instruments of labour market policy. For
the authorities subordinate to the Labour Market Agency, they
serve as an interpretation of current problem-saving
strategies.
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In the course of economic slowdown after 1975, more and more
priority was given to the creation of employment opportunités,
and the corresponding policy measure programmes were in¬
creasingly concerned with the problem groups of the labour
market. Thus the Labour Market Support Law (Arbeitsmarktförder-
ungsgesetz) passed in 1969 was amended eleven times by 1985 to
provide for the creation of employment and the expansion of
training opportunities. The ninth amendment of the Labour
Market Support Law also provides for "self-help" facilities by
which, for example, a bankrupt company is permitted to continue
its operations under the management of its own employees, who
would otherwise be faced with unemployment.
Further important impulses resulted from the OECD programme
Initiated by France in which job creation on a local level was
implemented as a new area of labour market policy.
4. Social Partners and Experimental Programmes
The orientation of Austria's labour market policy toward
consensus among the social partners creates a difficult
environment for innovative an experimental approaches. The
positions of the business associations are marked by con¬
siderable reservations.
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Social-political motivation for employment creation measures is
generally rejected, for the business associations feel that
only profit-oriented businesses, rather than public services,
can generate the Investment required to create secure and
productive jobs. Apart from the view that too much in public
funds is contributed to state-owned companies and public
services at the expense of the private sector, it is also
postulated that an expanding non-profit sector is incompatible
with a market economy, and that the Minister of Social Affairs
pursues not only a pro-employment policy but also an anti-
market policy. It is further felt that the support of "self-
help" facilities has created a broad ideological field for
testing the viabilitiy of anti-market economy models on the
expense of society as a whole .
The position of the unions toward unconventional employment
programmes is also rather reserved. They point out the danger
of sel f -exploitât ion (for example, in the form of unpaid
overtime) which is often accepted by employee-managed companies
during an expansion phase in order to maintain their own jobs
and to be able to compete with privately capitalised companies.
Employee representatives fear that a disregard for the
collective bargaining agreements could develop into an
instrument for weakening the labour regulations in the private
sector, and they see the current debate over "self-help"
facilities, in which conservative voices are clearly heard, as
a confirmation of their fears.
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However, the labour market policy function of "self-help" and
the maintenance of jobs that would otherwise be lost prevent
these reservations form developing into outright rejection.
Unconventional employment programmes have already met with con¬
siderable success in speciffic problem areas of labour market
policy and their relevance for the youth labour market is also
implied in the statement that youth unemployment is caused by
management's reluctance to hire young people. As this attitude
on the part of management is not expected to change, a shift in
the existing concentration of job creation programmes from the
private sector towards experimental projects would also be in
the interests of the unions.
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5. Youth Unemployment
The youth unemployment rate was nearly equal to the rate of
total unemployment until 1981 when the employment situation
worsened rapidly. Since 1981 young people have been subject to
above-average unemployment. While the unemployment rate of the
whole economy was 3.7% in 1982, the rate of youth unemployment
climbed up 4.1% and by 1983 was already up to 5.7%. (Biffi,
p. 10)
The proportion of the unemployed below age 25 in the stock of
the unemployment register increased from 24.3% in 1980 to 28.8%
in 1982, despite the fact that youth unemployment was not as
explosive in Austria as in the other Western industrial
economies .
A good indicator for the risk of losing a job is the ratio of
the number of people becoming unemployed to the total number of
employed and unemployed in a year. The figures indicate that
young workers run an overproportional risk. It is interesting
to note that it is especially the people between 20 and 24
years old for whom the probability of losing their job is
highest. Since 1983 the 15- to 19-years-old people have also
belonged to the high-risk group (see table 1).
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Table 1
Ratio of the number of people becoming unemployed
to the total number of employed and unemployed in a year
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
all people 9 % 11 % 14 % 15 % 15 % 15 %
15 to 19 years old 8 % 7 % 13 % 17 % 19 % 21 %
20 to 24 years old 12 % 15 % 20 % 22 % 22 % 23 %
Young people are also in Austria more subject to the reduction
of employees in the whole economy because, in a recession,
entrepreneurs try to reduce the labour force to the so-called
"core" of the personnel.
The function of the "border staff" is in practice that of a
potential for adjustments to changes in demand. Young people,
especially those Who are less qualified, often belong to that
group because they are not yet integrated into the operational
chains of mobility and promotion. The growing number of young
people afflicted by unemployment and the declining chances to
get a job again confirm the hypothesis that staff reduction
always affects those people most who have worked in a firm for
a relatively short time: Whoever comes last has to go first.
(Pichelmann/Wagner 1984b, p. 200).
The longer the crisis of the labour market lasts, the more the
core of the personnel is also affected by staff reduction.
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Enterprises change the labour force if they find more qualified
persons on the labour market. "For Austria this process can be
recognized by the fact that a growing number of the labour
force from the middle of the wage and salary pyramid is
affected by unemployment." (Pichelmann/Wagner, 1984b, p.l95f.)
Nevertheless young people are more affected by a restrictive
personnel policy on the part of employers. Operational training
training costs may be reduced as a result of raising the hiring
standards. Corresponding training will not be offered om the
job; rather it will be demanded that the employees bring along
with them the necessary qualifications and job experience.
These higher criteria and the required work experience are the
barriers which handicap the entree into professional life.
The number of apprenticeships diminished in the years 1980
until 1983 from 197,000 to 175,000. The proportion of
apprenticeships to the job market as a whole those sank from
7.1% to 6.6%.
Especially the situation for girls on the apprenticeship market
has rapidly become worse. Besides that it may be assumed that
many young people who are in search of jobs are not quoted in
the statistics. As they have no claims to unemployment
insurance payments there is no incentive to register as
searching for a job. Estimates for 1981 (Butschek 1982)
resulted in more than 7000 young people aged between 15 and 19
years out of work without being registered as unemployed by the
labour exchanges.
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6. Measures against Youth Unemployment
All subsidy measures for procuring jobs for young people aim
at securing them long-term unemployment.
The Austrian labour market policy mainly consists of three
kinds of intermediary subsidization in the field of private
enterprise. In any case the amount of the subsidy must not
exceed a maximum of seventy percent of wage costs.
Within the "company hiring subsidization plan" the potential
employer receives subsidies of the wage costs. This aims at
encouraging employers to create additional jobs for young
people or to hire young people for jobs becoming vacant even if
they are less qualified than other workers.
These hiring subsidies are very often connected with training
support. If a company is prepared to instruct unqualified youth
it may obtain a refund during the training from the Labour
Market Administration.
These subsidies may apply to the initial acquisition of
qualifications if the young person has no professional training
as well as to youth with professional training but no
experience. As a rule the hiring company is granted a training
subsidy after presenting a corresponding training schedule
which shows the reason for the measures, the necessary time,
the contents of the programme and the expenditures.
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In both cases a regular employment contract for the subsidized
person is required. This is not the case for subsidies of the
practical job training programme. In this case, though the
subsidized person enjoys the full programme of social
insurance, the employer does not provide an employment
contract. Rather youth axe offered the opportunity to
participate in practical on-the-job training precisely because
of the lack of a direct opportunity of procuring employment.
Moreover they are offered an individual subsidy to cover their
living expenses. The company does not incur any expenses during
this time. If it later takes on the subsidized person with a
regular employment contract, it enjoys the adventage of not
needing the initial training period for a new employee.
This kind of measure is mainly intended for youth with
completed professional training. Even if they do not always
result in an employment contract, they provide an extension of
training through practical knowledge and by that improve the
future prospects of employment.
These measures for procuring employment belong to the
traditional tools of active labour market policy. Moreover the
Labour Market Administration tries to achieve a problem-
oriented focus of the measures by special programmes. The
largest of these special programmes is shown as follows.
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7. Special Programme "Aktion 8000"
From 1981 to 1983 a development began to be recognized which
was defined as "segmentation of unemployment": opportunities of
unemployed to reenter employment have been increasingly
unequally distributed.
For certain groups of persons it takes longer and longer until
they find new jobs. Youth with no professional experience have
been harder and harder to find jobs for.
The Labour Market Administration was therefore forced to
develop employment prgrammes for both of these problem groups
of the labour market. Thus, at the end of 1983, the "Action
Programme to Create Additional Employment Opportunities for
Youth and Long-Time-Unemployed", better known as "Aktion 8000",
was launched. Since the beginning of 1985, due to difficulties
of execution, only jobs with public and non-profit institutions
may be subsidized.
The "Aktion 8000" is an employment programme which is ex¬
clusively concerned with the non-profit sector. Subsidies
within the "Aktion 8000" are granted for the employment of
rr youth (until the age of 25) which have been registered as
unemployed for at least three months or are able to prove
that they have been unemployed for at least three months;
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- unemployed over the age of 25 with a minimum registration
time of six months (long-term unemployed).
Youth may therefore also be subsidized if they are not
registered at the Labour Office. With respect to the jobs
offered and employment contracts certain conditions have to be
fulfilled. Subsidies will only be granted if the patricipating
employer takes all social welfare standards into account. This
is supposed to prevent an implementation of precarious, i.e.
legally not defined employment contracts with public funds.
In detail these regulations contain the following conditions:
- an employment contract lasting at least one year has to be
concluded with the subsidized employee. As a rule, within
this time period eight months will be subsidized, the
remaining third has to be financed by the participating
employer;
The wage is supposed to correspond with the locally common
level and must not be lower than the wage agreed upon in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement;
- Within four months before the engagement and during it, it
is not allowed to dismiss employees in the working field of
the subsidized person without the agreement of the Labour
Office concerned.
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Project oriented measures:
The Labour Market Administration differentiates between
individual jobs and project jobs. An individual job is given if
the subsidized worker is integrated into an existing team and
the field of activity of the participating employer essentially
remains the same.
Thus it is also possible to establish more individual jobs at
the same employer. It becomes more complicated with regard to
project jobs. Translated into the language of the Labour Market
Administration, the word "project" in connection with the
"Aktion 8000" is only used if it will be founded in order to
execute the subsidy programme. This means that project jobs are
limited in respect of the volume of activity, the level of
qualification needed and the time estimated. The jobs created
for the project are therefore defined as project jobs. Public
as well as non profit institutions may participate.
To ease the choice of the participants for the Labour Office
the ministerial programme planning has given various
suggestions for appropriate organisation forms. Specially
qualified employers for the execution of project jobs with
subsidies of the "Aktion 8000" are officially: communities,
associate communities, forest authorities, local environment
lobbies, citizens committees, women's centers, youth centers,
religious institutions, social welfare centers, and so on.
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Job projects which are created by these employers to execute
the programme "Aktion 8000" are required to fulfill certain
social-political criteria. Mainly within project oriented
measures, the "Aktion 8000" aims at a combination of social and
employment criteria. Project jobs are supposed to be created
mainly in socially, ecologically and culturally critical
sectors. Therefore the following fields of activities are said
to be especially worthy of being subsidized: environmental
protection, social services, municipal renovation, village
improvement, culture and art.
Conditions of Subsidies
Also within project-oriented measures the subsidy is connected
to the person. The conditions already mentioned apply as well.
They have been extendend to include three additional
conditions :
- a direct project substitution within the fields of
activities has to be impossible;
by analogy with subsidized individual jobs the subsidized
projects have to be additional ones, i.e. not to be realized
without subsidy.
the participation of other public or private authorities is
required. This third condition may be dropped in the case of
important projects.
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8. Evaluation of the Programme "Aktion 8000'
Within an international perspective, the programme "Aktion
8000" can hardly claim to be "experimental" in itself. Similar
schemes have been introduced in many European countries for
some time. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the Austrian
labour market administration, the "Aktion 8000" entails the
necessity to adjust in an innovative fashion, for several
features of this new programme do not go well with established
procedures of active labour market measures. Two aspects stand
out: First, the jobs are created in the non-profit sector;
secondly, the jobs are of a transitional nature (they might be
shed the moment financial support runs out).
Drawing on his experience, a seasoned administrator within the
Austrian labour market agency would argue that the "non-profit"
and "non-permanent" character of the jobs financed through the
"Aktion 8000" puts the success of the programme at high risk:
First, the programme has to be implemented on a local level,
which causes frictions within the federal agency traditionally
run in a highly centralized way. Given this tension between the
organizational routine and the specific implementation
prerequisites of the programme·, the "Aktion 8000" will never
really get off the ground, either because take up will be very
low or because the central bureaucratic machine will grind to a
halt if forced to deal with great local variations of programme
administration .
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Secondly, the non-profit organizations will behave in a
counterproductive way; either they will carry out work
traditionally done by a regular employed person through an
"Aktion 8000" job, thus undercutting union rates; or they will
give only menial work to those employed through the "Aktion
8000" (for the whole set-up is considered as merely
transitional) thus depressing rather than enhancing the general
capacity for work of the young and long term unemployed.
Thirdly, the organizational misfit of the implementation
prerequisites and the counterproductive behaviour of the job
creating units will render the programme ineffective; it will
cost a lot and achieve little. Thus it will be vulnerable to
criticism of the Minister of Finance that the social
administration wastes money rather than making best use of it
under conditions of tightening budget constraints.
It seems difficult to reject the three critical arguments
against experimental programmes encouraging (a special type of)
local employment initiatives out of hand. The capacity of the
Austrian society to inaugurate innovations in times of adverse
economic trends has not only been questioned by seasoned
administrators. Hence some empirical evidence is called for. It
will be provided in the next section.
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"It cannot get off the ground"
(Hypothesis 1)
The programme started during the first quarter of 1984. At
first it seemed to have little scope for proper development.
Take-up was poor and only few provisions for handling the
programme internally were made by the Labour Market
Administration. But already by 12 months later it seemed to
have caught on.
Chart 1
Programme development
Number of jobs created
Tun**.
Source: IWS Datafile AKTION 8000
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Those institutions already familiar with the type of jobs to be
created with the help of the "Aktion 8000" reacted fastest.
They pushed on with already existing plans to expand their jobs
which had been held back by financial considerations. Local
communities and established non-profit-organisations (like
church related welfare associations) created 80 per cent of all
jobs funded by the "Aktion 8000". They showed little concern
about the temporary nature of the job subsidy; they seem to be
used to getting something started provided that an initial
endowment is available. Long-term financial considerations do
not enter their decisions as a binding constraint. Moreover
they show sufficient self-confidence to face future financial
pressures .
Table 1
Number of persons employed
in the period 1984 - I9Ô6
Number of persons Per cent
employed of Total
Province (Länder) 334 7.5
Local communities 1713 38.3
( Gemeinden )
Private Associations 721 16.1
( Vereine )
Other non-profit 1705 38.1
organisations (Church etc.)
Total 4473 100.0
Source: IWS Datafile AKTION 8000
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'The behaviour of job creating institutions
is counterproductive" (Hypothesis 2)
The fact that a programme has caught on does not necessarily
prove it to be productive in achieving the aims set. In this
context, two doubts tend to be raised:
either that a conversion of proper jobs into "experimental"
ones takes place;
or that the incumbents of such experimental jobs get no
chance to exercise relevant work skill, let alone to acquire
new ones.
The "conversion" argument is not borne out by available data on
the behaviour of the job creating institutions funded by the
"Aktion 8000". Roughly one-third of all "experimental" jobs are
transformed into permanent ones, i.e., the Job creating
institution keeps the person on its payroll after the funding
of the labour market agency has come to an end. Only one- fifth
of all jobs are merely transitory.
Even stronger evidence against the "conversion" hypothesis is
the structure of wages paid for experimental jobs. Whereas in
the early stages of the "Aktion 8000" the pay scales were
substantially below standard rates, they seem to converge
towards the union level the longer the programme lasts. In this
sense, very little undercutting of going wage rates can take
place in jobs created through the "Aktion 8000". At least, it
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is fair to say that the readjustment of pay scales for
experimental jobs does not exhibit a downward bias stronger
than the one to be observed on regular Austrian regional labour
markets since the 1980s.
Table 2
Post programme
career patterns
absolute in percent
of total
Continuation of the job 753 30.8
with the previous employer
Job with a new employer 468 19.1
Retraining 25 1.0
Unemployed (eligible for 515 21.1
benefits)
Unemployed (not eligible 195 8.0
for benefits)
Other 488 20.0
Total 2444 100.0
Source: IWS Datafile AKTION 8000
The substantial share of persons who are kept on by their
employer beyond the public funding of the job indicates that
the job creating institutions do not take a purely short-term
opportunistic view of the services rendered by the employees.
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Table 3
Areas of work.
Area of work Numbers of per cent
empoyed persons of total
Environmental protection 464 10.4
Social welfare services 1544 34.5
Urban and village renewal 697 15.6
Cultural activities 209 4.7
Others 1547 34.6
Total 4461 100.0
Source: IWS Datafile AKTION 8000
An additional success is evident in the fact that about one-
half of the previously unemployed persons can hold on to
employment after they have gone through the programme.
This group obviously had a chance to enhance (or at least
stabilize) their general capacity to perform at a job. Some of
the incumbents certainly get an opportunity to acquire specific
skills through "learning by doing". About one-third of the jobs
are located in the area of social welfare services and about
one quarter in the field of urban renewal and environmental
protection. Only one in six of the unemployed had to accept a
job with lower skill requirements than was necessary at the
person's previous job.
11J
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Thus the "conversion" argument and the "exploitation"
hypothesis have to be rejected on empirical grounds. It seems
that the job creating institutions do not exhibit a behaviour
which in most cases could be labelled as counterproductive from
the point of view of the labour market agency.
"The experimental programme does not
meet the criteria of cost effectiveness"
(Hypothesis 3)
Such an argument carries much weight in periods of tight budget
constraints. But it is misdirected. If a specific experimental
programme does not prove to be cost effective, this does not
emply that experimentation is not worthwhile. Since learning
through experience will always include "failures", their
occurence does not prove the futility of the overall search for
new options.
Moreover, in the case of the "Aktion 8000", the experimental
programme turns out to meet very high standards of efficiency:
First, it is effective in the sense that, in comparison to
standard measures of active labour market policies, it scores
high in the dimensions of "targeting" and of "long-term
employment stabilization". Secondly the net financial burden to
the federal and local budgets is very low. In fact there is a
positive financial return to the public purse for about two-
thirds of the jobs and persons covered by the "Aktion 8000".
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(A) Together, the income generated through taxes and
(B) the outlays (for social security benefits) saved through
job creation (within the "Aktion 8000" context) add up
to a larger total than the direct costs of funding and
administering the programme.
This positive balance works out within the timespan of two
financial years, which is well within the planning horizon of
even a strongly risk- adverse decision maker.
The result of such a calculation hardly comes as a surprise to
anyone familiar with the high costs of unemployment in a
welfare state. Nevertheless it is worthwhile to state
explicitly that the "inefficiency" -hypothesis has to be
rejected on empirical grounds. Experimental job creation with
the help of local employment initiatives is highly cost
effective.
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